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INTRODUCTION 
The trend toward preservation of open-space has recently received 
renewed impetus. The historical origins of this movement, however, can 
be traced bs<;k for over three-quarters of a century. On March 3, 1891, 
the U.S. Congress authorized the President to set apart lands from public 
domain for use as forest reserves (85). The original movement had a 
component of a general natural resource conservation era. Fear of natural 
resource exhaustion was prevalent. The I960's marked a renewed concern 
over natural resources. The interest was no longer based on physical 
commodities but rather on environmental quality. The form of this concern 
may change, and its rate of growth fluctuate, but it seems likely that this 
concern will substantially increase in the foreseeable future (16, 77). 
The national anxiety over the quality of life has many facets. The 
general area of concern with which this paper will deal is concern over 
open-space, or the lack thereof. The social role and functions of open-
space have been elsewhere identified (9, p. 19; 55, p. 181; 25, p. 3). 
Open-space has taken many forms in the United States -- from national parks 
to natural areas within a housing project. Open-space is one possible 
proRram in quest of promoting aesthetics, structuring community development, 
or whatever goals are relevant to a people. Greenbelt, parks, and others 
are then projects within an open-space program. A park may be one of 
several projects in an open-space program which, when used in conjunction 
with other programs, tends to accomplish one or more of several societal 
goals. This paper is concerned with project level activities that deal 
with outdoor recreation facilities. 
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Various governmer al agencies have the responsibility of providing 
for future open-space needs in the form of outdoor recreation opportunities. 
The Iowa State University Department of Forestry has investigated the 
problems associated with expanding outdoor recreation opportunities. It 
has concluded that at least four kinds of decisions are particularly 
important (62, p. 5): 
1. Choice among various kinds of recreational facilities 
2. Choice among alternative locations for recreation facilities 
3. Choice among alternative levels of investment in new 
recreational areas and facilities 
4. Choice among various institutional arrangements and devices 
for providing and financing recreational areas and f«c-lJr.ies 
Research Project 1824, "Demand Patterns for Outdoor Recreation," wss 
initiated under the auspices of the Iowa State University Agriculture and 
Home Economics Experiment Station, One objective was "to examine and 
compare alternative institutional devices for expanding the availability 
of attractive outdoor recreational opportunities"; this relates to the 
fourth decision area above. This paper is the result of one study 
conducted in pursuit of that objective. 
The difficulties associated with expanding outdoor recreation 
opportunities are basically the difficulties associated with controlling 
land-use. To the extent that current land-use differs from desired 
land-use, adjustments can be made. The set of alternative institutional 
devices or arrangements used to direct land-use goes by the general heading 
of "land-use controls." These controls may range from zoning to market 
purchase of the land. The problem, then, is to identify and compare 
alternative ways of bringing current land-use more closely in line with 
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desired use. 
Control of land-use is both a public and a private activity. While 
most efforts in this area have been public, even that is too broad and 
diverse a topic to adequately discuss here. This study concerns only the 
activities of state and federal government agencies which control land-use 
for outdoor recreation purposes,^ Public authority to employ land-use 
controls results from a power specifically delegated to a government agency 
by law and may be withdrawn from one agency or additionally specified to 
another. Organizational authorizations and structures change too rapidly 
to justify more than this broad, conceptual definition of the decision­
maker. Directing land-use requires many types of decisions: funding, 
coordination of activities, personnel requirements, and others. We are 
concerned only with those decisions relating to acquisition of property 
rights in land. 
There are numerous alternatives available to an agency for controlling 
land-use. These correspond to the set of land-use controls authorized for 
agency use by law. A wide range of land-use controls are available; 
market purchase, zoning, condemnation of title, and easements are just a 
few. Any given agency, however, may be authorized to use only a few 
controls; these constitute the agency's alternatives. 
The hypothesized objective of the decision-maker is to choose among 
the several land-use controls for which it has use-authorization (the 
alternatives) in order to find that optimum combination (or mix) which will 
The major exception involves police power devices. Typically, these 
are restricted to either the county or municipal levels of government. 
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either accomplish a policy directive at a cost minimum or maximize 
accomplishment at a given cost subject to all imposed constraints. 
Selection of the optimum mix of land-use controls could result 
from some form of systematic decision-making. This would require legal, 
social, political, and economic information. Decision-makers currently 
have neither the technical information nor the framework (procedure) that 
can help to systematically analyze these decisions. This ought not be 
unexpected. The vast preponderance of information (literature) available 
on this topic deals only with the legal aspects of land-use controls. 
Literature on the social and political aspects is scarce, and economic 
information is typically limited to theoretical considerations of 
externalities (26, 70) or inadequate data on costs.^ 
Solution to the problem faced by the decision-maker requires several 
types of information. First, the agency should have a thorough knowledge 
of the legal, social, and political elements associated with each relevant 
land-use control. The second information need lies in the area of the 
monetary costs associated with each land-use control. These data are 
necessary to compare the degree of physical substitutability versus the 
cost of substituting different land-use controls. The third type of 
information need is that of a systematic decision-making framework which 
will allow an agency to select the optimum mix of land-use controls. 
The research reported here was designed to provide the information 
needed by the decision-makers. This was accomplished by three separately 
^These data are inadequate because they usually reflect prices paid 
to landowners; while legitimate, they represent only one cost component 
and are hence incomplete. 
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conducted but interrelated studies. The first study consisted of an 
evaluation of the literature of land-use controls as applied to open-space 
acquisition in general, and outdoor recreation projects in specific. The 
second study estimated the cost to an agency of selected land-use controls. 
The third study developed a decision-making framework and provided 
illustrative examples. 
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LAND-USE CONTROLS; A SURVEY 
Introduction 
One of the most important aspects in administering land-use controls 
is for the agency in question to have a thorough knowledge of the controls 
available (presently and potentially) for its use. This chapter presents 
a brief summary of the more important aspects of some land-use controls 
currently used in open-space programs. The objective is to provide 
decision-makers with an adequate overview of the historical perspective 
together with the social, political, and economic implications of the 
controls. 
Land-use controls refer to a set of devices within law to direct 
land-use on a parcel of land. Some controls involve the modification of 
or infringement on property rights; others are effective outside the realm 
of property rights. Tha most important class of land-use controls used in 
open-space programs involves property rights. The concept of property 
rights is often discussed with a standard analogy to a bundle of straws. 
"In a legal sense ... property does not consist of objects but rather of 
•man's rights with respect to material objects' "(7, p, 336). Each straw 
represents one of the various rights -- ability to manipulate, if you will — 
associated with a given object or unit of land. All of the straws, taken 
together, account for all rights to that material object. It is widely 
believed that "ownership" of a material object implies possession of all of 
the rights — i.e., ownership of all straws in the bundle. This is not 
true. Some of the straws in the box, the individual rights, are reserved 
for (and often by) the government. Full ownership rights to a material 
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object is really owning all non-reserved rights to that object. While 
land ownership may be defined as complete control of land and everything 
attached to it, under it, and over it, legal title to land does not convey 
the unrestricted exercise of all rights (20, p. 53). 
Property rights and public institutions are intimately related. 
First, governments and courts must help decide which individual has what 
rights and who has the power to claim that his rights are affected by 
others. Second, rights so assigned must be protected by the power of the 
state or the owners must be allowed to protect the rights themselves. 
Private property rights today have the following broad characteristics 
(32, p. 62; 41, p. 1): (1) individuals have control over the use to which 
scarce resources are put; (2) the right of control is salable or 
transferable; (3) prior consent is required of owners before their property 
can be affected by others; (4) man ought to be able to establish exclusive 
rights in desirable areas of land; (5) these rights are alienable, 
inheritable and divisable in all ways; and (6) the needs of society are 
paramount. Since the end of the 19th century, lawmakers have shifted 
their point of view from protecting individual property and controlling 
rights to increasing sensitivity for social and economic consequences of 
legal rules (10, p. 1143). This changed attitude has made possible many 
land-use control efforts in the area of open-space. 
Land-use controls may have either direct or indirect effect on land-
use (15, p. 272). Direct gcvsrnmsnt controls consist of items like zoning. 
Indirect controls include manipulation of interest rates, prices, and 
others. This paper will only consider direct controls classified under the 
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four powers of government; 
1. Police Power 
2. Taxation Power 
3. Spending and Proprietary Power 
4. Eminent Domain Power 
Table 1 shows some explanatory comparisons between these powers. 
Police Power 
Application of police power is relatively new in the area of rural 
land-use control. Its origin and main force of current application 
continue to be of urban orientation. The range of land-use controls under 
the police power is broad. Included are such diverse controls as building 
codes and agricultural production controls. Table 2 shows some explanatory 
comparisons for selected police power land-use controls; each will be 
separately discussed later. 
Police power is "a concept underwhich the legislature may 
constitutionally interfere with the use of private property, even to the 
point of taking it, but for which no compensation is required because the 
property is not being taken for public use" (41, p. 8). The basic 
rationale and limit to the use of police power lie in the due process and 
equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
(9, p. 23): 
No person shall 'be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law ... nor shall 
private property be taken for public use without 
just compensation' (78). 
The critical elements here are the words "property," "public use," and 
"just compensation." If the public confiscates any private rights for 
public use, it must pay for these rights. These ideas will be explored 
Table 1 
Summary of Government Powers 
Characteristic Police Power Taxation Proprietary & Spending Eminent Domain 
Definition 
Examples 
Acquisition 
Compensation 
Purpose 
Control 
Historical 
origins 
Power to regulate 
and preserve public 
order, tranquility, 
and promote health, 
safety, morals, and 
general welfare 
(29, p. 82) 
Zoning 
Involuntary 
None 
Public purpose 
Direct or indirect 
Most common early 
power used. Direct­
ed to abuses of the 
city. Economically 
justified. Traced 
to 1632 tobacco re­
strictions. Term 
invented by U.S. 
Supreme Court in 
1827 (33, 41, 7} 
Pecuniary charge im­
posed upon persons 
or property for 
public purposes 
Property taxes 
Involuntary 
None 
Public purpose 
Direct or indirect 
Used for thousands 
of years. Policy 
aspects of property 
taxes have influ­
enced land-use. 
Federal authoriza­
tion gained through 
U.S. Constitution; 
other governments 
have similar autho­
rizations (78) 
Power to manipulate 
lands to further 
some goal; spending 
provides funds to 
accomplish social 
objectives 
Government land 
management ; Funding 
police department 
Voluntary 
Fair market value 
Public use 
Direct 
Early proprietary 
was acquisition and 
disposal of land; 
early spending in­
volved defense and 
land classification. 
Legally authorized. 
Public funds now ex­
pended for any so­
cial purpose 
(6, 84) 
Legally established 
process by which 
agencies meet consti­
tutional requirement 
chat just compensa­
tion be paid for 
property taken for 
public use (41^ p. 8) 
Title condemnation 
Involuntary 
Fair market value 
Public use 
Direct 
Writings date to 
1625. "Created in 
the natural law move­
ment." Historically 
property was taken 
for public benefit. 
In 1954 public use 
was decided to not 
mean physical use or 
occupancy. Govern­
ment and private or­
ganizations use it 
(7, 82) 
Table 2 
Summary of Police Powers 
Characteris tic s Zoning Subdivision Control Official Map 
Definition Regulation by districts 
of development and uses 
of property. A typical 
ordinance divides area 
into districts, each of 
which has unifom regu­
lations for building 
uses and open-fspace 
(22, p. 380) 
Historical Originally used so one 
origins neighbor could not in­
jure another. 
"Injury" has changed. 
In the 17th century, gun 
powder mills were banned 
in certain arejis! (68, 
p. 383). Early zoning 
was concerned with public 
nuisances (22, p. 368; 
30, p. 6), Comprehensive 
city planning marked the 
second phase ol: zoning 
( p. 446; 68, p. 384) ; 
it was first court tested 
in 1915 (81) and reaf­
firmed in 1926 (82) 
"A device which can be 
used to regulate and or­
der the process of sub­
dividing and developing 
public land" 
(31, p. 26) 
First used in the plan­
ning and coordination 
associated with the rec­
tangular survey after 
the 18th century ( 22, 
p. 415). Present system 
dates from 1849 (Wise.) 
requiring public approval 
of subdivision ( 7, 
p. 507). Use in communi­
ty development after WWI. 
U.S. Dept. Commerce 
drafted standard enabling 
legislation in 1928. 
Shift from central city 
renewed interest after 
WWII 
A map on which a govern­
ment indicates the loca­
tion of current and 
planned roads, waterways, 
etc. The plans can be 
legally enforced 
One of the oldest land-
use controls. It has 
been previously success­
ful in keeping open and 
undeveloped strips of 
land for future streets 
or widening existing 
streets. May have in­
creased future use. It 
may enable a temporary 
freeze on undesirable 
land uses until agencies 
can acquire desired pro­
perty rights ( 9, p. 25) 
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more fully later. The power lies with the states. The U.S. Constitution 
carries no express federal authority. Minor exceptions exist -- the 
District of Columbia and certain federal territories have been authorized 
the free use of police power (6), Federal influence typically has been 
in conjunction with programs such as rent controls during war and market 
quotas and crop acreage allotments in the regulation of interstate 
commerce (41, p, 5; 6, p. 340), 
A striking evolution in police power lies in the area of re-evaluating 
the concept of public welfare. Police power is "the power of promoting 
the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and 
property" (43, p. iii). Heretofore, welfare has been very narrowly 
defined and interpreted. The courts now say that "general welfare" has a 
meaning of its own, quite apart from the other aspects of health, safety, 
and morals (9, p. 23). Police power legislation need only tend to 
accomplish some declared public end (59, p, 711). Reinterpretation of 
"public welfare" is of critical impact in the area of open-space land-use 
control via "aesthetics." Some specific police power land-use controls 
are quite applicable to open-space programs 
Zoning is probably the most widely understood and applied police power 
land-use control (15). It has been described as the planned and structured 
application of the police power in a local area (41, p. 8). A more 
satisfactory description would be to say that zoning "merely means the 
division of land into districts having different regulations" (7, p. 494). 
Two general types of land-use zoning can be identified: "strict" and "weak." 
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In strict zoning, each zone or district has a specific use to which the land 
may be put. Under weak zoning, land-uses are arranged in some sort of 
hierarchial order. All land-uses are permitted in some zones, while in 
other zones only a few uses are authorized. Strict zoning has been 
termed zoning by "exclusive" districts and weak zoning, by "cumulative" 
districts (68, p. 384). Several ideas in zoning are important. 
Open-space zoning Zoning has been primarily an urban land-use 
control. Changing patterns of urbanization, however, have emphasized the 
importance of non-urban lands and provided the stimulus to seek a solution 
to these new problems. Rural zoning has been developed to meet, in part, 
these new needs; it has been widely used for open-space purposes. 
Rural zoning is merely "zoning outside of the limits of cities and 
incorporated villages. This includes suburban, or 'rural' as well as 
strictly rural territory" (65, p. 6), Two major classes of rural zoning 
are fringe area zoning and open country zoning (18, p. 746). Fringe area 
zoning is essentially a negative device since it generally attempts to 
maintain a less than adequate status quo. Open country zoning has been 
typically directed toward relatively undeveloped lands. Another possible 
category of rural zoning is that of "comprehensive" rural zoning (7, p, S03). 
Rural zoning can be traced back to 1692 when Massachusetts granted 
Boston and other market towns the power to influence the location of 
"offensive" industries such as slaughterhouses, still houses, and houses 
for trying, tallowing, and curing leather" (69). The state of Wisconsin 
is generally acknowledged to have initiated the first major rural zoning 
action in 1929, restricted to the northern cutover areas. Leaders saw 
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an opportunity to use restrictions against year-round residences as a means 
of checking the "back to the land" movement, not from enthusiasm for 
land-use control (7). The early objectives of the Wisconsin regulations 
ranged from separating forest from farm to lowering the cost of public 
services (67, p, 349). The leading case concerning the legality of rural 
zoning was Zahn v. Board of Public Works in 1925, when the California 
Supreme Court held that zoning of rural areas was reasonable (18, p. 751); 
this decision was tested and reaffirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court (83). 
Several governmental objectives are typically promoted through rural 
zoning: (1) protecting existing community values; (2) preventing 
maladjustment in land-uses occurring in the future; and (3) correcting 
existing maladjustments in land-use (67, p. 360). The major steps in the 
rural zoning process have been identified elsewhere (65, p. 10). 
Some specifically rural oriented zoning districts have been developed 
and used in open-space projects (9, p. 25; 29, p. 81; 61, p. 640; 93, p. 73; 
68, p. 386): 
1. Conservancy or Conservation Districts 
2. Shoreland Districts 
3. Greenbelt Districts 
4. Forest Only or Forest and Recreation Districts 
5. Flood Plain Districts 
6. Agriculture Only Districts 
7. Development Districts 
8. Large Lot Districts 
9. Historic Districts 
These districts are neither mutually exclusive nor used in all zoning 
ordinances. They indicate the range of districts currently in use. Four 
prominent types of zoning districts follow. 
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Conservancy or conservation districts The term conservancy 
district has been used mainly for wetland districts where the objective 
is to keep these areas undeveloped (9, p. 25). Conservation districts 
may enclose watersheds, flood plains, or both. The purpose may be to 
protect water sources or to avoid land loss due to improper use of land 
having a high water table or periodic floods (68, p, 389), 
Shoreland districts A 1966 Wisconsin law was passed to 
protect clear water and the natural beauty of rural shorelands. It called 
for special county zoning of unincorporated shorelands of all navigable 
waters. The law authorized state level zoning by the Division of Resource 
Development iu the event that counties did not adopt effective ordinances 
by January 1, 1968. The objective was to prevent and control water 
pollution to protect spawning grounds, fish, and aquatic life, and to 
preserve shore cover and natural beauty (93, p. 73). 
Greenbelt or open-space districts The basic idea of 
"greenbelts" comes from the English greenbelt system. Rings of permanent 
doughnut-shaped green areas, several miles across, are established, within 
which new urban development is prohibited. English towns have thus 
maintained their medieval city patterns, with the greenbelt replacing the 
old town wall (52, p. 21), In 1955, California passed a greenbelt law 
which allows for zoning of agricultural lands that cannot be annexed by a 
city; this zoning requires the owner's consent (61, p. 640). Another 
American counterpart to the English greenbelt is the open space district. 
Depending on the locality, open space districts attempt either to reserve 
for the future rural areas of trees and plants on the urban fringe, in 
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order to provide permanent open-space, or to protect natural 
watercourses (68, p. 389). 
Forest only or forest and recreation districts In practice, 
these two types of districts really amount to the same thing. The objective 
of such a district may be timber production, recreational value enhancement, 
water supply protection, wildlife encouragement, grazing provision, or any 
combination of these. This type of zoning was first applied in Oneida 
County, Wisconsin, in the 1930's (67, p, 377), At first only forestry and 
closely related activities were allowed, but later residences and 
protection of property were included (68), 
Aesthetic zoning Much of the movement today in providing open-
space is grounded not only on community growth and health arguments but 
also, and possibly to a larger extent, on the basis of aesthetics. Early 
problems with aesthetic grounds centered around the courts' view that 
"aesthetics" meant art and refined culture and could not be construed to 
influence health, safety, or general welfare (8), Early courts looked at 
aesthetics only as a luxury (64). Promotion of aesthetics was rejected 
because it meant: (1) unreasonable interference with private property; 
and (2) insufficient relationship between the statute and the public 
purpose served (48, p. 167). 
It is now felt that there is nothing in the concept of police power 
that requires the courts to discriminate against aesthetic regulation (55, 
p. 171). On November 22, 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the 
Berman v. Parker community redevelopment case which struck down the Law 
of Aesthetics (8, p. 730), It showed that "it is within the power of the 
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legislature to determine that a community should be beautiful as well as 
carefully patrolled" (59, p. 715). Government has as much "power to regulate 
in the interest of beauty as in the interests of efficiency" (85). It is 
now generally established that regulation for beauty, for aesthetics, for 
amenities is an appropriate use of police power (9, p. 33). Where once it 
sought grounds on which to invalidate laws, the courts now look to 
validation (64, p. 150). Aesthetic zoning is intended to promote, preserve, 
or restore beauty, and to remove or hide eyesores (1). It relates to the 
law of nuisance, or actually, a "quasi-nuisance"; a direct nuisance need 
not exist (59, p. 713). 
The battle of aesthetic zoning is still being fought. In 1955, 
"police power not be used to accomplish purely aesthetic 
objectives" (34). The courts generally no longer rule that zoning for 
aesthetics amounts to zoning for luxury. About a decade later, it was 
well settled that the mere presence of aesthetic consideration will not 
invalidate legislation. 
Yet, courts have been slow to accept that zoning regulations may 
serve the general welfare when based entirely or primarily on aesthetic 
considerations (22, p. 390). Many state courts have justified this sort 
of zoning on grounds of economic well-being and not of aesthetics (1, p. 435), 
The case for aesthetics is made easier if the area being zoned is of 
historic, substantial scenic, or civic importance (22, p. 390). In cases 
where the courts had upheld zoning on purely aesthetic grounds, they had 
either defined aesthetics in a highly specialized way or found that the 
challenged legislation was sustainable by reference to some traditional 
police power objectives (94, p. 88). In balance, it appears that the 
17 
historical trend is toward acceptance of aesthetic zoning per se, but this 
is not yet the case. 
Flexible zoning When the idea of comprehensive zoning (later 
called Euclidean zoning) was first initiated in New York in 1916, it was 
thought to be a milestone in the advancement of the use of police power. 
The authorization for government to comprehensively plan for orderly 
community growth and development was considered a great innovation. This 
feeling was equally applicable to comprehensive zoning of rural areas. 
It has subsequently been found that comprehensive planning is a two-edged 
sword. Some now argue that instead of a milestone, comprehensiveness is 
really a millstone (58, p. 261), It is now widely accepted in the courts 
that zoning and other police powers must not only be comprehensive themselves, 
but they must also be part of an overall comprehensive plan. To the extent 
that the original comprehensive plan was well founded and social conditions 
tended toward the static, a plan might be long lived and changes 
unnecessary. To the extent that these conditions do not hold, change 
becomes desirable. Social environments have been changing rapidly in 
recent years. Flaruiers may fiuu themselves "locked" into a comprehensive 
plan. Once accepted, the courts resist tendencies to quickly change to 
a new comprehensive plan. The question is how to make a zoning ordinance 
which is firm and comprehensive today but can be easily altered to meet a 
changed environment tomorrow. In a gross sense, planners want an ordinance 
that the court will find comprehensive but yet has enough "loop holes" to 
allow change as the need dictates. Several zoning techniques do provide 
desired flexibility. 
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Amend the ordinance This device is almost self-explanatory. 
When an ordinance becomes out-of-date, the government merely initiates 
action to develop a new ordinance. 
Zoning variance The standard zoning enabling legislation 
act allows an adjustment board to "authorize upon appeal in specific cases 
such variances from the terras of the ordinance as will not be contrary to 
the public interest, where owing to special conditions, a literal 
enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary 
hardship and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and 
substantial justice done" (22, p. 394). The variance was designed to be 
a safety valve. Rather than destroying the entire zoning ordinance, 
special exceptions are legally authorized. This procedure may result in 
a court case to answer questions relating to justice being done and other 
such questions. 
Special exception or use This is a post World War II idea. 
It permits in a particular district a use not otherwise permitted when 
certain conditions specifically set out in the ordinance satisfactorily 
exist. A zoning act may say "in appropriate cases and subject to 
appropriate conditions and safeguards, make special exceptions to the terms 
of the ordinance in harmony with its general -purpose and intent and in 
accordance with general or specific rules herein contained" (22, p. 399). 
This differs from the variance technique in that the exception provision 
authorizes special uses while the variance technique relaxes regulations. 
None of the above devices need be specifically authorized. For 
instance, in an Illinois case, the special use provision was not authorized 
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in the enabling legislation. The court held, however, that neither the 
variance or the amendment exactly fit the desired change; a special use 
permit was approved, even though unauthorized (95, p. 479). 
Floating zone The floating zone is a relatively new concept. 
It amounts to zoning for a purpose but not setting any specific district 
boundary. An amendment is typically added to the zoning ordinance to 
specify the circumstances under which the area may be rezoned to a more 
intensive use. It is especially applicable when an area can be developed 
in several ways. Instead of lines drawn on a map, appropriate development 
standards are established for land-use alternatives (31). This procedure 
makes it possible for the planner to commit himself to a general objective 
(development standard) without specifying the means (land-use) and thereby 
to gain in flexibility. If the court will accept the special exception 
idea for a locality, it will probably also accept the floating zone 
amendment technique (22, p. 402). 
Contract zoning This is also a relatively new technique. 
It is particularly applicable where a proposed land-use is not adequately 
covered by the zoning ordinance. Neither the variance nor the special 
exception sections are relevant to a proposed land-use. For instance, an 
early ordinance that listed blacksmithing as an acceptable business for s 
district might not be able to cope with the advent of automobile 
manufacturing. The government and the affected party form a contract of 
performance under which both presumably benefit (31). 
Density zoning This is largely a suburban development device. 
It is used to provide open-space by altering the usual family residential 
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house pattern. Density zoning permits higher density development on part 
of the development site with lower density on the remainder (25). This 
pattern of lumpy development gives rise to areas of open-space. 
Cluster zoning This is just the opposite of density zoning. 
Instead of putting more people on one lot, the basic idea here is to 
maintain some overall desnity and vary the lot size (36, p. 582), The 
developer is allowed to reduce the size of the permitted (allotted) number 
of lots for a given area and group or cluster them together (25). The 
unused area is then open-space. It also breaks up the housing development 
pattern of residences. 
Planned unit development This is very similar to the idea of 
new town zoning. Its intent is to encourage a more creative approach to 
land development. Entirely planned communities are included under this 
scheme. It is hoped that this technique will give rise to a more rational 
use of available space (25). 
Spot zoning The above techniques constitute the major devices 
used to provide planners with flexibility. They are judicially acceptable 
techniques. Heretofore, an unacceptable device has received widespread 
application. When a government periodically modifies its zoning ordinance, 
it may rezone certain areas in response to a landowner (22, p. 397); this 
gives flexibility. When small area rezoning is abused, it is called 
"spot zoning"; the term may be used to describe zoning of a spot (58. p. 248), 
Legally, spot zoning can be held as invalid on both statutory and 
constitutional grounds. On statutory grounds, the amendment may not be in 
accordance with the comprehensive plan; on constitutional grounds, it often 
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amounts to arbitrary legislative favoritism in rezoning the tract which may 
violate "due process," "equal protection," or both (22, p. 397), Several 
guidelines have been formulated to keep small area rezoning from being 
deemed illegal spot zoning (58); 
1. The larger the size of the "spot," the better 
2. The areas rezoned for a service business should be 
for a business needed in the area 
3. The existing zone should have resulted in a complete 
loss of value to the owner 
4. The area should be located near another rezoned 
area, or be close to lesser zones 
5. The area should be used by a public utility for 
area-wide service 
6. The area is significantly affected by increased traffic 
or is located on existing transportation facilities 
7. The rezoning will have a favorable impact on tax 
revenues or other community economic goals 
Some advantages and disadvantages associated with zoning are listed in 
Appendix A. 
Subdivision controls 
Subdivision control, as a police power control, gains its justification 
by promoting the public health, welfare, and other public purposes. The 
historical origin of subdivision control coincides with that of zoning and 
other police powers. The act of zoning certain types of "nuisance" 
industries into the outskirts of town was a rudimentary form of subdivision 
control. 
Control of subdivisions can play a vital role in promoting and 
protecting the interests of the land subdivider, home buyer, and community 
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in general. Communities confronted with uncontrolled subdivisions are 
required to provide a wide range of services to the underdeveloped areas 
which may never pay for the services themselves. The idea behind 
subdivision control is that (31, p. 26): (1) a private developer will 
receive a profit; (2) this action will alter the tax base and make need 
for new public services; and (3) the municipality is therefore 
justified in regulating the process of subdivision and in establishing 
these reasonable conditions upon which the plot approach will be granted. 
To accomplish this sort of control, two principle types of statutes are 
used (22, p. 508): (1) state level laws, which are mandatory requirements 
affecting all subdivisions; or (2) holding acts which authorize 
governments to adopt subdivision regulations. 
Subdivision controls may vary quite widely. They can require a 
developer to dedicate some of his land for public use. Controls can be 
used in conjunction with flood control, street layout, construction 
standards, and various public service systems. The power may be combined 
with other measures to promote open-space purposes. The normal procedure 
is for a community to draw maps of planned streets* parks, and other 
facilities within its jurisdiction; future subdivision normally must be 
conducted in accordance with this plan. The ownership of land mapped 
for public use stays with the private owner until the property rights to 
the land are acquired by the government. 
One of the most important ways of providing for open-space lands 
with this control is through the early planning for parks and playgrounds. 
"The limits on what conditions can be required for approval ... are very 
broad. But they must be imposed for the good of the community as a 
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whole" (7, p. 510). To promote the common good, then, a developer may be 
required to leave certain areas available for open-space before his 
subdivision plan will gain governmental approval. If, for a particular 
subdivision, land is not suitable for parks, etc., the payment may be 
"in lieu of fee"; the government can then take the money and build/buy 
a park in a more suitable site (9, p. 24). 
Official map 
The official map is mainly an urban-oriented tool. This device has 
not been used much in conservation programs, but rather has been confined 
largely to reservation of lands for future streets and the establishment 
of widening lines for existing streets (9, p. 25). The main value is that 
it indicates, at an early date, where specific public service facilities 
are to occur; the developer is then forewarned not to develop sites so 
indicated. 
Professor Krasnowiecki of the University of Pennsylvania, an 
enthusiastic supporter of this little-used tool, argues that this technique 
provides the best control over land areas large enough to accomodate a 
comprehensive open-space project. A narrow distinction exists between 
the effect of a specific piece of zoning legislation and the official map 
approach. The advantage Professor Krasnowiecki sees is that "the decision 
is implemented by a prohibition against improvements in areas earmarked 
for acquisition and enforced by injunctive relief and denial of the right 
of compensation, or later condemnation for unauthorized improvements" (47, 
p. 184). The cost of property rights acquisition is held to the value 
originally indicated in the official map description. 
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The main drawback to the official map approach is regulating use while 
allowing land to yield a reasonable or fair return -- i.e., regulation and 
not taking of land. The whole scheme is threatened when the land owner 
is given the right to develop whenever his land "cannot yield a reasonable 
return" (47, p. 187). Within this range from regulation to taking, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the opportunity to employ this control 
should be more fully explored. 
Taxation 
The power to levy taxes is one of government's oldest and best 
known powers. Taxation can be used to influence property rights as a 
land-use control. Taxation can be used to influence land-use in four 
general ways: (1) foster more intensive land-use; (2) promote conservation 
goals; (3) attain particular tenure goals; and (4) discourage certain types 
of land-use (7, p. 545). 
Two points relating to taxation and land-use are relevant. First, a 
government can acquire the necessary revenues to finance its own 
operation. This is the most widely accepted role of taxes.- The second 
point involves taxation to influence the accomplishment of public policy. 
This role is much less widely accepted as a proper function of taxation. 
While it is clear that the tax is an appropriate revenue producing 
device, it is not clear that it is an appropriate policy instrument. The 
crux of the issue involves the relationship between the accepted policy 
tool, spending, and the questionable tool, taxation. Just as it is 
possible to prompt the results of a spending program through taxation, a 
tax designed exclusively as a revenue device will necessarily act as a 
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negative spending device. It will, at least implicitly, influence some 
public policy. Complete separation of the revenue and policy roles is 
rarely possible (42, p. 3). 
Almost any conceivable tax will have a policy consequence. It is 
asserted that some of these consequences have to do with land-use. Some 
taxes may and can be used to influence land-use while other taxes influence 
land-use as a by-product. A distinction may be made between types of 
taxes on the basis of their influence on land-use -- direct, or indirect 
influence (6, p. 342). The major types of taxes that either directly or 
indirectly affect land-use are; (1) property tax, (2) special assessment 
tax, (3) capital gains tax, (4) severance tax, and (5) other taxes such 
as sales and business taxes (7, p. 534), Of these, the property tax or 
some variation of it is the more important and widely used. State and 
local levels of government are in the best position to influence land-use 
with this tax. "After three unhappy attempts to use federal property tax 
levies. Congress has abandoned this approach as substantially unworkable" 
(6, p. 342). Local governments, however, have often overlooked the 
potential value of tax policy to encourage land-use, and institute 
policies that are in conflict with the planners' objectives (28, p. 279). 
Tax problems 
Taxation promoting more intensive land-use has allegedly caused a 
withdrawal of large areas of land away from open-space functions, particularly 
around urban areas. Normally, land is valued for property tax purposes 
under the "highest and best" use — a more economically intensive use. 
While this is an economic concept, we often want to use it to further 
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social objectives; empirically, this has not been done (42, p. 3). That 
is, open-space land may be non-market valued. The "highest and best" use 
is economically (market) not socially determined. The problem of 
open-space taxation is to transform a system of taxation which is 
inherently biased against land-uses which are of a low market value into 
a system that actually encourages this sort of land-use. 
Tax solutions 
Taxes play a dual role. Not only have past tax programs supposedly 
been related to the loss of open-space, but revamped tax programs may be 
used as solution vehicles. Tax program modifications do not, however, 
always provide for open-spaces; in reality they may only maintain the 
status quo. Rather than being a positive step toward the accomplishment of 
public policy, such tax solutions typically amount to a defensive or 
"holding tactic" to insure that future public policies are not precluded 
by current private actions. In a general sense, tax solutions are based 
on the idea of changing the taxation basis from the value as determined by 
the market to that determined by social desires. As such, Poole has 
chosen to categorize tax solutions under the heading of use-value 
assessment (60, p. 5). Two modifications of property taxation relate to 
open-space programs, preferential taxes and tax deferral. 
Preferential taxes Preferential taxation is a technique whereby 
the government attempts to encourage the status quo land-use by removing 
the incentive to change its use. This is one of the oldest and most 
widely understood modifications of a property tax system. Its use neither 
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originated with nor is restricted to the open-space context. Preferences 
have been widely used to encourage industrial location or product 
production. This need not be the result of a conscious policy action; it 
can result simply from erratic administration of a "neutral" property 
tax system. 
The basis for the preferential tax argument generally lies in the 
determination of fair market value for each parcel of land. The fair 
market value is typically defined as the value of the land parcel under 
its highest and best use. By taxing a chicken ranch in the middle of the 
central city in terms of the land used for business or office purpose, it 
discourages less than the highest and best use of the land. Open-space 
lands located on the rural/urban fringe are often taxed with the 
subdivision value of the land being considered as the best use. The 
farmer (landowner) may then be forced to change the use of his land to a 
more productive use. This new use is often in the form of residential 
development or industrial expansion. In order to avoid a change in 
land-use and to provide for greater tax equity, many groups (e.g., farmers) 
have pushed for tax concession laws (90. p. 5)-
Preferential assessment consists of outright forgiveness for part of 
the real property tax which would have been levied on a parcel of land if 
the assessed value were based on fair market value and not "use value" (25, 
p. 14). Some land-use planners have argued that if open-space land, when 
taxed at a higher than use value, will eventually have the use changed to 
non open-space, then the open character can be maintained by taxing at a 
less than fair market value. Several states have enacted preferential tax 
programs; they have generally not withstood court action (36, p. 587), 
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Preferential taxation also goes by the name of "tax incentives" (21, p. 179; 
61, p. 649). These schemes run into problems with constitutional provisions 
that one man's land must be taxed the same as everyone else's -- on the 
basis of fair market value (90, p. 5); the tax must be uniformly applied. 
Some difficulties associated with preferential taxation for open-space 
purposes are listed in Appendix A. 
Tax deferral Another modification of the property tax system to 
encourage open-space reservation is tax deferral. The basic rationale is 
the same as that for preferential taxation. 
Under the tax deferral system, the tax assessor values the open-space 
land parcel both in terms of its use value (farm) and its highest and best 
use value (non-farm). The landowners is then given the option of paying 
the tax on either basis. If he elects to be taxed on the farm basis and 
later converts to non-farm use, he is charged with the back tax 
differential (36, p. 589). Differing from preferential assessment, the 
taxes are not forgiven, but rather they are deferred until the land is 
actually converted to the higher use; the interest on the tax may also be 
deferred (25, p. 15). A form of this tax modification has been applied 
to a severance tax on timber where the tax falls due when the timber is 
harvested (90, p. 8). 
This procedure has the advantage, over preferential taxes, of being 
acceptable on the equity of taxation principle (47, p. 190). It has some 
drawbacks. An obvious problem is the administrative difficulty of 
maintaining two sets of assessed value accounts for each parcel of land. 
The deferral system must also be based on an overall land-use plan; this 
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planning process could hasten the process of higher assessment (90, p. 9). 
It also suffers from the same problem as all consensual schemes; it 
actually encourages development, because as many landowners adopt the 
tax break, the land value of non-adopters increases and becomes better 
for development (47, p. 190). A final criticism is that when use is 
changed, this procedure may result in a greater than normal tax bill. 
This difference might be considered to be a penalty for changing land-use. 
Miscellaneous tax schemes The preferential and deferred tax 
programs are the main property tax modifications for open-space purposes. 
The following indicate some minor schemes. First, Sections 631(a) and 
631(b) of the Internal Revenue Code give capital gains treatment to various 
timber transactions in order to encourage timber production (74, p. 607). 
Second, if taxes are really a significant factor in land-use decisions, 
the government should give direct grants to cover the increased taxes. 
This grant would equal the difference in the tax bill and could be viewed 
as rental payment, by the public, to keep the land in its current use 
(25, p. 15). Third, total exemption of taxes may be used; this has been 
applied to low-income housing, rental housing, and industrial development 
(27, p. 80). In at least eleven states, growing trees have been totally 
exempted from property taxes with a bare land tax remaining (74, p. 616), 
Finally, it has been suggested that exemption from corporate taxation, 
mortgage insurance, and other forms of federal insurance might be used in 
conjunction with tax programs to encourage open-space (27, p. 80). 
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Proprietary Power and Spending Power 
Spending and proprietary power have been used to promote outdoor 
recreation or other open-space projects. These closely related powers 
should be viewed as two separate entities. Excluding individual beliefs 
concerning the nature of government (e.g., "the best government is one 
that governs the least"), neither idea is very complex or controversial. 
Proprietary power 
Governments "have long since found that they can exert more influence 
over the uses made of land resources when they are held in public 
ownership than when they are held by private owners" (7, p. 527). The 
extent to which a government can influence a land-use objective by 
manipulating resources is largely related to the magnitude of land area 
under its jurisdiction. This power is available to most all levels of 
government from a city or county to the federal government. The federal 
government owns and controls about one-third of the land area of the 
United States; this ranges from a high of 95.3 percent of Alaska to a low 
of 0.3 percent of Connecticut in federal ownership (80, p. 327). The 
federal government owns about 22 percent of all commercial forest lands, 
states own 4 percent, and counties own about 2 percent (79, p. 142). 
Various levels of government have the potential of exerting a significant 
impact on the use of land resources. By the sheer magnitude of numbers, 
the federal government can expend the greatest influence. Aggregate data, 
however, shield internal variation; the northern Lake States have 
particularly heavy concentrations of state and county ownership. 
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Proprietary powers have a great potential for influencing land-use. 
Open-space programs can be affected through either (1) disposal policy of 
government-owned lands, or (2) actual management objectives being pursued 
on these lands. The only limitation to these efforts is that proprietary 
action must not be in violation of public law or sanction. 
Spending power 
The right of a government to spend moneys has often been termed the 
"power of the purse." Barlowe has identified five ways that this power 
has been used to control land-use (7, p. 525): 
1. Acquire lands for various public purposes 
2. Carry on public resource developments 
3. Provide public credit facilities 
4. Subsidize desired private practices 
5. Finance part of the cost of various state and local projects 
Proprietary power and spending power are related since spending power 
is one way a government can finance proprietary goals, A second relationship 
is that the spending power may be used to acquire the lands to which the 
proprietary power will be applied. 
There are four major ways that governments, particularly the federal 
government, have implemented the spending power in the area of land-use 
control (40, p. 453; 6, p. 357). First, rights to land can be purchased. 
Second, grants have been provided to support desired improvements and 
education; these have resulted in changes in land-use. These grants have 
been termed "bribes-in-aid" (9, p. 26). Third, credit programs have had 
an indirect impact by providing access to project financing. Fourth, 
subsidies and technical assistance programs have been provided to 
individual landowners. Instead of providing states with standards of 
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achievement or regulations, the federal government has tended to use 
subsidies, price support, matching funds, and other aids to secure program 
compliance (6, p. 339). 
Of particular relevance to open-space programs is the use of spending 
power to acquire all or parts of the total bundle of rights to land. The 
government may wish to exert a greater and more direct degree of control 
over the land in question than is possible with other controls. It is 
then appropriate to actually acquire the land rights needed. 
Spending power is an expensive way to control land-use. The government 
essentially pays for any benefit received. Any actions taken by a 
government to acquire lands or property rights under the spending power 
must be at the owner's consent; the government/individual relationship 
must be voluntary. Some confusion exists. Many people label the 
spending power, when applied for instance to land acquisition, as being 
the power of "eminent domain" (9, p. 26). This is not the case. While 
the spending power refers to voluntary acquisition, the power of eminent 
domain refers to involuntary acquisition. 
Eminent Domain 
The end result of acquiring rights to land under the eminent domain 
power is exactly the same as under the spending power. The government 
controls the desired land rights and the landowner receives the fair 
market value for the rights relinquished. The process, however, is quite 
different. While under the spending power rights are voluntarily sold, 
under eminent domain they are involuntarily relinquished. The key ideas 
involved in this power are "just compensation" and "taken," "Compensation" 
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distinguishes eminent domain from the police power and "taken" distinguishes 
eminent domain from the spending power. 
It is important to distinguish between the powers of police, eminent 
domain and spending. 
Under the police power, rights of property are 
impaired not because they become useful or necessary 
to the public, or because some public advantage 
can be gained by disregarding them, but because 
their free exercise is believed to be detrimental 
to the public interest; it may be said that the 
State takes property by eminent domain because 
it is useful to the public, and under the police 
power because it is harmful (43, p. 17). 
Police power, generally, attempts to promote the general welfare by 
preventing undesirable occurrences while eminent domain promotes the 
general welfare by initiating desirable accurrences. Both involve 
infringements on individual rights. "A determination that a particular 
infringement involves an exercise of eminent domain rather than the police 
power is a confusion drawn from the necessity or non-necessity of 
compensation under all the circumstances surrounding the infringement" (5, 
p. 619). Table 3 depicts the relevant distinctions. Many open-space 
Table 3 
Government Powers 
Property Owner 
Receives Compensation 
Property Owner Relinquishes Rights 
Voluntary Involuntary 
Government 
Objective 
Yes 
No Philanthropy Police Power 
Spending Eminent Domain 
Prevent Harm 
Promote Good 
projects are intended to promote some public advantage. In this case, 
spending and eminent domain are appropriate. 
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Condemnation 
The procedure by which property is taken and just compensation paid 
is called condemnation. This is basically a judicial process. In 
condemnation proceedings, the court must balance "justice" and "equity" 
(24, p. 237), There are two basic elements in condemnation: (1) how much 
compensation, and (2) who will determine the compensation value. 
"Just compensation" and "fair market value" are customarily considered 
synonymous. Compensation based on fair market value will not always 
fully compensate because adjustments are not typically made for changing 
economic conditions (24, p. 238). There are three standard methods to 
determine property value: (1) market value, (2) cost value, and 
(3) income value. These methods will not be evaluated. Several factors, 
in addition to property rights value, have been identified as important 
in determining the condemnation award (19, p. 197); 
1. Reasonable and forseeable use (not speculative) in the near 
future 
2. Fear of danger of injury to persons or property 
3. Tortious conduct by the condemnor 
4. Inconvenience resulting from the taking 
5. Possible interference with efficient operation of 
telephone and radio 
6. Aesthetic consideration 
There are three forums used to actually determine compensation; 
jury method, commission method, and trial by court. No attempt at 
evaluation will be made. Suffice it to say, each can be abused and there 
is ample opportunity to improve each procedure (2, p. 20; 3, p. 726). 
One author argues that juries should not be used for value determination 
because they are not qualified; further, agencies will often demand a jury 
trial knowing that in cases where little value is involved, the small 
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owner cannot afford to go to court (57, p. 240). 
Advanced condemnation Public acquisition of private rights to 
land in advance of the actual need is often not only desirable but 
necessary (25, p. 12). It may avoid the escalation of land prices as 
projects become approved and subsequently administered. It may be 
necessary to acquire property rights to insure that a public project is 
not precluded by private actions. Desired lands then remain open until 
construction of a project actually begins. This may be important for 
projects that require a unique site; an example of this would be waterfowl 
habitat where a swamp, if drained, would be of no value. This authority 
has been given to several state highway commissions and has been upheld in 
several courts (91, p. 19). The question is, how far in advance of 
immediate need may lands be condemned. As a general rule "advanced 
acquisition has been upheld, particularly if pursuant to a comprehensive 
plan" (36, p. 563). 
Excess condemnation If a specific land-use project is associated 
with some boundary characteristics, an agency may feel that more land is 
needed to either protect the integrity of the project or to allow for 
future expansion. This is called excess condemnation. Some states have 
had constitutional amendments to allow this, and in other instances the 
courts have accepted excess condemnation where reasonable (7, p. 523). 
"Excess condemnation can be used to acquire land for such purposes as 
small parks along a highway, or a neighborhood park adjacent to a school, 
or a buffer between a city and adjacent residential areas" (25, p. 14). 
Cities have also condemned more lands than were actually required for 
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streets to allow for future street widening and to insure the beauty of 
public improvement (35, p. 455). 
Access condemnation In the process of administering an open-space 
project, land rights may be purchased or condemned so that access to 
unacquired lands is impaired. This raises the question as to whether the 
landowner, in addition to normal compensation, should receive compensation 
for loss of access to other lands. In one study, the differential value 
of a farm, before and after installation of a highway right-of-way, was 
used as the basis for the value of access loss (72, p. 15). The biggest 
problem reported was to determine the value of "landlocked" property; 
as a matter of policy, the state of Michigan buys these lands at fair 
market value and resells them. Another study looked at the problem of 
government condemnation of a waterfront area which cut off access to the 
water for the landowner (44, p. 136). The landowner may be entitled not 
only to the value of land taken but also to the value of the access right 
to the water. The determination largely depends on the navigability and 
size of the water. If navigation improvement is the goal, compensation 
is not required; in the Thomas case, the court granted in favor of the 
loss of access (37). 
Future interest condemnation "The taking by condemnation of future 
interests most clearly presents the conflict in ail eminent domain 
proceedings between the protection of personal property rights of property 
owners and the public's need for administrative convenience and expediency 
in eminent domain proceedings" (71, p. 242). Future interest may be 
defined as an "interest in property in which the privilege of possession 
or of enjoyment is future and not present, although it is regarded as part 
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of the total present ownership." A landowner might argue that he could 
potentially use his stream access as a future commercial boat landing/ 
rental enterprise. Courts typically refuse to compensate for any but 
vested inlerests (71, p. 247). 
Lease condemnation Special problems arise when property rights 
are condemned if these rights (or some of them) have already been leased. 
Some problems and conclusions have been elsewhere presented (17, p. 279). 
First, what happens to the obligation to pay rent? If the entire 
leasehold is condemned, the lease Is terminated and the rent obligation is 
discharged; if the leasehold is partially condemned, the lease continues. 
Second, what of the leasee's right to compensation? If the leasee has 
compensatable rights at the time of condemnation, he will be paid. 
Third, the apportioning of the gross award between leasee and leasor 
will be done on the basis of provable interests. This study concluded 
that the best solution is to have a "condemnation clause" in the lease 
itself stating exactly what will be done in the event of condemnation. 
Land-use controls 
Both the spending power and the eminent domain power of a government 
can be used to acquire rights to land for public purposes. Identical 
rights are obtained in either case. The specific land-use controls 
available under both powers are then the same. 
Compensation paid for rights acquired is theoretically directly 
related to the number and value of these rights. A useful dichotomy 
involves the distinction between acquiring all of the rights to land, or 
just some of them. "In medieval times, a great lord would grant a man 
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a tract of land to use, in return for which the man would be obligated to 
perform certain services or fees; the land with the fewest conditions 
attached -- the simplest fee, you might say -- was the closest to outright 
ownership" (89, p. 69). Today, if a man owns all property rights to a 
material object, he possesses a "fee simple" ownership. 
Fee simple ownership If a high degree of control must be exerted 
over the land, full ownership may be required. Once acquired, the public 
agency is free to modify its land-use plan within the bounds of public 
policy constraints. It has been said that fee simple ownership must be 
the "backbone" of any conservation program (88, p. 3). Many times, 
however, public agencies do not desire to expend these large amounts of 
acquisition funds, nor to totally control the land, nor to administer 
large areas of land.^ Fee simple ownership may not then be desirable. 
A whole list of legal devices have evolved which involve less than fee 
simple ownership. 
Less than fee simple ownership There are three major advantages 
to less than fee simple ownership (88, p. 3; 92, p. 37; 90, p. 17): 
1. Land is mainly left in private ownership; it remains 
productive without public inputs, and gives use to 
less land and lower public maintenance costs -- the 
public simple does not need all of that land 
2. While the land remains on the tax roll at reduced 
value, it nevertheless maintains some of the revenue 
producing ability for local governments 
3. From a government or agency standpoint, the cost of 
land control may be greatly reduced 
Another problem often mentioned is the reduction of tax revenues with 
increased public land ownership. "In lieu of tax" payments may be used to 
make "acquisition more politically palatable" but the reduction in tax 
revenues may, in net, reduce acquisition funds (46, p. 12). 
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Partial, like total, rights to land are acquired under either the spending 
or eminent domain powers. Acquisition must comply with the legislative 
requirements for application of the powers. Lands acquired must be used 
for public purpose, Asa general rule, actions of legislative bodies are 
identically equal to the public purpose (91, p. 16). Several devices 
are available to acquire less than fee simple ownership in lands. Few 
have been used in open-space programs. Three major ways are easements, 
the purchase/leaseback scheme, and the guaranteed value method. 
Easements Definitions of the word easement hinge on a central 
point — one or more property rights (but not all) are acquired. One 
definition says that an easement is the rights held by another to use 
one's land for special purposes (7, p. 244), Another defines it as an 
"acquired privilege or right of use falling short of ownership which one 
may have in the land of another" (20, p. 53). "One form of purchasing 
some of the man's bundle of rights is through the use of an easement" 
(89, p, 69).1 
Easements may be classified in two major ways. First, an easement 
may be either affirmative (positive) or negative. An affirnstiva sasssient 
is a limited right to make use of land owned in fee by someone else. A 
negative easement is the right to prevent a nearby property owner from 
The public easement is similar to the private control called 
restrictive covenant. This normally takes the form of a contract between 
two neighboring landowners by which one acquires the right to restrain 
the other from putting his land to certain specified uses (49, p. 246). 
In some private planned communities, a new owner must sign a very strict 
document of this nature which states exactly what the owner can and 
cannot do on the land (36, p. 575). 
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using his land in specified ways (92, p. 39). Under the positive easement, 
a person acquires the right to do something such as hunting or building a 
highway on another person's land; the purchaser gains direct benefit. The 
negative easement does not involve physical use of another's land; the 
seller agrees not to do something on the land. An easement may be 
specifically defined as 
the privilege of doing a certain class of acts 
on, or to the detriment of, another's land 
(affirmative easement), or a right against 
another that he refrain from doing a certain 
class of act on or in connection with his own 
land (negative easement) (56, p. 352). 
The second way of classifying easements relates to the location of 
the lands owned by each party in the easement agreement. An easement 
"appurtenant" is an easement held by the owner of nearby land and is used 
in connection with that land; an easement in "gross" is where ownership of 
the easement has nothing to do with ownership of nearby lands (92, p. 39). 
That is, an easement is gross "is not created to aid the holder of the 
easement in the use of his land" (51, p. 51). 
Easements may be acquired by purchase, deed, reservation, gift, 
condemnation, or adverse use or possession throughout the prescriptive 
period (7, p. 344). They were used under English law long before there 
was a colony in this country (9, p. 28). Easement law in the United States 
is virtually identical to English law from which it was borrowed. As such 
it has the following features (91. p. 11): 
1. It is an incorporeal right, a right to the use and 
enjoyment of land, and not to the land itself 
2. It is imposed on corporeal property 
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3, It is a right without profit 
4. It requires two distinct elements: the 
dominant. which enjoys the right and the 
servient which submits to it 
One of the first uses of easements for open-space purposes occurred in 
1893 when the state of Massachusetts authorized the Boston Metropolitan 
Park Commission to acquire rights to land (91, p. 11). Easements have 
since been used to varying degrees in land-use programs. Probably the 
major effort to fully utilize this tool occurred in 1961 when the state of 
Wisconsin began a resource development and conservation program that 
involved about $2 million for easement acquisition (45, p. 343). 
The cost of an easement has been the subject of much discussion in 
the literature. The term "cost" is somewhat misleading. Actually, the 
price paid to the landowner for his loss of rights is being considered. 
We shall, temporarily, accept this synonymous view of cost and price. 
Literary discussions center around the argument as to whether or not the 
easement price paid approximates the cost of fee simple acquisition. There 
is no reason to expect any general answer to this controversy. In theory, 
the cost of an easement is dependent on the quantity and value of the 
rights transferred. Several authors have attempted to identify the 
independent variables that influence the total easement cost (88, p. 4; 
89, p. 72; 45, p. 361); 
1. Kind of easement 
2. Negotiator 
3. Engineering and overhead costs in the agency 
4. Occupational bias of the administering agency 
5. Timing (or degree of speculation) of easement procurement 
6. Negative or positive easement 
7. Objective factors such as market value, distance to city, etc. 
8. Existing degree of land control 
9. Land survey cost 
10. Merchantibility of title 
11. Negotiability of offer price 
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Several conceptual methods have been suggested to determine the cost 
of an easement. One rule of thumb is to estimate the difference in land 
value both with and without the easement. This difference will represent 
both what is being given up and hence the easement cost (90, p. 18). 
Additional techniques are (20, p. 55): (1) the difference between the 
fair market value before and after the taking; (2) the value of the right 
considered as a separate unit plus damages to the remainder; (3) the value 
of the right considered as a part of the whole plus damages to the 
remainder; and (4) the damages to the remainder included in the value of 
the rights taken. 
Several attempts to actually estimate the cost of various types of 
easements have been made. Two basic approaches are used. First, office 
calculations have been made to determine, by different methods, what a 
specific type of easement should cost (73, 20, 75). The second major 
approach has been to analyze empirical data. Some of the results of 
these studies are indicated in Table 4. The price of an easement has 
been found to vary from some small fraction of the fee simple price to 
more than the value of the fee; the reason for this phenomenon is not 
known. 
The number of easements used in open-space programs is a small portion 
of the total set of easements possible. There is not complete concurrence 
in regard to nomenclature. For instance, to one author a conservation 
easement means acquisition of a specific bundle of rights (27) and to 
another it implies a general class consisting of several types of 
easements (87). The general breadth of easements used in conjunction 
with open-space programs includes: 
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Table 4 
Easement and Fee Simple Value Comparisons 
Agency/Purpose 
Easement 
Cost Per Acre 
Fee Simple 
Cost Per Acre 
U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife' 
Waterfowl Production 
North Dakota 
South Dakota 
Minnesota 
$6.11 
7.60 
4.22 
$25.25 
27.50 
48.56 
State of Wisconsin 
Fish Management 
South Wisconsin 
Central Wisconsin 
North Wisconsin 
Average 
$294,00 
366.00 
107.00 
198.00 
$196.00 
57.00 
46.00 
60.00 
National Park Service 
Scenic Easement 
Virginia 
Natchez Trace, Mississippi 
$50.00 $60.00 
50-100% of fee 
State of Wisconsin 
Scenic Easement 
Mississippi River Parkway 
Project A 
Project B 
$  8 . 2 2  
23.75 
$35.00 
44.85 
Flight Safety Easement $15.00 
Army Corps of Engineers 
Flood Control 
'45, p. 347, 357. 
^88, p. 32, 33. 
60-80% of fee 
-RQ n. 19. 
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1. Conservation easement (the class) (87, p. 64; 31, p. 12) 
— hunting and fishing rights 
— flowage rights 
-- scenic beauty protection 
— trails, roads, and access ways 
— well and open-space reservation 
2. Conservation easement (per se) (27, p. 79) 
3. Scenic easement (the class) (91, p. 12) 
— for park purposes 
-- for parkways 
-- for highways 
4. Scenic easement (per se) 
5. Development right easement 
6. Right of way easement (91, p. 14) 
7. Airport easement (91, p. 14) 
8. Water control easement (91, p. 14) 
9. Game and fish management easement (45, p. 347) 
10, Open-space easement 
11. Cropping rights easement (13, p. 95) 
The scenic easement and the development right (or open-space) easements 
have received wide attention. 
Scenic easement A scenic easement may be defined as 
"a restriction imposed upon the use of property ... for purposes of preserving 
the ... attractiveness of ... lands of the grantee .... In the grant, the 
granter agrees to refrain from the erection of any advertising structure, 
or ... new structure, or alternation of any existing structure, without 
the consent of the grantee" (73, p. 531). Scenic beauty along highways 
may be preserved by purchasing a perpetual easement which prevents a 
landowner from obstructing or destroying the view from the highway (56, 
p. 352). It may also be used to preserve historical sites and buildings 
by prohibiting demolition or other serious forms of modification (53, 
p. 257). The term "scenic easement" may be used as a shorthand way of 
encompassing the surrender of a wide variety of sight-oriented privileges 
of land-use (12, p. 28). 
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The scenic easement has had a history of legal difficulties. The 
courts have previously stated flatly that an easement of view would not 
be recognized (92, p. 45). The current position is that; 
It should be clear, of course, that if the taking 
of a scenic easement by eminent domain meets the public 
use test, the expenditure of public funds to pay the 
landowner for the easement acquired will necessarily 
satisfy the 'public purpose' test. On the other hand, 
a determination that the taking serves 'public purpose' 
does not self-evidently mean that the taking is for 
public use.' The major difficulty in this regard 
arises from the fact that a scenic easement is 
essentially a set of land-use restrictions imposed 
on private property, and that the public does not 
acquire any affirmative 'use' privileges in the 
conventional sense .... Assuming ... scenic 
easement can be deemed for a public use .. for 
a public purpose, the next question is where a 
public purpose can be found ... there can be little 
doubt ... acquisition of scenic easements ... will 
be held to constitute a 'public purpose' (23, p. 226). 
Yet, even if a project is for public purpose, with due process, etc., 
it can still be argued that there is no "necessity" for the taking of a 
scenic easement at that location; if this location were selected by the 
legislature the challenge would almost certainly fail, but if it were 
agency determined the challenge would be open to judicial scrutiny (23, 
p. 254). Another difficulty arises if a landowner sells the land without 
mentioning the easement, or with minimizing it, such that a misunderstanding 
results (92, p. 144). In this connection, "it is quite doubtful whether 
burden of a scenic easement can 'run' with servient land, so as to be 
enforceable against subsequent owners of the land if the benefit is only 
'personal' or in 'gross' the burden of appurtenant scenic easements 
will, however, run with servient lands (23, p. 256). Enforcement of 
easement conditions is also a problem. Courts typically will not issue 
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injunctions before the fact, so anticipated troubles go unchecked (92, p. 144). 
Development rights easement A development rights 
easement may be defined as a negative easement wherein the grantor 
(a landowner) agrees to give up the right to develop his property but 
retains the right to continue the existing use (42, p. 9). In this way, 
a desired land-use is continued and the prevention of land subdivision is 
assured. This type of easement is typically obtained for some time period 
less than perpetuity; future development of the property, when desirable, 
is possible (31, p. 14). Development right easements may either be 
consensual or condemnable. The latter is preferable for an agency, 
"The effects of open-space programs on the social and economic life or 
urban and suburban communities are far too serious to allow them to be 
exposed to haphazard implementation through consensual arrangements with 
willing property owners"(47, p. 191). The development easement is also 
known as an open-space easement (52, p. 24). The idea is exactly the 
same — the owner keeps the title but sells all development rights to 
the public. 
The development rights approach would ensure that society would be 
the beneficiary for at least a portion of the unearned increment or 
windfall accompanying urbanization (42, p. 9), It may also supplement 
zoning. One problem with zoning is the fine line between regulation and 
taking. If the court decides that part of an ordinance is "taking," the 
whole ordinance may be void. One way to circumvent this possibility is 
to use the development rights easement for the questionable parts of the 
ordinance; by paying for the taking, the overall ordinance remains 
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valid (47, p. 191). The following material is provided in Appendix A for 
the interested reader: (1) advantages and disadvantages of easements in 
general; (2) disadvantages of development right easements; and 
(3) some conclusions pertaining to easement documents and administration. 
Purchase leaseback/resale A government can acquire less than 
fee simple interest in land by purchasing the land in fee and then 
disposing of unneeded rights. This disposition may take the form of a 
lease or of a conditional sale. Either technique would seem useful 
where fee simple ownership is unnecessary and an easement is inadvisable. 
This may be a more satisfactory way of controlling land-use than the 
easement (27, p. 79). 
The purchase leaseback technique can accomplish the same desired 
land-use control as the purchase and resale subject to specified 
conditions. Under the purchase leaseback: (1) the land usually does not 
remain on the tax roll; (2) land maintenance costs are usually borne by 
the government; (3) enforcement of lease provisions is usually easy; and 
(4) it is particularly applicable to handling commercial development in 
a park. Under the purchase conditional resale scheme; (1) resale 
conditions are inforceable through a suit for damages or injunction 
relief; (2) land remains on the tax roll; (3) government does not incur 
maintenance costs; and (4) it is particularly useful in urban renewal 
projects (31, p. 14). Several disadvantages associated with these 
techniques are listed in Appendix A. 
Guaranteed value The "guaranteed value" or "compensatable 
regulation" scheme is a recent innovation in land-use controls. It does 
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not really meet the exact conditions of either police power, spending 
power, or eminent domain. The guaranteed value method is preported to 
take the best features of each and combine them into one composite control. 
The basic procedure of this method is quite straightforward (76, 
p. 1639; 47, p. 198). First, an "owner's guarantee" is established for 
the land parcel in question. This may be accomplished by determining the 
fair market value or the just compensation value as if the land were being 
condemned. Second, the landowner is guaranteed this value. The aggregate 
of all such determinations would amount to a summation of condemnation 
fees. Third, a detailed set of regulations controlling land-use is 
imposed. Fourth, if the regulations lower the value of the land as 
presently used, the landowner can claim compensation. If the loss in 
land value is immediate, reimbursement will be accomplished by petitioning 
the administering agency for payment. If the loss in land value arises 
through a loss in its development value, the land is then submitted to a 
supervised public sale; the actual loss value will be determined as a 
result of this sale. 
This system is very similar to the English greenbelt system of 
guarantees (52, p. 24). The main advantages lie in the fact that the sum 
of all reimbursements plus the sale value must not be greater than the 
original or guaranteed value. No unnecessary public funds are expended 
because the landowner is paid only when he receives a demonstrable loss 
of value. To the extent that public regulations prompted this loss in 
value, society will pay exactly for rights obtained. Hence, a lower initial 
outlay of public funds is required. The final result, due to the abolition 
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of valuation uncertainties, is a lower overall cost than with either 
easements or fee purchase. Because the guaranteed value is for the fee, 
it does not overestimate the development rights portion. It is, therefore, 
a good method to use where lands are very valuable and close to a city. 
And finally, this method is extremely flexible. With land value set at 
a given date, it is argued that any value decrease is the result of public 
regulations. The regulations may then be changed in any way that is 
publically desirable. Any subsequent loss in value is then the result of 
additional public regulations and will be routinely compensated. Some 
disadvantages are listed in Appendix A. 
The guaranteed value method, as stated, has some internal inequities. 
If countervailing pressures (or phenomena) exist such that while the 
regulations per se lower the value, other pressures raise it so that the 
new land value is greater than the guaranteed value, society pays nothing 
for the regulatory cost. On the other hand, if one set of regulations 
decreases value, the owner is reimbursed. If a second set of regulations 
raises the value, does the landowner pay back the difference? The system 
is primarily based on value lost. Presumably, modifications are possible. 
Miscellaneous controls In addition to the major land-use 
controls already described, several other controls broaden the range of 
alternative devices available. 
Raup has indicated several land-use controls used in Europe which 
might be useful for American open-space programs (63, p. 25). First, 
land-use may be influenced by control of inheritance procedures. Second, 
the governmental right of prescriptive land purchase may be used. Third, 
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direct land control is possible through control of the land transfer and 
land rental markets. 
Some states have encouraged donations by means of real estate tax 
concessions (36, p. 574). The lands can be given to a government agency 
or a tax exempt private trust. 
Landowners in some states are able to combine forces and incorporate 
their lands as a separate municipality. This can relieve the pressure to 
change their desired land-use pattern (i.e., farming) and also reduce the 
threat of land condemnation by another government subdivision. It may 
also stabilize the tax burden and avoid tax increases if the newly formed 
corporation has a low desire for public services (25, p. 16). 
Conclusions 
The literature of land-use control is quite wide ranging. It 
primarily deals with the legal aspects of these controls. Little attention 
has been given the more restricted topic of land-use controls as applied 
to open-space (or outdoor recreation) activities. Table 5 represents 
seme conclusions as to the utility of several classes of controls in 
accomplishing outdoor recreation programs. Several other conclusions 
permeate land-use control literature — these follow. 
A major aspect of land-use planning in the United States is the lack 
thereof. "One of the characteristic features of suburban development in 
America is its lack of contiguity. Individual developers use whatever 
land they can acquire quickly and cheaply .... The result is a patchwork 
of development, unsightly, wasteful, inconvenient, and expensive to 
service" (27, p. 74), It is not original to say that better planning is 
Table 5 
Land-Use Control Conclusions 
Land-Use 
Control 
Cost Flexibility Applicable 
Project Size Longevity 
Zoning 
Subdivision 
Official 
Map 
Taxation 
Proprietary 
Fee 
Ownership 
Easement 
Ownership 
No direct cost 
No direct cost 
No direct cost 
No direct cost 
Direct cost, 
depends on level 
of management 
Direct cost, 
full value of rights 
Direct cost, 
percentage of full 
rights value 
Difficult to change 
in short run 
Uniformity requires 
semi-inflexibility 
Relatively inflex­
ible once lands are 
included on map 
Inflexible, diffi­
cult to establish 
or change 
Flexible within 
public policy 
Flexible within 
public policy 
Flexible in 
planning, 
inflexible later 
Large project in a 
single political 
jurisdiction 
City or county in 
a single political 
jurisdiction 
Less than a city 
in a political 
jurisdiction 
Uniformity requires 
this to be applied 
to political unit 
Any size 
Any size 
Any size 
Ordinance "erodes" 
through political 
pressure 
Relatively permanent 
Relatively permanent 
Relatively permanent 
Permanent depending 
on public desires 
Permanent depending 
on public desires 
Theoretically 
permanent; empiri­
cally, not enough 
experience to say 
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both necessary and forthcoming (41, p. 14). Many land-use problems stem 
from reaction instead of action. Zoning laws are enacted after nuisances 
are established. Agencies incur high land acquisition costs because they 
wait until development is imminent. Better land-use planning is needed 
to avert social problems before they occur. 
Who should do the planning? Evidence indicates that the smaller, 
restricted levels of government are becoming less and less effective. 
Metropolitan governments and new types of federalism are being discussed 
(33, p. 13). Land-use problems do not honor political boundaries. The 
external effects of individual actions can be felt over wide areas. 
The state of Wisconsin and its shoreland zoning is probably indicative of 
the future; initial local option to zone will be offered, but if not 
implemented then a higher level authority will accept the responsibility. 
Future efforts in land-use control will increasingly involve higher levels 
of government. 
Some authorities argue that one of the basic reasons the United States 
has open-space problems is because of the people's attitudes and the 
corresponding solution approach, "Before necessary land-use controls can 
be implemented, popular attitudes about private property must be changed 
to engender a collective sense of social responsibilities for the manner 
in which land is used" (30, p. 2). America perpetuates the myths of the 
frontier and of absolute ownership. Governments largely reflect the 
populus. Protection of the traditional views of private property rights 
is still the advocated rule (50, p. 324). "Local governments have not 
been overly zealous in protecting the public's long run land-use control 
interests" (31, p. 9). A popular movement away from absolute property 
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ownership and a governmental movement toward more public and less private 
property rights orientation is warranted and essential to proper land-use 
control. 
Some people argue that the only way to solve new land-use control 
problems is to devise new land-use controls. Others argue for better 
understanding and application of the controls currently available. 
Efforts are being spent on finding new and less costly control techniques 
(39, p. 449). But the problems are of today. Should we wait until 
tomorrow when new devices are perfected or should we solve current problems 
with the tools of today? Perhaps the problems with land-use control do 
not rest with inadequate controls but with inadequate planning and 
administration: "The most promising aspect of current thinking on problems 
of land-use control in America is not that which insists on ever more 
precise and specific types of controls but rather that which seeks a more 
explicit statement of public policies which the controls should 
implement" (27, p. 110). 
Probably the most overriding conclusion in the land-use control 
literature is that for maximum effectiveness, an integration of land-use 
controls is essential. "It's combination. No one of these devices is 
worth very much isolated by itself" (89, p. 68). It is necessary that 
open-space programs obtain a good balance of police power, eminent domain, 
and other land-use controls (54, p. 51). "We customarily compartmentalize 
our thinking ... this compartmentalization causes us to overlook possibilities 
of integrating" (11, p. 56). 
Simple to advocate, integration is much more difficult to accomplish. 
Agencies often use only one control to the exclusion of all others. This 
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is not, typically, the result of analysis to select the best control. 
More likely, it is historical accident. "The more difficult substantive 
problem is determining which technique to use for each situation" (45, 
p. 360). This difficulty is largely based on two factors. First, we 
lack the understanding of how to select a land-use control or controls for 
a specific situation. Second, we lack rudimentary forms of data upon 
which a decision can rest. One of the most important bits of data needed 
is the economic costs of various land-use controls. Before any serious 
effort can be made to integrate land-use controls, an agency ought to 
know how much application actually costs. These data, heretofore, have 
not been available. Looking toward the eventual goal of specifying an 
integrated program of land-use controls, the next portion of this paper 
is devoted to providing some data on the cost of land-use controls. 
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LAND-USE CONTROLS: COST ESTIMATES 
Introduction 
The decision-maker's objective was earlier defined as "choosing among 
the several land-use controls ... to find that optimum combination (or mix) 
to accomplish a policy directive at a cost minimum." Empirical cost 
estimates for selected land-use controls discussed in this section are 
needed to accomplish that objective. "Costs" are considered to be dollar 
flows from the administering agency. There may be additional opportunity 
costs associated with choice of sites for development of outdoor recreation 
facilities or external costs; neither will be given explicit consideration. 
Cost estimates were based on studying the experience of five government 
agencies. 
Objective 
The objective was to estimate the average cost per acre of each 
selected land-use control expressed in terms of present value constant 
(1970) dollars. Cost estimates (C^) may be described as follows: 
Let: cT = per acre constant dollar value cost of land-use 
^ control (i) for i (i = 1 ... 9) where r represents 
one of four discounting rates 
k = project identifier k (k = 1 ... m) 
Xj = per acre cost of cost factor j for j (j = 1 ... n) 
QPI-
k = constant dollar factor using the ratio of the 1970 
CPI^gyg Consumsr Price Index to the Consumer Price Index 
when a project was started 
1 = present value factor to discount costs occurred^t years 
.t after project k began discounted at r = 0, 5, 7=, and 
I f'k 10 percent 
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k = acreage weighting factor for project k 
r k i ^^^k *k^iik 
Objective: determine C, = „ i — for each 
i S S (1+r)^ 
i and r combination.^ 
Method 
The five agencies selected to serve as case studies were the Iowa 
Highway Commission, Iowa Conservation Commission, Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation, Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, and the U.S. 
Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife. Subjective criteria used to select 
these agencies ranged from agency expertise in particular land-use controls 
to immediate usefulness of results. Each agency has had major experience 
with one or more land-use controls applicable to outdoor recreation 
purposes. Study methods for each agency were essentially the same. 
A sampling frame was developed for each agency and land-use control 
studied via land transaction records. The basic sampling unit was either 
an individual land parcel transaction or a land-use project transaction 
consisting of several acquired parcels; this was dependent on the agency's 
record system. The population definition differed for esch agency studied. 
Three definition criteria were used; (1) no procedural change in the 
acquisition process was allowed, (2) cost records had to be available, and 
(3) the acquisition process had to have been completed for each unit studied. 
^Cost sswiïïîstss «C not i.nvoXv£ of cost 
functions, or the underlying production functions. Rather, they were 
developed directly from output levels and input cost relationships. From 
the production function method TPy = f(x); TCy = f(x)Py;and ACy = f(x)Px/Y; 
this study used: TCy = TPyP^ and ACy = TPyP^/Y. Since TPy = r(x), the 
two methods result in the same point estimates; the latter method does 
not allow for continuous estimates. 
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Depending on the number of sampling units in the population, either a 
census or systematic sampling with a random start was conducted. 
The acquisition procedure for each land-use control was determined. 
This knowledge together with agency cost accounting systems was used to 
Identify and define all factors affecting agency-incurred costs. Cost 
factors identified generally reflect the underlying production process. 
Three methods were used to gather data: (1) Investigation of cost 
accounting records, (2) personal interviews, and (3) mail and telephone 
questionnaires. Total response was achieved on every cost factor for 
every sample unit studied. 
Cost data were discounted to the present and converted to a constant 
dollar basis. Costs Incurred after a project began were discounted to 
the project beginning date; this yields the present value cost. Discounting 
rates were 0, 5, 7^, and 10 percent. Constant dollar conversions were 
made to allow cost comparisons for different years. The Consumer Price 
Index was used because its components largely reflect the types of costs 
Incurred in controlling land-use. 
Several similar analyses were conducted on cost data associated with 
each land-use control. Unweighted means, weighted means,^ standard 
deviations, and confidence limits were calculated both for individual 
factors and for total cost of each land-use control on the basis of; 
(1) raw data, (2) constant dollar data, and (3) 5 percent, 7^ percent, 
and 10 percent discounted constant (not current) dollars. Simple 
^The mean (unweighted) Is merely a cost total divided by the number 
of sample units, while the weighted mean Involves weighting by the number 
of acres Involved In each unit. Weighted mean costs will be emphasized. 
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regression analysis was conducted between sample unit cost per acre (Y) 
and respective unit acreage (X) for each land-use control. This analysis 
Investigated the "scale of operations effect" in an attempt to uncover 
cost reductions in land acquisition as the size of taking increases. 
Analysis of variance (one way) was conducted on mean costs between 
different land-use controls within a specific agency. Analysis of covariance 
was conducted to compare the costs of all land-use controls; parcel size 
was the covariate. All statistical tests of hypotheses were made at the 
95 percent level. Other general details involved in these studies can be 
found in Table 6. 
A word of caution should be mentioned. Cost estimates presented 
should be considered minimums. Only cost factors that could not only be 
identified but also for which monetary estimates were available were used 
in these studies. There is, also, an intimate relationship between the 
cost estimate for a land-use control and the agency used in the study. 
General applicability is a problem faced by all case studies. The 
procedure employed by an agency and its organizational structure tend to 
make these cost estimates unique. Several aspects of the study method 
necessarily differed between agencies; these follow. 
Two land-use controls were studied in the Iowa Highway Commission — 
market purchase and mixed acquisition of fee simple title. Under the 
market purchase, all parcels were simply purchased. Under the mixed 
acquisition control, some parcels were purchased while others were 
condemned. Highway Commission land acquisition projects can be 
distinguished as rural or urban; only rural projects were studied. Factors 
influencing the agency-incurred cost of acquisition were identified via 
Table 6 
Land-Use Control Study Descriptions 
Agency 
Studied 
Land-Use 
Control 
Treat 
ment 
ID 
Sample 
Unit 
Population 
Description 
Pop. 
Size 
Sample 
Method 
Sample 
Rate 
No.Cost 
Factors 
Ident. 
Primary 
: Data 
Source 
Iowa Purchase 1 Project Acquired since 7/66 110 System­ 10% 17 Accounting 
Highway fee simple atic w/ & employee 
Commission random records 
start 
Mixed 2 Project II  100 II  10% 18 It  
fee simple 
Iowa Purchase 3 Parcel Acquired since 1/68 170 II  10% 8 Employee 
Conservation fee simple records 
Commission 
Wisconsin Mixed scenic 4 Project Began after 1/66 & 11 Census 100% 15 Accounting 
Department of easement Finished by 11/70 & employee 
Transportation records 
Mixed scenic 5 Project II  7 Census 100% 15 II  
easement & 
Mixed fee 
Mixed 6 Project f t  8 Census 100% 15 II  
fee simple 
Wisconsin Purchase 7 Parcel Began after 1/64 & 12 Census 100% 10 Accounting 
Department of fishery Finished by 11/70 & employee 
Natural easement records 
Resources 
Gift fishery 8 Parcel II  6 Census 100% 10 II  
easement 
U.S. Bureau Purchase 9 Parcel Acquired since 1/68 4200 System­ 1% 11 Employee 
of Sport wetland atic w/ records 
Fisheries easement random 
and Wildlife start 
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cost records and employee knowledge. These are listed and defined in 
Appendix B. Most cost data were determined by researching records at the 
Iowa Highway Commission headquarters, Ames, Iowa. Other data were 
obtained via mail and telephone questionnaires to field locations. 
The Iowa Conservation Commission provided an opportunity to study 
purchase of fee simple title to recreational lands. Cost factors were 
identified through personal interviews with key Land Acquisition Section 
personnel located in the Des Moines, Iowa, headquarters. These are listed 
and defined in Appendix B, The employees associated with acquisition of 
each land parcel were identified. With the exception of the land purchase 
price, ail cost data were obtained by a questionnaire mailed to each 
relevant employee. 
The Wisconsin Department of Transportation uses several land-use 
controls in scenic highway projects. These include purchase and/or 
condemnation and/or gift of scenic easements, or fee simple acquisition. 
The following distinction was made: (1) scenic easement projects; 
(2) scenic easement/fee simple projects; and (3) fee simple projects. In 
each, individual parcels were acquired through combinations of purchase, 
gift, and condemnation. Cost factors representing agency-incurred costs 
were identified through discussions with key personnel and studying the 
agency cost accounting system.^ Cost factors are listed and defined in 
Appendix B. Most cost data were obtained at the Madison, Wisconsin, 
^The current accounting system was initiated early in 1969. While 
this system did not change broad cost categories, it did provide for 
greater internal distinctions within the categories. Both new and old 
systems are reflected in the cost factors evaluated. 
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headquarters by scrutinizing cost records; administrative costs were 
determined by personal interviews. 
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources acquires various types 
of easements for outdoor recreation purposes. Easements relating to 
fisheries, both management and access, were investigated. Easement 
parcels studied were either purchased or received as gifts. This 
distinction was formalized as two land-use controls in subsequent analysis. 
Cost accounting records and interviews with key personnel were used to 
develop a list of factors influencing easement costs. These are listed 
and defined in Appendix B. Cost data from central accounting records 
and personal interviews were available for direct investigation in the 
Madison, Wisconsin, headquarters. Information from field records was 
obtained via mail questionnaires and telephone interviews. 
The U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife was the only federal 
agency studied. More specifically, waterfowl management easements in the 
Midwest Region with regional headquarters in Minneapolis, Minnesota, were 
studied. Key personnel indicated the easement acquisition procedure; 
steps in this process were defined as cost factors and arc listed in 
Appendix B. Field supervisors were questioned to ascertain the identity 
of the personnel associated with each cost factor for each parcel studied. 
A questionnaire was mailed to each employee identified to obtain pertinent 
costs. 
The foregoing study methods resulted in sample/census characteristics 
summarized in Table 7. In total, 123 land acquisition units were 
studied. These ranged in size from less than one to more than five 
hundred acres each and totaled to more than 6,000 acres of property 
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rights acquisition. 
Table 7 
Sample Description by Agencies Studied 
Agency 
and 
Land-Use Control 
Number 
Units 
Sampled 
Total 
Acres 
Sampled 
Acreage 
Range of 
Sample 
Iowa Highway Commission 
Purchase Fee Simple 
Mixed Fee Simple 
11 
10 
152.49 
2014.15 
0.10 -
9.70 -
71.40 
568,15 
Iowa Conservation Commission 
Purchase Fee Simple 17 1395.15 1.00 - 352.00 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation 
Mixed Scenic Easement 
Mixed Scenic Easement and Fee 
Mixed Fee Simple 
11 
7 
8 
111.77 
145.51 
97.32 
2.49 -
4.91 -
1.91 -
25.87 
65.11 
38.93 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources 
Gift Fishery Easement 
Purchase Fishery Easement 
12 
6 
69.19 
25.15 
1.01 -
1.90 -
40.00 
8,00 
U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries & Wildlife 
Purchase Waterfowl Easement 41 2184.00 12.00 - 203.00 
Agency Cost Estimate Results 
The costs associated with application of land-use controls are 
(1) cost of property rights, or land costs; (2) costs of acquisition, or 
non-land costs; and (3) costs incurred after property rights are acquired. 
Cost estimates presented in this section will deal with the first two types 
of cost; the sum of these will temporarily be termed total cost. Table 8 
provides a summary of the best estimates available for acquisition and 
total (land plus acquisition) costs for the land-use controls studied. 
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Supporting cost information for each agency follows. 
Table 8 
Accepted Measure of Land-Use Control Mean Costs 
(In Constant Dollars Per Acre) 
Agency and Acquisition Total 
Land-Use Control Cost Cost 
Iowa Highway Commission 
Purchase Fee Simple $480,28 $1664.72 
Mixed Fee Simple 219,68 1630,94 
Iowa Conservation Commission 
Purchase Fee Simple 7,84 223,20 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation 
Mixed Scenic Easement 69.24 149,27 
Mixed Scenic Easement and Fee 40.53 428.36-6.85(a) 
Mixed Fee Simple 296.35-6.94(a) 484.90 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources 
Gift Fishery Easement 75.78 75.99 
Purchase Fishery Easement 235.70-23.46(a) 210.78 
U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries & Wildlife 
Purchase Waterfowl Easement 4.25-.03(a) 25.63-.08(a) 
Iowa Highway Commission 
The Iowa Highway Commission, without doubt, acquires more land for 
public use than any other Iowa agency. In the past, nearly all lands were 
acquired for highway construction per se. Future activities will probably 
broaden into areas of excess acquisition for other than strictly highway 
Cost information will generally be expressed in constant and/or 
10 percent discounted dollars. The range between the constant and 
10 percent discounted dollars typically reflects the range found in all 
calculations. Cost information for all discounting rates are shown in 
Appendix C. Easement exhibits are shown la Appendix D. 
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purposes. 
The land acquisition activities consist of obtaining fee simple title 
to desired lands. Like many other public agencies, the lova Highway 
Commission has authorization under state law to condemn or purchase desired 
property rights. Under either method, land acquisition activities amount 
to coordinated efforts between the Design, Right of Way, Legal, and Survey 
Sections. The Right of Way Section has the basic acquisition function and 
it draws on the services of other sections. 
Use of eminent domain is restricted. Property rights are condemned 
only after purchase attempts have failed. However, once land has been 
programmed for acquisition, it will be acquired. If condemnation is 
required, what is often termed the "jury method" has been used.^ A jury 
of neighboring landowners is selected and charged with determining the 
condemnation award. Appeal procedures are available to both landowner and 
agency in the event the award settlement is not satisfactory. 
The average total cost of lands acquired by the Iowa Highway 
Commission is over $1,600 per acre. About one-seventh is involved in costs 
associated with land acquisition per se. Table 9 shows average costs per 
acre. In spite of the fact that acquisition costs for purchased lands 
were over double that of mixed acquisition lands, total cost is about 
the same. An analysis of variance was conducted on acquisition and total 
costs for purchase and mixed acquisition lands. Given the sample sizes 
^The procedure has since been changed to where a compensation 
commission of six property owners is appointed by the Chief Judge of the 
applicable judicial district and charged with determining just compensation; 
however, all lands in this study acquired through condemnation utilized 
the "jury method," 
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Table 9 
Iowa Highway Commission; Mean Costs Per Acre 
. „ Acquisition Costs Total Costs 
unwtd. wtd:" ïïHStî: mr.—psTwrgEtzjiTzsn-
Control Mean Mean Mean Mean Confidence Interval 
Purchase Fee Simple 
Constant $ $3630.28 $480.28 $5648.24 $1664.72 $936.71-2392.73 
10% Disc. $ 3492.56 434.20 5398.20 1518.14 811.32-2224.96 
Mixed Fee Simple 
Constant $ 445.87 219.68 2141.25 1630.94 1025.04-2236.84 
10% Disc. $ 414.87 195.51 1957.77 1426.96 916.18-1937.74 
TOTAL 
Constant $ $2116.08 $237.22 $3978,21 $1633.30 $1229.40-2037.20 
involved, there was not sufficient statistical evidence to conclude a 
difference exists between these cost means. If a difference were found, 
it would have been attributed to something inherent in the condemnation 
process. An analysis was conducted to detect the presence of a scale 
effect in acquisition and total costs. In all cases, given the sample 
size involved, there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that the 
average cost goes down as the acquired acreage goes up.^ 
Some unanticipated information was obtained on components of land 
price, as shown in Table 10. Damage to a landowner's remaining property 
accounted for a larger portion of the final purchase contract, for 
purchased lands, than did the value of the raw land. The relationship 
between the condemnation offer and the actual award should be tempered. 
More cost items may be included in a condemnation award than were involved 
in the original offer. The margin of condemnation award over condemnation 
^Stated alternatively, any conclusion of "no scale effect" should be 
understood to mean that the null hypothesis (Ho:P = 0) was not rejected. 
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Table 10 
Iowa Highway Commission: Land Cost Components 
(In Constant Dollars Per Acre) 
Land-Use Control Unweighted Weighted 95% Weighted Mean 
Cost Component Mean Mean Confidence Interval 
Purchase Fee Simple 
Land 
Fence 
Damage 
Tenant Release 
Contract 
Mixed Fee Simple 
Land 
Fence 
Damage 
Tenant Release 
Condemnation Offer 
Condemnation Award 
Contract/Award 
offer does not necessarily reflect any action of the condemnation jury to 
increase the award over the original offer. 
Total costs for both purchased acquisition and mixed acquisition 
are broken into component costs in Table 11, Two cost components are 
noteworthy — administrative costs, which can be assigned to a project 
but not LÔ a specific cost component, and miscellaneous costs, vhich 
cannot be assigned to a specific project. Together these account for 
almost half of the acquisition costs. Apparently, there is some 
difficulty in accounting for costs both within and between projects. 
$ 522.48 $ 496,54 $435.84- 557.23 
233.02 147.03 109.69- 184.36 
1266,39 540,65 211.60- 869.69 
1.91 1.23 0.22- 2.25 
2011,96 1184,44 855.95-1512.92 
360.29 532.76 107.78- 757.74 
49.17 7,30 0.00- 25.86 
297.73 229.97 93.76- 366.18 
1.40 0.49 0,00- 1,01 
526.64 481.32 284.79- 677.84 
673.89 550.14 331,03- 709.25 
851.48 676.97 213.16-1140,79 
Table 11 
Iowa Highway Commission: Factor Costs 
(In Constant Dollars Per Acre) 
Purchase Fee Simple Mixed Fee Simple 
Cost Factor Unwtd. Wtd. 95% Weighted Mean Unwtd. Wtd. 95% Weighted Mean 
Mean Mean Confidence Interval Mean Mean Confidence Interval 
Condemnation Award 
00 <jy 
,84 $638, ,34 $393. ,26- 00
 
00
 
w
 
.42 
Purchase Contract $2011 .96 $1184, .44 $855. ,95-1512, ,92 946, ,54 772, ,92 256, ,83-1289, .01 
Est. R.O.W, Const. 85 .44 90 ,13 0 .00- 16. ,78 1 .53 0. ,15 0, 00- 1, .04 
Title Search 260, 43 15, ,97 0, 00- 81, ,80 10, 44 1, .96 0, ,00- 5, 23 
R.O.W. Design 210, .11 29, ,86 0, ,00- 63, ,06 30, ,16 15. 62 7, 37- 23, ,86 
Appraisal 660, ,66 62, .37 0, .00- 166. 23 63, ,84 32. 79 18, ,62- 46. 95 
Negotiation 436, .55 75. 24 8, ,05- 142. 42 55, ,71 25. 05 4, ,22- 45, .88 
Condemnation 271, .54 11. 83 0, .00- 61. 04 42. ,24 14. ,38 2. 31- 26. 46 
Certificates 0, .01 0. ,07 0, .02- 0, ,18 0. 08 0, ,18 0. 06- 0. 31 
Utilities 0. ,00 0. ,00 0. ,00- 0, ,00 0. ,32 0. ,83 0. 25- 1. ,41 
Property Plats 5, .49 5. 68 1. 41- 4, .14 1. 43 0. ,31 0. 00- 0. ,91 
Property Management 7. 82 0, .72 0. 00- 5. 47 0. 86 1, ,05 0. 03- 2. 07 
Document Exam 80. ,72 12, ,65 0, ,00- 27, ,02 10. 34 1. 85 0, ,00- 5, ,48 
Relocation A»st. 0, ,42 2. ,18 0, .62- 3-.74 0, 01 0, .03 0. 00- 0, ,07 
Old Condemnation 48. 96 26, 57 9. 43- 43. 70 24. 32 24. 16 15, 14- 33, ,19 
Condemnation Survey 0. 89 4. ,57 1. 30- 7. 84 19. 37 8, .34 2. 37- 14-32 
Administration 180. 13 90. 13 35. 38- 144. 88 92. 81 49. 90 21, 89- 77. 92 
Miscellaneous 1383. 25 144. 74 0. 00- 503. 76 92, 42 43. 09 20. 26- 65. 92 
TOTAL $5648. 24 $1664. 72 $936. 71-: 2392. 73 $2141. 25 $1630. 94 $1025. 04-: 2236. 84 
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Iowa Conservation Commission 
The Iowa Conservation Commission is the primary Iowa agency 
responsible for maintaining and promoting conservation activities, all 
of which relate to outdoor recreation. The Conservation Commission is 
authorized to obtain lands in fee simple, and in certain cases easements 
may be obtained. Experience with easements has been disappointing and it 
is not considered a viable land-use control. Property rights are not 
condemned. 
Land acquisition by the Iowa Conservation Commission is a relatively 
minor activity. The main input in this process is accomplished by the 
Land Acquisition Section consisting of less than ten employees. In 
various stages of the acquisition process, however, heavy reliance may be 
placed on personnel from other sections (e.g., Division of Fish and Game). 
The Acquisition Section is a service unit only and responds to requests 
of other units. The land acquisition process is typically decentralized. 
Field personnel from other sections together with certain Acquisition 
Section personnel keep a constant vigil for desirable lands. When these 
become available, formal acquisition may be initiated. This may result 
in desired lands not being acquired or being acquired only after a long 
waiting period. 
Land cost represents almost all of the total land acquisition cost 
for the Iowa Conservation Commission. Table 12 shows that acquisition 
costs represent less than 4 percent of all acquisition costs. This may 
exist for at least two reasons. First, Acquisition Section field 
personnel are constantly looking for suitable lands to purchase. Because 
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Table 12 
Iowa Conservation Commission; Mean Costs Per Acre 
Land-Use 
Control 
Acquisition Costs 
Unwtd. Wtd. 
Mean Mean 
Total Costs 
Unwtd. Wtd. 95% Weighted Mean 
Mean Mean Confidence Interval 
Purchase Fee Simple 
Constant $ $18.67 $7.84 $1187.82 $223.20 $20.25-426.15 
10% Disc. $ 18.03 7.63 1071.75 200.00 16.29-383.71 
no central cost accounting system exists, these costs are difficult to 
discern and may go unaccounted. Second, the decentralized nature of the 
acquisition process often involves various field men, and acquisition 
may be a very minor aspect of their job; the costs, consequently, become 
irretrievably subsumed in their major cost activities. The hypothesis 
that cost reductions and scale of operation are not related was tested 
and accepted. The decentralized nature of land acquisition plus the 
relatively low level of land acquisition activities may account for this. 
The average cost per acre for each cost component in the Conservation 
Commission land acquisition process is shown in Table 13. The most costly 
Iowa Conservation Commission: Purchase Fee Simple Factor Costs 
(In Constant Dollars Per Acre) 
Cost Factor 
Unweighted 
Mean 
Weighted 
Mean 
95% Weighted Mean 
Confidence Interval 
Purchase Contract $1169.15 $215.36 $13.18-417.61 
Survey 5.23 4.22 0.00- 9.21 
Appraisal 1.17 1.17 0.52- 1.82 
Title Search 0, 55 0.20 0.01- 0.39 
Negotiation 6.81 0.70 0.00- 2.00 
Document Exam 2,01 0.22 0.00- 0.61 
Property Plats 0.75 0.07 0.00- 0.19 
Administration 1.32 1.25 0.25- 2.26 
TOTAL $1187.82 $223.20 $20.25-426.15 
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acquisition cost component Is surveying. This may result because these 
costs are definitely assignable to a specific land parcel and cost records 
are relatively accessible and reliable, 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation 
The Wisconsin Department of Transportation has received widespread 
attention concerning its application of scenic easements over the past 
decade. Its expertise in acquisition of easements goes unquestioned. 
Relative to early and mid 1960*s, the volume of easement acquisitions 
used in this study is markedly down, but still done in a skilled manner. 
The department obtains scenic easements and some fee simple titles 
for scenic highway purposes. A standard easement document is used. 
Administratively, easement and fee simple property rights are mixed together 
in a highway beautification program. Property rights are acquired via 
purchase, gift, and condemnation. Eminent domain is used for both 
easement and fee simple acquisition. The condemnation process is known 
as a "quickie" condemnation; basically, this is an extrajudicial process 
and only involves Department of Transportation administration and 
approval. Appeal procedures which may result in subsequent judicial review 
are available to both landowner and agency. 
The department's Right of Way Bureau has the basic responsibility for 
acquiring property rights, A service unit, it responds to acquisition 
requests originating from other divisions. Acquisition is decentralized. 
The central staff is relatively small and some reliance is placed on inputs 
from field personnel. 
The Wisconsin Department of Transportation pays an average cost of 
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$250 per acre for all lands acquired for scenic purposes as shown in 
Table 14. Over one-fourth of all costs are acquisition costs. Relative 
Table 14 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation: Mean Costs Per Acre® 
Acquisition Costs Total Costs 
Unwtd. 
Mean 
Wtd. 
Mean 
Unwtd. 
Mean 
Wtd. 
Mean 
95% Weighted Mean 
Confidence Interval 
Mixed Scenic Easement 
Constant $ 
10% Discounted $ 
$85.17 $69.24 
81.08 66.09 
$173.24 $149.27 
163.58 142.21 
$26.09-272.44 
30.56-253.86 
Mixed Easement/Fee Simple 
Constant $ 
10% Discounted $ 
63.50 
62.75 
40.53 
40.28 
285.01 
278.07 
156.40 
154.40 
5.80-306.99 
5.71-303.20 
Fee Simple 
Constant $ 
10% Discounted $ 
181.03 
174.53 
86.87 
91.85 
646.97 
603.91 
484.90 
455.95 
147.56-822.25 
138.84-753.07 
TOTAL 
Constant $ $118.14 $67.41 $358.40 $249.20 $126.26-372.14 
^Different land-use controls do not acquire identical property rights, 
to total costs, acquisition costs ranged from a high of one-half for scenic 
easement projects to a low of one-sixth for fee simple projects. Curiously, 
nominal acquisition costs were lowest for mixed acquisitiou projects. 
An analysis was conducted to ascertain whether average costs for the 
three classes of land-use controls (T^, T^, and Tg) were statistically 
equal. Results are shown in Table 15. Acquisition and total mean costs 
were found to be statistically different for each control class. There 
was not sufficient evidence to conclude that mean costs for mixed 
acquisition differed from the average of the easement and fee acquisition 
projects. 
Results from the analysis of scale effect are shown in Table 16, No 
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Table 15 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation: Weighted Mean Cost Comparisons 
Mean Cost 
Comparison 
Acquisition Costs 
F Conclusion 
Total Costs 
Conclusion 
T4 = T5 = ^ 6 
T4 = "6 
(T^ + Tg)/2 = Tg 
3.55 
4.85 
2.25 
Reject 
Reject 
Accept 
7.48 
14.42 
0,56 
Reject 
Reject 
Accept 
Table 16 , 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation; Cost Scale Effect 
(In Constant Dollars Per Acre) 
Land-Use 
Control 
Acquisition Costs 
Evidence 
Total Costs 
Evidence 
^ _ , Cost Model: Cog^ Model: 
Mixed Scenic Easement No — No 
Mixed Easement/Fee Simple No — Yes $423.36-6.85(a) 
Mixed Fee Simple Yes $296.35-6.94(a) No 
TOTAL Yes $165.81-3.49(a) No 
Different land-use controls do not acquire identical property rights. 
evidence of scale effect was found for either acquisition or total costs 
for scenic easements. The lack of scale effect evidence in cases of total 
cost was probably due to the important role of relatively constant per acre 
land cost. The scale effect found for the total agency in acquisition 
costs was likely related to the highly significant scale effect detected 
in fee simple acquisition costs. The sample sizes used were not 
sufficiently large to support acceptance of scale of operation effect in 
either acquisition mode involving scenic easements. 
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Record availability made possible a comparison of scenic easement 
values and the corresponding fee simple land values. All easements were 
consolidated and distinguished only by acquisition method — purchase, 
condemnation, and gift. These comparisons are shown in Table 17. The 
Table 17 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation: 
Fee Simple and Scenic Easement Land Values Per Acre 
Acquisition Current Dollar Value Constant Dollar Value 
Method Fee Simple Easement % Fee Simple Easement 7o 
Purchase 
Appraised 
Not Appraised 
$214.97 $ 63.77 
21.93 
29.7 $236.53 $ 69.41 
24.14 
29. 3 
Condemn 
Appraised 
Not Appraised 
741.43 226.36 
7.39 
30.5 800.49 246,70 
7.61 
30. 8 
Gift 
Appraised 
Not Appraised -- 7.07 — — — — 7.70 --
TOTAL 
Appraised 
Not appraised 
Combined 
$271.74 $81.30 
9.60 
50.66 
29.9 $297.35 $88.51 
10.38 
55.11 
29. ,8 
best measure of the easement/fee simple relationship is obtained from 
cases where the land value was appraised. Easement land cost was about 
30 percent of the fee simple value. In total, the agency pays an 
additional $30 for appraised parcels over the $55 per acre average for all 
essenients acquired. This reflects the impact of gift acquisitions. The 
relatively small sample sizes available should temper these results. 
Tables 18, 19, and 20 show the total cost for each land-use control 
on the basis of cost components. The zero cost indicated for the litigation 
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Table 18 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation: Mixed Scenic Easement Factor Costs 
(In Constant Dollars Per Acre) 
Cost Factor Unweighted 
Mean 
Weighted 
Mean 
95% Weighted Mean 
Confidence Interval 
Condemnation Award $ 17.16 $ 13.75 $ 0.00- 38.35 
Purchase Contract 70.91 66.28 9.91-122.64 
Engineering I 17.77 11.65 0.00- 23.37 
Engineering II 3.87 2,69 0.00- 9.75 
ROW I 36.31 31,00 0.00- 68.89 
Appraisal 6.80 6.84 0.00- 18.58 
Public Relations 0.00 0,00 0.00- 0.00 
ROW Operations 6.67 6.01 0.00- 13.05 
Litigation 0.00 0.00 0.00- 0,00 
Site Clearance 0.00 0.00 0.00- 0.00 
Land Management 0.00 0.00 0.00- 0.00 
Utilities Operations 0.00 0.00 0.00- 0.00 
Document Recording 0.91 0.70 0.16- 1.24 
Administration 9.41 6.96 4.03- 9.89 
Unclassified 3.45 3.39 0.00- 7.95 
TOTAL $173.24 $149.27 $26.09-272.44 
Table 19 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation: 
Mixed Scenic Easement/Fee Simple Factor Costs 
(In Constant Dollars Per Acre) 
Cost Factor 
Unweighted Weighted 95% Weighted Mean 
Mean Mean Confidence Interval 
Condemnation Award 
Purchase Contract 
Engineering I 
$ 98. 
1 0 9 
76 
-7C 
$ 41. 
7/. 
59 
OQ 
$0. 
n 
00-152. 
no 1 70 
64 
A7 A.*.*. « 
2. 
/ V 
91 
/ 
2. 
«•o 
59 0. 01- 5. 
v t 
17 
Engineering II 0. 91 0. 35 0. 00- 0. 00 
ROW I 4. 39 7. 48 0. 21- 14. 76 
Appraisal 19. 85 12. 37 0, 00- 31, 13 
Public Relations 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00- 0. 00 
ROW Operations 21. 36 9. 54 0. 00- 24. 87 
Litigation 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00- 0. 00 
Site Clearance 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00- 0. 00 
Land Management 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00= 0. 00 
Utilities Operations 0, 79 0. 30 0. 00- 1. 47 
Document Recording 0. 81 0. 52 0. 13- 0. 91 
Administration 8. 70 4. 86 1. 21- 8. 51 
Unclassified 3. 78 2, 50 0, 00- 6. 37 
TOTAL $285.01 $156.40 $5.30-306.99 
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Table 20 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation: Mixed Fee Simple Factor Costs 
(In Constant Dollars Per Acre) 
Cost Factor 
Unweighted 
Mean 
Weighted 
Mean 
95% Weighted Mean 
Confidence Interval 
Condemnation Award 
00 00 
72 $ 46.58 $ 0. 00-174. 61 
Purchase Contract 377. 22 351,45 70. 82-632. 09 
Engineering I 35. 22 27.21 0. 00- 55. 77 
Engineering II 0. 22 0.14 0. 00- 0. 53 
ROW I 20. 71 14.73 0. 00- 32. 50 
Appraisal 71. 84 24.05 0, 00- 72, 74 
Public Relations 2. 97 0.72 0. 00- 4. 13 
ROW Operations 22. 08 9,95 0. 00- 28. 43 
Litigation 0. 00 0.00 0. 00- 0. 00 
Site Clearance 0. 00 0,00 0. 00- 0. 00 
Land Management 0. 00 0.00 0. 00- 0. 00 
Utilities Operations 0. 00 0.00 0. 00- 0. 00 
Document Recording 1. 06 0.45 0. 00- 0, 91 
Administration 13. 57 5.37 0. 02- 10. 72 
Unclassified 13. 36 4.25 0. 00- 12. 53 
TOTAL $646. 97 $484.90 $147. ,56-822. 25 
cost factor indicates that no condemnation cases were appealed. The 
ROW (Right of Way) I cost factor generally corresponds to a combination 
of appraisal and negotiation. In all cases, the combination of ROW I 
together with appraisal and ROW operations (negotiations) accounted 
for the largest portion of acquisition costs. 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources 
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources is often cited as a 
national leader in the application of easements for various outdoor 
recreation purposes. The early and mid I960's saw great efforts on the 
part of the department in easement acquisition. Easements have ranged 
from scenic, to public access, to wildlife management, to fishery management. 
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and others. This agency does not typically use a standardized easement. 
Each easement document is tailor-made to a specific situation. The 
easements studied are those that are generally oriented toward fishery 
management. 
The Bureau of Real Estate within the Department of Natural Resources 
has the basic responsibility to acquire easement property rights. Both 
field and administrative acquisition procedures can be classified with a 
prefix "semi." The field procedures used by this bureau are semi-centralized. 
That is, while heavy reliance is placed on field personnel from other 
divisions from time to time, the Bureau of Real Estate maintains a highly 
trained central acquisition staff. Administratively, this agency falls 
between the extremes where any lands programmed for acquisition will be 
acquired, and where suitable lands only when readily available will be 
acquired. Semi-program oriented, any property rights acquired by the 
Department of Natural Resources must fit into a land-use project, but the 
project acquisition timetable is not generally critical. 
Property rights may be acquired in several ways. The Department of 
Natural Resources may use eminent domain in certain cases. As a matter of 
policy, this power is seldom exercised and was not used in any cases 
investigated in this study. Many property rights are voluntarily 
surrendered in the form of gifts.^ Acquisition of property rights via 
gifts was particularly apparent in the case of fishery easements. A 
^Cifts of property rights must qualify, however, by being consistent 
with a land-use project description. Where inconsistent, gifts are not 
accepted and the donor is recommended to contact another public or private 
conservation organization. 
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distinction was therefore made between easements acquired through gifts 
and those purchased. 
Table 21 shows the mean costs per acre of acquiring fishery easements 
Table 21 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources: Mean Costs Per Acre 
Land-Use 
Control 
Acquisition Costs Total Costs 
Unwtd. 
Mean 
Wtd. 
Mean 
Unwtd, Wtd. 95% Weighted Mean 
Mean Mean Confidence Interval 
Gift Fishery Easement 
Constant $ 
10% Discounted $ 
$241.01 $ 75.78 
226.27 70.55 
$241.66 $ 75.99 
226.88 70.75 
$ 2.27-149.72 
1.11-140,40 
Purchase Fishery Easement 
Constant $ 128.98 
107o Discounted $ 118.49 
102.18 
95.10 
243.56 220.42 
229.52 210,78 
136.78-304.05 
133.62-287.94 
TOTAL 
Constant $ $203.66 $ 82.84 $242.29 $114.50 $ 50,49-178.50 
by purchase and gift. In total, the agency spends about $115 per acre for 
a fishery easement. Of this total, almost three-fourths is attributable 
to acquisition costs. Nearly all of the total costs associated with 
easement gifts and about half of total costs for purchased easements are 
acquisition costs. An analysis of variance was conducted to determine if 
estimates of average costs for the two acquisition methods were the same. 
While the cost estimates appear quite different, statistical evidence 
(given these sample sizes) supports the position that acquisition and 
touâl costs for each land=usc control are equal. Results of analysis of 
scale effect are shown in Table 22, Total agency cost economies, the mean 
cost per acre going down as the size of the taking increased, were found. 
No evidence of a scale effect was found for gift easements or for total 
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Table 22 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources: Cost Scale Effect 
(In Constant Dollars Per Acre) 
Acquisition Costs Total Costs 
Land-Use 
Control 
Evidence 
of Scale 
Effect 
Cost Model: Evidence cost Model: 
= a-P(acres) "g^fect^ ^ = a-p(acres) 
Gift Fishery Easement No — No 
Purchase Fishery Easement Yes $235.70-25,46(a) No 
TOTAL Yes $247.60-8.38(a) Yes $288.76-8.87(a) 
costs of purchased easements. The invariant and important nature of land 
costs may provide an explanation. 
The relationship between land values and easement values is shown in 
Table 23. The importance of easement gifts is apparent; average total 
Table 23 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources; 
Fee Simple & Fishery Easement Land Values Per Acre 
„ Current Dollar Value Constant Dollar Value Acquisition ___________ 
Method Fee Simple Easement L Fee SimpleEasement% 
Purchase 
Appraised $243,35 $99.40 40.3 $289.07 $117.36 40.6 
Not Appraised 
Gift 
Appraised 430.71 0,17 0.0 529.35 0,20 0.0 
Not Appraised __ 0.36 — — 0.43 
TOTAL 
Appraised $379.23 $27.43 7.2 $463.27 $ 32.39 6.7 
Not Appraised __ 0.36 -- -- 0.43 
Combined __ 26,63 -- — 31.44 
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easement cost was $32,39 compared to $117,36 for those purchased. Purchased 
fishery easements average about 41 percent of fee simple value. 
Tables 24 and 25 show the total cost of fishery easements in terms of 
component costs for gifts and easement purchases. Noteworthy are the 
relatively high costs associated with accurate determination of land 
ownership. With the exception of administrative costs, title-oriented 
costs represent the largest class of costs and range upward to half of 
all acquisition costs. 
Table 24 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources: Gift Fishery Easement Factor Costs 
(In Constant Dollars Per Acre) 
Unweighted Weighted 95% Weighted Mean 
Mean Mean Confidence Interval 
Purchase Contract $ 0.65 $ 0.21 $0. 02- 0.40 
Contract Title Search 49.01 15.85 1. 38- 30.33 
Contract Title Abstract 8.23 2.36 0. 00- 6.45 
Contract Doc. Recording 2.41 0.78 0. 02- 1.53 
Appraisal 24.17 6.37 0. 00- 15.77 
Title Search 4.81 1.97 0. 00- 6.34 
Document Recording 0.00 0.00 0. 00- 0.00 
Survey 21.57 6.16 0. 00- 14.98 
Negotiation 24.79 8.33 0. 00- 19.10 
Admi nis t ra t i on 106.02 33.96 2. 53- 65.39 
TOTAL $241.66 $75.99 
CM 
27-149.72 
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Table 25 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources: 
Purchase Fishery Easement Factor Costs 
(In Constant Dollars Per Acre) 
Cost Factor 
Unweighted 
Mean 
Weighted 
Mean 
95% Weighted Mean 
Confidence Interval 
Purchase Contract $114.58 $118.24 $61.67-174.82 
Contrsot Title Search 25.70 20.71 10.39- 31.05 
Contract. Title Abstract 6,66 5.29 0.00- 11.74 
Contract Doc. Recording 1.74 0.97 0.00- 3.39 
Appraisal 14.64 10.87 3.04- 18.70 
Title Search 1.10 1.11 0.00- 2.82 
Document Recording 0.00 0.00 0.00- 0.00 
Survey 5.12 4.72 0.00- 11.28 
Negotiation 15.19 11.79 0.65- 22.92 
Administration 58.81 46.71 21.76- 71.66 
TOTAL $243.56 $220.42 $136.78-304.05 
U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife 
The Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife may well be one of the 
largest easement acquiring organizations in the nation. The waterfowl 
management easement is an important tool in the wetlands program; about 
828,000 acres are under perpetual easement as of June 30, 1971, in the 
Midwest Region. Property rights acquired in the waterfowl eesement are 
relatively uniform and the legal easement instrument is standardized. 
Within the bureau, the Division of Realty has the responsibility to 
acquire easements. Easement program administration is centralized; 
easement acquisition is largely decentralized, with realty personnel in the 
four states of the region actually obtaining the easement contract. 
Easements are acquired by purchase only within project boundaries; these 
are administrative (state) and not operational boundaries. 
Table 26 shows that both total and acquisition costs are lower for 
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Table 26 
U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife: Mean Costs Per Acre 
Land-Use 
Control 
Acquisition Costs Total Costs 
Unwtd. 
Mean 
Wtd. 
Mean 
Unwtd. 
Mean 
Wtd. 
Mean 
95% Weighted Mean 
Confidence Interval 
Waterfowl Easement 
Constant $ $2.51 
10% Discounted $ 2.32 
$1.68 
1.53 
$21.66 
19.93 
$19.76 
17.90 
$17.15-22.37 
15.56-20.24 
this than for the other agencies. While acquisition costs represent about 
one-tenth of total costs, less than $2 per acre is actually spent on 
acquiring easements. This may be accounted for because; (1) acquisition 
costs sre spresH nver relatively large easement acreages; (2) waterfowl 
management easements have been readily accepted by many landowners; and 
(3) easements are generally acquired by highly trained, professional 
acquisition agents. 
The analysis of scale effects for both total and acquisition costs 
was positive. Statistical evidence indicates that the average cost per 
acre goes down as the size of the taking increases. This relationship is 
much more significant for acquisition cost than for total cost. The 
appropriate per acre cost expression for acquisition cost is 
($4.25-.03(acres)) and for total cost is ($25.63-.08(acres)). 
Easement cost as a percentage of fee for waterfowl easement property 
rights is largely invariant. This is shown in Table 27. Easement land 
prices average about 20 percent of fee. This is likely explained by 
administrative operating procedures. 
The average total and component costs of waterfowl easement 
acquisition are shown in Table 28. As expected, the largest cost component 
is the easement land price. Regional office review is the single largest 
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Table 27 
U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife: 
Fee Simple and Waterfowl Easement Land Value Per Acre 
State Current Dollar Value Constant Dollar Value 
Acquired Fee Simple Easement % Fee Simple Easement 7o 
Minnesota $129.58 $27.12 20.9 $144.17 $29.92 20. 9 
North Dakota 74.51 15.19 20.4 78.96 15.99 20. 3 
South Dakota 85.18 18.31 21.5 90.87 19.23 21. 2 
TOTAL $79.88 $16.54 20.7 $488.21 $17.47 20. ,5 
Table 28 
U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife; 
Purchase Waterfowl Easement Factor Costs 
(In Constant Dollars Per Acre) 
Cost Factor 
Unweighted 
Mean 
Weighted 
Mean 
95% Weighted Mean 
Confidence Interval 
Purchase Contract $19.15 $18.08 $15.62-20.54 
Select Work Area 0.12 0.07 0.00- 0.16 
Select Specific Ownership 0.13 0.13 0.02- 0.23 
Court House Review 0.15 0.10 0.07- 0.13 
Contact Fee Owner 0.20 0.12 0.07- 0.17 
Value Estimate 0.24 0,15 0.09- 0.20 
Negotiation 0.29 0.19 0.11- 0,26 
Final Package Preparation 0.19 0.13 0.10- 0.16 
Supervisor Review 0.10 0.06 0.04- 0.08 
Supervisor Transmittal 0,06 0.04 0.02- 0.06 
Regional Office Review 1.04 0.70 0.54- 0.85 
TOTAL $21.66 $19.76 $17.15-22.37 
acquisition cost. When all administratively oriented (nonfield) costs 
are summed, they account for about one-half of all acquisition costs. 
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General Cost Estimate Results 
The preceeding cost estimates were exclusively oriented toward a 
specific agency. Cost estimates presented here disassociate land-use 
controls from an administering agency. Most costs were grouped into 
eight major cost categories, so that cost estimates for each category are 
comparable to the largest extent possible. In some cases, this resulted 
in a smaller average total cost because items peculiar to a given agency 
were not included. Total agency costs consist of the value of the property 
rights (land) acquired, acquisition costs, and subsequent administrative 
costs. Several cost analyses shed light on land-use control costs. 
Table 29 shows mean costs for each land-use control (treatment) 
studied on the basis of the consolidated cost categories. Total cost 
ranges from a high of $1,664 for fee purchase to a low of about $20 per 
acre for waterfowl easement purchase.^ 
An analysis of scale effect was conducted on each land-use control 
for acquisition and total costs. The results are shown in Table 30, It 
can be noted that while the conclusions for each land-use are the same as 
when each agency was discussed separately, the coat models may be 
different. In general, it appears that cost reductions due to increases 
in the scale of operation are the exception rather than the rule. This 
seems reasonable enough for total costs because of the invariant nature 
^Cost data used in this study were final costs. No explicit effort 
was made to identify physical inputs or employee cost rates. Approximate 
cost rate ranges serendiptiously uncovered are shown in Appendix E. The 
interested reader may use these to make cost structure comparisons. 
Table 29 ^ 
Land-Use Control Costs 
(In Constant Dollars Per Acre) 
Cost 
Category Fee 
Purchase 
Fee 
Mixed 
Fee 
Purchase 
4 
Scenic 
Easement 
Mixed 
5 
Scenic 
Easement 
Fee Mixed 
Fee 
Mixed 
7 8 9 
Fishery Fishery Waterfowl 
Easement Easement Easement 
Gift Purchase Purchase 
Land Costs $1184, .44 $1411. 26 $215, .36 $ 80, 03 $125, .87 $398, .03 $ 0. 21 $118, .24 $18. 08 
Plats & Survey 35. ,54 15. 93 4, ,29 14. 34 2, .94 27. ,35 6. ,19 4. 72 0. ,00 
Document 28, 62 3. 81 0, .42 0, ,70 0. 52 0. ,45 20. 96 28. 08 0, .10 
Appraisal 62, ,37 32. 79 1. 17 6. ,84 12, ,37 24. 05 6. ,37 10. 87 0. ,15 
Negotiation 75. ,24 25. 05 0, ,70 6, ,01 9. ,54 10. ,67 8. ,33 11. ,79 0, ,31 
Condemnat ion 42. ,97 46. 88 0. ,00 0. ,00 0. ,00 0. ,00 0, ,00 0. 00 0. ,00 
Administration 90. ,13 49. 90 1, 25 6, ,96 4. ,86 5. ,37 33. ,96 46. ,71 1. ,13 
Miscellaneous 144. 74 43. 09 0. ,00 34. 39 9, ,98 18. ,98 0, 00 0. ,00 0. ,00 
TOTAL $1664. 05 $1628, 71 $223. 20 $149. 27 $166, 08 $484. 90 $75. 99 $220, 42 $19. 76 
^Different land-use controls do not acquire identical property rights. 
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Table 30 ^ 
General Land-Use Controls; Cost Scale Effect 
(In Constant Dollars Per Acre) 
Acquisition Costs Total Costs 
Land-Use 
Control 
Evidence 
of Scale 
Effect 
Cost Model: 
Y = a-p(acres) 
Evidence 
of Scale 
Effect 
Cost Model: 
Y = a-p(acres) 
Purchase 
Fee Simple 
No -- No - -
^2 
Mixed 
Fee Simple 
No No -  -
^3 
Purchase 
Fee Simple 
No No 
Mixed 
Scenic Easement 
No - - No - -
^5 
Scenic Easement & No 
Mixed Fee Simple 
--
Yes $427.03-6.82(a) 
Mixed 
Fee Simple 
Yes $256.08-6.17(a) No -  -
^7 
Gift 
Fishery Easement 
No No - -
Tg Purchase 
Fishery Easement 
Yes $235.70-25.46(a) No --
Purchase Yes 
Waterfowl Easement 
$4.25-.03(a) Yes $25.63-.08(a) 
^Different land-use controls do not acquire identical property rights. 
of land costs. Visions of organizational efficiencies would lead one to 
expect cost scale effects, however, for acquisition costs. 
An analysis of covariance was conducted on all land-use controls for 
acquisition and total mean costs. The results are shown in Table 31. 
Basically, this analysis allows comparison of mean cost where any "scale 
effect" has been eliminated. The data were fit to the model: 
Y = a + T^ + P(X-X), where a is the overall mean, T^ are the adjusted 
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Table 31 
General Land-Use Controls; Weighted Mean Cost Comparisons 
Mean Cost Comparison 
Accept or Reject Comparison 
Acquisition Cost Total Cost 
Reject Reject 
Reject Reject 
(T^ + ^  + ^  + T^)/4 - Accept Accept 
II Accept Accept 
(T^ + T^)/2 = T^ Accept Accept 
(T^ + T^)/2 = T^ Accept Accept 
(T^ + T^ + T^ + T^)/4 = T^ Accept Accept 
T^ + fJ + f^ + T^ = T^+f^ + T^ + f^ Reject Reject 
land-use control (treatment) cost means, and (X-X) is the adjustment 
covariate acres. Because of the continuous covariate, independent 
orthogonal comparisons were not possible; the comparisons shown are 
nonindependent results. When comparisons of total and acquisition costs 
were made for fee simple controls, all means were found to be unequal; 
this result probably reflects agency operational differences. There was 
no difference in acquisition and total costs for any easement. This may 
be due to large variances in cost data or to the fact that the population 
parameters are in fact equal. 
Easement land value/fee simple value relationships shown earlier 
have been consolidated in Table 32, The values for gift easements should 
be understood to reflect minimum payments for any land transaction; 
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Table 32 
Easement/Fee Simple Relationships 
(In Constant Dollars Per Acre) 
Acquisition 
Method 
Scenic Fishery Waterfowl 
$ % Fee $ % Fee $ % Fee 
Purchase Appraised $ 69.41 29.3 $117,36 40.6 $17.47 20,3 
independent of acres involved, this ranged from $1 to $50 minimums. 
The literature often reflects the belief that the total of land and 
acquisition costs does not account for all the relevant land-use control 
costs. Depending on the nature of the property rights acquired, there may 
be administrative costs incurred subsequent to rights acquisition. For 
instance, ownership of fee title may obligate the owner to remove noxious 
weeds and ownership of an easement may necessitate future policing of the 
agreement. These subsequent administrative costs must be periodically 
accomplished and are quite independent of any management program; they 
are a cost of ownership. A modest attempt was made to ascertain these 
the results of these investigations. Subsequent administrative costs 
for scenic and fishery easements were determined to be essentially at 
the zero level; the only activity was agreement policing which was not 
accomplished through any sort of regular program. Costs that could be 
determined were collected for 1970 and then divided by the total land 
area over which they were applied. This resulted in an average annual 
per acre cost estimate. The present value of these annual costs was 
then calculated. 
Condemn Appraised 
Gift 
246,70 30.8 
7,70 0,43 
costs where applicable to outdoor recreation projects. 
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Table 33 ^ 
Land-Use Control Subsequent Administrative Costs 
Land-Use 
Control 
1970 Per Acre 
Annual Cost 
Present Discounted Value 
5% 10% 
Fee Simple 
Game Management 
Fence 
Weed Control 
Protection 
Drainage 
$0.128 
0.170 
0.002 
0.036 
$2.56 
3.40 
0.04 
0.72 
$1.70 
2.27 
0.03 
0.48 
$1.28 
1.70 
0.02 
0.36 
Total 0.336 6.72 4.48 3.36 
Forest Management 
Fence 
Weed Control 
Protection 
Legal 
0.214 
0.057 
0.110 
0.014 
4.28 
1.14 
2,20 
0.28 
2.85 
0.76 
1.47 
0.19 
2.14 
0.57 
1.10 
0,14 
Total 0.395 7.90 5.27 3.95 
Waterfowl Easement 
Policing 0.07 1.40 0.93 0.70 
Scenic Easement 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 
Fishery Easement 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 
^Different land-use controls do not acquire identical property rights, 
The best estimates û£ total and acquisition costs for the 
controls studied are shown in Table 34. These cost estimates are 
associated with organizational characteristics. The decision-guide for 
selection was that if a cost scale effect: were detected, it would be the 
best measure of cost; otherwise, the weighted mean cost was used. Cost 
estimates are best applied to organizations with structures similar 
to those listed. Total costs presented reflect the earlier assumption 
that total costs equals the sum of land and acquisition costs. Subsequent 
administration costs should be added where appropriate. 
Table 34 
General Land-Usie Controls; Accepted Measures of Mean Costs 
(In Constant Dollars Per Acre) 
Land-Use Control Agency 
Size 
Acquisition 
Organization 
Project Acquisition 
Required Costs 
Total 
Costs 
Purchase Fee Simple Large Centralized Yes $479.61 $1664.05 
Tg Mixed Fee Simple Large Centralized Yes 217.45 1628.71 
Purchase Fee Simple Small Centralized No 7.84 223.20 
T, Mixed Scenic Easement 
4 
Medium 
Large 
Decentralized Yes 69.24 149.27 
Scenic Easement & 
Mixed Fee Simple 
Medium 
Large 
Decentralized Yes 40.21 427.03-6.82(a) 
Tg Mixed Fee Simple Medium Decentralized 
Large 
Yes 256.08-6.17(3) 484.90 
Gift Fishery Easement Medium Semi-Central Yes 75,78 75.99 
T_ Purchase Fishery Easement Medium Semi-Central 
o 
Yes 235.70-25.46(a) 220.42 
T. Purchase Waterfowl 
Easement 
Medium Decentralized 
Large 
No 4.25-0.03(a) 25.63-0.08(a) 
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Conclusions 
Accessibility to reliable cost records was critical to this study. 
From an agency view, it is difficult to imagine something approaching 
optimal land-use control application without knowledge of costs previously 
incurred and their corresponding effectiveness. Adequate cost records 
were not always available. Some agencies have no cost accounting system. 
Others encounted difficulties ranging from inability to retrieve desired 
cost information to unreliable or inappropriate cost information retrieved. 
A major problem faced by any cost accounting system is GIGO -- garbage in, 
garbage out. The importance of accurate cost records should be made more 
obvious to personnel supplying basic cost inputs. Where cost accounting 
systems do not exist, investigations should be undertaken to determine the 
benefits and costs of initiating such a system. Where already in operation, 
efforts should be made to render cost record outputs meaningful, consistent 
with the expense of so doing. 
Land costs are geographically variable, depending on the land's 
underlying highest and best use. When accurate appraisal records were 
available, partial versus total taking of all fee lands under a single 
ownership was found important. Partial taking of an ownership typically 
involves damage to the remaining lands. Iowa Highway Commission appraisal 
records indicate that damage to the remainder ranged from about half to more 
than the value of the land alone. Implications of this should be considered 
in fee simple acquisition. Not surprisingly, land costs were the lowest 
when the property rights were received as gifts. Gift acquisitions should 
be more thoroughly investigated as a less costly alternative to purchase or 
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condemnation. There was opportunity to investigate two types of 
condemnation procedures. In neither case was total cost higher for 
condemned property rights than for purchased rights. This is not to say 
that condemnation never involves greater costs, but rather that these 
findings did not support this contention. 
Acquisition costs largely depend on organizational procedures end 
structures which vary widely. Cost data researched do not allow inferences 
to be drawn as to desirability of organizational procedures or structure. 
Subjective judgements may be drawn. Variation in acquisition costs may be 
related to whether an organization acquires property rights because they 
are needed to accomplish a land-use program or because the rights are 
available. It is expected that strong pressures (e.g., the budget 
appropriation process) will require early program planning and subsequent 
property rights acquisition to be consistent with a land-use program. This 
may have advantages for the agency. Only when rights acquisition was 
associated with a predetermined outdoor recreation land-use program were 
any acquisition cost economies of scale found. Conclusions relating to 
the desirability of a centralized or decentralizeu acquisition staff do 
not seem possible. All discussions with key officials, however, indicate 
that high quality negotiators are indispensable. The power of eminent 
domain is judged as a critically important tool that should be available to 
negotiators. High quality negotiators will lessen dependency on the 
condemnation alternative. Explicit efforts were not made to uncover cost 
saving ideas for property rights acquisition. Possible innovations should 
be investigated. An example inadvertantly found relates to title insurance 
which guarantees the title quality at, for instance, the land fee value. 
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One official found that the insurance policy costs about the same as the 
amount the agency spends on document work. By purchasing insurance, the 
insurance company did the document work and further guaranteed the value 
of the land against title defect. 
Subsequent administrative costs were found to represent a small 
portion of total acquisition costs. This may be due to incomplete cost 
records or, more likely, to the fact that these costs are basically low. 
Subsequent administrative costs will probably rise in the future. As cost 
accounting systems improve, these costs will become increasingly accountable. 
More importantly, subsequent activities will probably expand. Environmental 
pressures on fee owners may well dictate a higher level of stewardship, 
independent of management activities, in the future. Subsequent easement 
administration will likely increase through initiation and formalization 
of procedures. One official indicated plans to insure easement perpetuity 
by periodically refiling the legal document and reinforcing the easement 
conditions through discussions with the fee landowner. 
Cost estimate results and conclusions must be tempered. Results 
were largely dictated by the agencies studied and should be applied to 
agencies with similar structures and using similar methods. Nonetheless, 
the cost estimates presented do represent the best available information 
on land acquisition costs. Recognizing the drawbacks inherent in these 
results, they do have some empirical significance in outdoor recreation 
land-use planning and decision-making. 
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LAND-USE CONTROLS: DECISION-MAKING 
Introduction 
Information concerning the general nature of and cost estimates for 
land-use controls has already been presented. The third type of information 
needed by decision-makers to efficiently accomplish land-use projects 
concerns the decision-making process itself. How does one make decisions 
concerning how much and which land-use control to use in accomplishing 
project and other requirements? One possible method is presented here. 
This method is applicable to decisions made during the planning stage 
of a land-use project rather than to actual field completion. One decision 
problem is where an agency must plan and analyze a proposed project prior-
to requesting formal project approval from a legislative body; it may be 
required to submit project cost estimates and other details. Another 
instance is where an agency receives authorization for a project together 
with a budget appropriation; the agency must then attempt to most 
efficiently utilize its alotted budget, 
A hypothetical example will be employed to demonstrate resolution 
of several decision-making opportunities. The land-use project, the 
government agency, and the land-use controls available to the agency are 
all hypothetical. This in no way negates the applicability of the 
decision-making method described. Generality of the method presented 
can be more effectively presented. 
The hypothetical government agency is assumed to be basically 
centralized with a small but highly-trained field acquisition staff. 
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Property rights are acquired only when associated with a formal land-use 
project. The land-use controls available to this agency are indicated 
and identified as Y's in Table 35. No explicit definition will be given 
Table 35 
Hypothetical Agency Land-Use Controls 
Property Rights Method of Acquisition 
Acquired Purchase Condemnation Gift 
Fee Simple 
^1 
- -
Scenic Easement 
^2 ^3 
Fishery Easement 
^6 
Wildlife Easement --
Development Easement 
^10 
- - - -
each type of property rights group except that fee simple ownership is 
understood to imply control of all possible property rights. The scenic 
easement generally prohibits activities that reduce the scenic quality of 
applicable lands. The fishery and wildlife easements allow lands to be used 
pursuant to management activities. The development easement forbids the 
landowner to change land-use except within a specified set of restrictions. 
When eminent domain is used to acquire any right, it is assumed to be 
done through a "quickie" condemnation procedure; the basic process is 
extrajudicial and only involves the agency administration. This agency 
uses a 7^ percent discounting rate in all cost calculations. 
This example requires the agency to make three types of decisions 
concerning the prospective land-use project. First, the agency must decide 
on the best combination of property rights for project accomplishment at a 
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cost minimum. Second, the agency must decide how to acquire maximum 
combination of property rights subject to a budget appropriation constraint. 
And third, the agency must acquire maximum combination of property rights 
subject to budget and other constraints. 
These types of decisions lend themselves to numerical analysis in a 
programming format. The general programming problem is to find the 
optimum levels of (X^, X^, •**, X^) to: 
Minimize (or maximize): 
f(X^, Xg, ..., X^) 
Subject to: 
§1(^1> ^2' » = ^1 
x," V 
X.iO 
The basic components of this are the objective function f(X^, Xg, X^), 
the restriction function g^(X^, X^, X^), and the restrictions 
Most subsequent efforts to describe the decision-making method involve 
identification and specification of these components. 
The objective and restriction functions may be linear or nonlinear. 
The linear form basically involves independent X's raised to the first 
2 
power. The nonlinear form involves terms like X^ , or X^Xg. Depending 
on the form of the objective and restriction functions, either linear 
or nonlinear programming should be used to solve the problem. Subsequent 
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decision-making problems are formulated in linear and nonlinear forms. 
Decision-making 
Solution to the decision-making problems is largely a matter of 
information gathering. The lesser difficulty associated with the 
mathematical operations is relegated to a programmed electronic computer. 
Some information is basic to all decision-making problems discussed, 
while other information needs are specific to each decision-making problem. 
Basic information 
Data needed to specify the objective and restriction functions 
provides a framework for all necessary information. Three types of 
information are needed: costs of land-use controls, project requirements, 
and productivity of the land-use controls in accomplishing project 
requirements. 
Cost information Cost estimates presented earlier are the basic 
source of all needed cost information. Original cost data will be modified 
for these examples. Some cost-incurring activities will be added to the 
previous cost estimates. A cost estimate for a land-use control not 
previously studied, development rights easement, will be developed. 
Appropriate cost expressions can be identified by considering each 
land-use control separately. Within each control, acquisition costs, 
property rights (land) costs, and subsequent administration costs should 
be identified. 
Subsequent administration costs may be divided into two groups: 
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fee simple and easement. Subsequent fee simple costs were shown earlier 
(Table 33) for game and forestry purposes. A simplifying assumption is 
that all fee lands will be uniformly used for forestry, game, and park 
purposes and that subsequent park costs equal the average of forestry and 
game. Using the 7^ percent discounted value, subsequent fee simple 
administration costs are: (4.48 + 5.27 +(4.48 + 5.27)/2)/3=$4,88 per 
acre. Subsequent easement costs are defined as those involved in 
(1) policing the easement agreement and (2) re-recording the easement 
document every ten years. The present value of easement policing was 
earlier determined to be $0,932 on a 7^ percent discount basis. Subsequent 
recording costs may be calculated by determing the mean of all recording 
costs ($0.64 per acre), dividing this by 10 years ($0,064 per acre 
per year), and calculating the 7g percent discounted value ($0,085), 
Subsequent easement cost is then the sum of policing and re-recording 
costs ($0,932 + $0,085) or $1.07 per acre. 
Land costs may be divided into three groups; (1) fee simple purchase 
and condemnation, (2) easements, and (3) gifts. Any fee simple land 
value, whether purchased or condemned, will be defined as the fair market 
value. The hypothetical agency will be assumed to pay a minimum of $50 
per gift transaction; this may be viewed as an insurance policy against 
any potential charge that the agency took undue advantage of a landowner. 
Easement land values may be divided into purchased and condemned easements. 
Results shown in Table 32 will be used. The most desirable measure of 
easement land cost is that of "percentage of fee," Purchased scenic, 
fishery, and waterfowl easements were valued at 29.3, 40.6, and 20.3 
percent of fee simple value respectively. Easement condemnation estimates 
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were available only for scenic easements — 30.8 percent of fee. It is 
assumed that the relationship between purchased and condemned scenic 
easements will be valid for other condemned easements. The land value 
for condemned fishery easements is therefore ((,308/.293).406) or 
42.7 percent of fee value. The presumed availability of the development 
rights easement requires more assumptions. The literature indicates that 
this easement is difficult and costly to obtain. For planning purposes, 
it is assumed that the development rights easement is 50 percent more 
difficult and expensive to obtain than the scenic easement. Purchased 
development rights easement land value is therefore set at 44 percent 
of fee simple. 
The final category of land-use control costs is acquisition costs. 
Implicit in all cost estimates previsouly discussed is the size (acreage) 
of the sample projects from which these estimates were developed. Results 
should be applied to projects of similar size. While empirical application 
often requires the user to go beyond the range of sample data, this should 
only be done in full knowledge of the implications. In the case at hand, 
users msy wish to apply results to a land-use project involving larger 
acreage acquisitions than those upon which the cost estimates are based. 
There is no valid way to do this. Probably the least objectionable way 
is to use the cost estimates involving scale effect and constant terms 
for projects involving relatively small acreage acquisitions; Table 7 
should be used as a guide. Cost estimates involving a constant term 
only should be used for large acquisition projects. Linear cost estimates 
can then be considered appropriate for large acquisition projects and 
nonlinear estimates for small acquisition projects. These two types of 
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estimates are presented with several discounting rates for all land-use 
controls in Table 32 of Appendix E. 
Acquisition costs equal the costs per acre times the applicable 
acreage. Acquisition costs per acre are obtained directly from Table52 
in Appendix E. Some of the small acquisition project cost estimates in 
Table 52 involve cost reductions as the size of taking increases. This 
is important in two ways. First, when a cost equation of the form 
2 
Y = a + PXj is multiplied by (acres of X^), a X^ term appears. 
Second, if one landowner's property is being considered for different 
purposes, acquisition cost reductions experienced when one portion 
of the land is acquired will affect the acquisition costs for the other 
portions. This results in X,X^ terms in a cost equation. Either the 
2 
X^ or X^Xg term requires a solution procedure different from a problem 
with such terms absent. 
Information on land, subsequent administration, and acquisition 
costs may be combined into cost equations for each land-use control. 
Results of these calculations are shown in Table 36 under the headings 
of linear and nonlinear forms. The first step in developing these costs 
is for the agency to examine Table 34, and select the land-use control 
and agency characteristic most applicable to itself. For scenic, fishery, 
and waterfowl easements the obvious selection is made. For fee simple 
ownership T^ is selected as most appropriate. The development rights 
easement is considered to be 50 percent greater than T^. With these 
selections made, the hypothetical decision-maker can now use Table 52 
in Appendix E and previously stated information to develop cost 
expressions. For example, the linear form of fee simple purchase or 
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Table 36 
Optional Cost Functions: f(C.,X.T + ••• + in) il il ilO ilO 
Cost Large Acquisition Project Small Acquisition Project 
Function (Linear Form) (Nonlinear Form) 
^ilhl 
(Fee + 87.90)X.^ (Fee + 255,06 - 6.09X^^ - 6.09X^^)X.^ 
(.293(Fee) + 67.89)X^2 (.293(Fee) + 67,89)X^2 
^i3^i3 
(.308(Fee) + 67.89)X^ (.308(Fee) * 67.89)X^ 
^i4^i4 
((50/R.) + 67.89)X.^ ((50/R^) + 67.89)X^^ 
CisXis (.406(Fee) + 97.79)X^^ (.406(Fee)+218.15-22,95X. ^-22.95Xj^^)X.^ 
CIGFIS ((.308/.293)(.406)(Fee)+97.79)X.g (,427(Fee)+218,15-22.95X.^-22,95X^^)X ^ 
((50/R.) + 72.84)X.^ ((50/R.) + 72.84)X.^ 
^i8^i8 (.203(Fee) 4- 2.64)X (,203(Fee) + 5,09 - ,03X. g  -  .03X^ g)X. g  
^i9^i9 ((50/R.) + 2.64)X. g  ((50/R.) + 5.09 - .03X. g  - .03X^ g)X. g  
CiioXiio(.609(Fee) + 101.30)X.^Q  (.609(Fee) + 101.30)X.^ q  
condemnation cost (T^) is the sum of land value (fee), subsequent 
administration costs ($4.88) and acquisitions costs ($83.02), These total 
to (Fee + $87.90) per acre. The nonlinear form of fee simple is the sum 
of land value (fee), subsequent administration costs ($4,88) and acquisition 
costs ($250,18 - $6.09(X)). This totals to (Fee + $255.06 - $6.09(X)), 
The - $6.09(X^^) term has been added in Table 36 to account for any other 
fee acquisitions in a specific ownership. 
Project requirements While the general cost expressions just 
developed are not particularly unique to any specific land-use project, 
project requirements are. Project (land-use) requirements are proposed 
land-use activities within a project translated into an analytical form. 
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Boat landings and picnic areas are possible land-use activities. A basic 
and quite possibly heroic assumption is that tlie agency knows in advance 
just what activities it wants to accomplish in the project. The hypothetical 
agency possesses this knowledge. 
Physical surface characteristics of the proposed project are shown 
in Figure 1. The project totals 2,165 acres. Each square represents 
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Figure 1 
Hypothetical Land-Use Project Surface Characteristics 
ten acres. The lake is assumed to be public property. Whether or not a 
land surface as depected actually exists is irrelevant. Its purpose 
here is to help demonstrate a planning procedure. 
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Figure 2 shows proposed land-use activities for the hypothetical 
project. A multi-purpose project, it may well have more land activities 
per acre than any actual project. An unnecessary but simplifying 
assumption is that the land-use activities follow 10 acre square boundaries. 
Discussions with personnel from the agencies indicate that the ability to 
draw a land-use activity map similar to this is dubious — they simply do 
not look that far ahead. Yet it is this very type of advanced knowledge 
and planning that is critical fo proper land-use control administration. 
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Hypothetical Land-Use Project Activities 
The next information needed concerns land ownership. Figure 3 shows 
that six landowners own all the land being considered for this project; 
any amount of owners would be equally applicable to this method, A simplifying 
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Figure 3 
Hypothetical Land-Use Project Ownership Status 
but unnecessary assumption is that land ownership boundaries follow 
10 acre square boundaries. 
Next, land-use activities are sLratified into restriction classes. 
This classification is unnecessary except to simplify explanation. Table 37 
indicates land-use activities and the appropriate land-use restriction 
class. Restriction classes range from a high to a low degree of control 
over land. The definition of each restriction class may be implicit or 
explicit and may vary from project to project. In the case at hand, the 
high control class is understood to mean the agency feels it must have 
essentially complete control over the land to accomplish its perceived 
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Table 37 
Restriction Class Relationship 
Land-Use Restriction Class 
, Moderate „ , ^ Moderate 
Land-Use Activities High y. . Moderate Low 
Control ^ . Control . Control 
Control Control 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Boat Landing x 
Canoe Run x 
Buffer #1 X 
Public Hunting & General Use x 
Waterfowl Production x 
Public Shooting Ground x 
Buffer #2 x 
Shore Fishing x 
Low Intensity Camping x 
Scenic Highway Corridor x 
Buffer #3 x 
Scenic Vista x 
Ski Area & Access x 
Buffer #4 % 
Hiking Trail x 
Headquarters x 
Buffer #5 x 
Nursery x 
Registration Office x 
Public Beach x 
Play Area x 
Auto & Tent Camping x 
Buffer #5 x 
desires. Low control means the agency can accomplish its desires with little 
or no additional control needed. Assignment of each activity to a restriction 
class is a subjective decision to be made on the basis of agency planning 
expertise. 
We may define a project restriction as every different combination 
of land ownership and land-use restriction class. Table 38 shows project 
restriction classes and the number of acres in each. Figure 4 shows this 
same information in map form. As can be seen, no land owner has land in 
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Project 
Table 38 
Programming Restrictions 
Land 
Owner 
Land-Use 
Restriction Class Acres 
Project 
Restriction 
1 4 280 
1 5 110 
2 3 130 
2 5 350 
3 2 220 
S 
4 5 180 
5 1 300 
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Hypothetical Land-Use Project Restrictions 
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more than two land-use restriction classes — again, a simplifying but 
unnecessary convention. Each project restriction class has meaning only 
when it is translated back to its ownership and land-use restriction 
classes. As developed, the hypothetical project is now described in terms 
of ten project restriction classes ranging from 110 to 350 acres each. 
With information available on both the cost of land-use controls and the 
project requirements, the next type of information needed is the applicability 
of each control to each restriction. 
Productivity characteristics The hypothetical agency has ten 
land-use controls available to acquire property rights in each of ten 
restriction classes. Land-use control productivity may be defined as the 
expected ability of a control to produce a unit of land for a project 
restriction class. There are two components to the idea of productivity. 
The first is obvious -- the inherent productivity associated with each 
land-use control based on the types of property rights acquired. For 
example, fee simple ownership acquires all available property rights; no 
matter what restriction class to which it is applied, fee ownership is by 
definition perfectly productive. Clearly, easements are different. The 
second component of productivity is the probability of accomplishment. 
This is best explained by the example of a fee simple gift. While the 
inherent productivity of fee ownership is perfect (let this equal 1.0), 
the probability of acquiring the property rights through gift may be only 
25 percent. The productivity of a land-use control is the product of its 
inherent productivity and the probability of accomplishment. In the case 
just described, fee simple gift productivity equals 100 percent times 
25 percent or (.25). Rather than productivity, the calculation results in 
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a measure of "expected productivity." 
Two assumptions are necessary. First, the probability of accomplishment 
for land-use controls involving condemnation, purchase and gift is such 
that > Pp > Pg. This is a fairly reasonable assumption and expedites 
productivity calculations. Probability of condemnation is defined as 
1.0 because the hypothetical agency can always condemn property rights. 
The second assumption is that the probabilities of condemnation, purchase, 
and gift are independent of each other except as indicated above. In all 
cases, assignments of these probabilities is a subjective judgment made 
by agency personnel. The quality of this judgment depends on a knowledge 
of individual landowner reaction to land-use controls. 
Results of productivity calculations for the hypothetical land-use 
project are shown in Table 39. The land-use controls indicated are the 
Table 39 
Land-Use Control Productivity Coefficients 
Land-Use Control 
Class 
^2 ^3 ^5 ^6 ^7 ''8 ^9 ^0 
1.0 .72 .90 .54 .35 .70 .28 .12 .90 .80 
^2 
1.0 .70 1.00 .67 .24 .40 .16 .35 .25 .70 
S 
1,0 .56 .70 .42 .20 .40 .16 .72 .56 .56 
\ 1.0 .70 1.00 .50 .24 .67 .18 .68 .45 .67 
S 
1.0 .49 .70 .28 .56 .80 .68 .81 .54 .50 
^0 
1.0 .80 1.00 .67 .72 .80 .68 .67 .67 .70 
1.0 .63 .70 . 56 .27 .30 .24 .30 .27 .35 
Kg 1.0 .80 1.00 .40 .68 .80 .54 .67 .56 .67 
S 
1.0 .56 .70 .42 .18 .30 .15 .40 .30 .42 
\o 1.0 .80 1.00 .67 .10 .20 .06 .42 .30 .67 
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same as those shown in Table 35. The procedure used to calculate each 
value is identical. For example, Y^, Y^, and Y^ represent purchased, 
condemned, and gift scenic easements. The first step is to ask what is 
the inherent productivity of scenic easements with regard to project 
restriction class R^? The judgment was made that the scenic easement is 
inherently 90 percent productive. Next, what is the likelihood of 
accomplishing a scenic easement by purchase, condemnation, and gift? 
Consistent with our earlier discussion, P = 1.0, P = 0.8, and F = 0.6. 
c p g 
Expected productivities are then calculated R^Yg = (.9) (.8) = .72; 
R^Yg = (.9)(1.0) = .90; and R^Y^ = (.9)(.6) = .54. This process is 
conducted for all other land-use controls in through R Q^. The result 
of these calculations, Table 39, may be termed the basic productivity 
matrix, which will be useful in all subsequent work. 
Decision-making examples 
With the basic decision-making information developed, the hypothetical 
agency can now proceed to solve three general types of decision-making 
problems. Two decision-making models will be presented for each problem — 
the linear and nonlinear models. The following symbols will be used; 
C = per acre cost equation; X = acres of land-use control; R = units of 
restriction; i = project restriction i, for i (i = 1 10); and 
Î  S  l û " " — i  î  / 4  =  1  • • •  1 A \  j nd=use control j, for j (j  
Cost minimization problem The general problem being investigated 
here is accomplishment of the land-use project for some predetermined 
level of acceptability at a minimum cost. The decision-making problem is 
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to find the optimum combination of land-use controls to provide a cost 
minimum. In a programming format, the problem is to find the optimum 
X.. to; 
ij 
Minimize: 
C = £(CyX.^) 
Subject to: 
i "l 
where C is the cost function, is the productivity matrix, 
are the project restrictions, and X^^ ^ 0 is the non-negativity 
requirement. The project restrictions, R^, are merely those shown in 
Table 38. 
Development of the productivity matrix, g^(a^jX^j), requires some 
manipulation. First, the agency must select some acceptable level of 
project accomplishment. This may range from 0 to 100 percent. This 
example will use the 66.7 percent level — the hypothetical agency has 
decided CO accomplish at least two-thirds of the project a minimum cost. 
As can be seen in Table 39, some values are equal to, greater than, or 
less than (.67). Only those values greater than or equal to (.67) are 
acceptable. Every one of these values is expected to accomplish at least 
two-thirds of the desired project.^ The a^. part of the g^. (a. matrix 
is developed as follows: (1) construct a table like Table 39, (2) for every 
The fact that some relevant productivity coefficients are larger 
than others is irrelevant in this cost minimization problem; overkill 
does not count. 
110 
Table 39 value equal or greater than (.67), enter a 1.0 in the new table; 
for other values, enter a 0.0 in the table. The result of this simple 
process is shown in Table 40. When each term is multiplied by its 
Table 40 
Cost Minimization Example: Productivity Coefficients 
Restriction Land-Use Control 
Class 
^2 ^3 ^5 ^9 ^10 
1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1,0 1.0 
^2 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 
1.0 1.0 1.0 0,0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1,0 0.0 1.0 
S 
1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
^7 
1.0 0.0 1.0 0,0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
^8 
1.0 1.0 1.0 0,0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 
^9 
1.0 0.0 1.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
'^lO 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 1,0 
respective X.. and summed, the result is the g.(a..X..) matrix. 
ij 1 ij ij . , -, 
The cost function, f(c.^X^^)j basically amounts to the cost expressions 
in Table 36 summed for each project restriction class. As can be seen from 
Table 36, the cost expressions require land fee value to have been 
determined. These fee values, which may be the result of office estimates 
or some other basis of information are listed below. In any case, the values 
are assumed to include property rights value, damage to the remainder. 
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Land-Use Fee Value 
Restriction Class Per Acre 
400 
250 
s 
300 
350 
s 
400 
350 
800 
450 
S 600 
ho 900 
fencing, and tenant release considerations. With ten land-use controls 
to be applied to ten different project restrictions, there will be one 
hundred expressions in the cost function. The general form of this 
function is; C = + - •• + ^ loiO^^lOlO^lOlO^ ' Written in the 
linear form: C = 487.90 + '•* + 649.40 Written in the 
nonlinear form: C = 655.06 - 6.09 X^^^ - 6.09 Xii%21 + *" + 649.40 X^Q^g. 
Each term in either equation form is easily developed by inserting the 
estimated fee value for each restriction class into the appropriate 
expression in Table 36. For instance, = ((Fee = 400) + 87.90)X^^ = 
487.90 X^^. Because of their length, complete linear and nonlinear cost 
functions will not be given. 
All information necessary to solve the cost minimization problem 
has now been developed. The problem can be rewritten: 
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M i n iiiiLzu: 
C(linear) = 487.90 + ••• + 649.40 
C(nonlinear) = 655.06X^^ - 6.09X^^^ - G.OWX^^Xg^ + ••• + 649.40X Q^ Q^ 
Subject to: 
1.0X^^+."+1.0X^^Q+0+ +0 > 280 
0+ +0+1.0X^2+.. .+1.0X^^^+0+ +0 ^  Ip 
Ô+ +04-1.0X^^Q+".+1.0X^Q^Q > 220 
X.. i 0 
Soliil ions may be obtained with linear and nonlinear programming. 
Production maximization I problem The general problem in this example 
is to accomplish as much as possible of a land-use project with a budget 
maximum Imposed. As before, the problem is to select the optimal combination 
of land-use controls. This can be written in the programming format as: 
Maximize; 
P - £(ayX^.) 
Subject to: 
Gi^^ij^ij) ^ *i 
h(c..X..) <$K 
X,j >0 
where P may be viewed as a production function, g (b X ) the productivity 
i ij ij 
matrix, the project restrictions, h(c^jX^j) the cost restriction function, 
$K the budget restriction, and X^^ ^0 the non-negativity requirement. 
This problem has some components identical to those in the cost 
minimization problem. The project restrictions, R^, are the same. The cost 
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restriction function, h(c..X.^), is the same as the objective (cost) 
function in the earlier problem, f(c..X..)' Note that the cost function 
ij ij 
was expressed in both a linear and nonlinear form. 
The production function, P = f(a^^X^j), has essentially been developed 
earlier. The expected productivity of each land-use control when applied 
to each project restriction was previously calculated and the results shown 
in Table 40. The production function amounts to multiplying each term in 
Table 40 by the appropriate term and then summing. The result of this 
is the expression; P = l.OX^^ + 0.72X^2 + ••• + O.SOX^Qg + 0.67X^Q^Q. 
Development of the productivity matrix only requires 
thought. Because the production is to be maximized, productivity of each 
land-use control is automatically considered. The cost restriction function 
literally makes production increases expensive. With productivity and 
costs accounted for, each project restriction may be satisfied by any 
combination of land-use controls. The b.. coefficients are therefore 1.0 
ij 
for every land-use control. The result would be a matrix like that shown 
in Table 40 but with 1.0 in every space. When each b^^ coefficient is 
multiplied by the appropriate X^^ expression and all terms for each 
summed, g.(b..X..) is formed. 
1 ij 1] 
With the exception of the budget constraint, all information for 
problem solution has been developed. If the budget constraint is set at 
$250,000, this problem can be written in its linear and nonlinear forms as; 
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Maximize: 
P = l.OX^j + ... + 0.67Xj„jo 
Subject to: 
1.0X^^+".+X^^Q+0+ +0 < 280 
0+ +afl.OX„,+.. .+1.0X„,-+0+ +0 <110 
; /I ZiU I 
487.90X,,+ +649.40Xjg <.250,000 (linear) 
655.06X,j-6.09Xj^ -6,09XjjXj2+ +649.40X^Q^Q i 250,000 (nonlinear) 
"ij i" 
As before, linear and nonlinear programming computational procedures can 
be used to solve these problems. 
Production maximization II problem This problem is basically the 
same as the previous production maximum problem except that additional 
constraints will also be imposed. The main purpose in this example is to 
demonstrate the flexibility of these programming procedures. This problem 
can be written in a programming format as: 
Maximize: 
P = f(a..X. .) 
iJ ij 
Subject to: 
Gi^^ij^ij) = \ 
%(bijXij) 5- \ k (k = m+ l ••• m + 3) 
h(CijXij) <$K 
Xij ^  0 
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where are additional restrictions, is an additional 
productivity matrix, and all other components are as before. 
The additional constraints can be almost any meaningful restrictions 
that are translatable into programming language. This problem will 
consider one additional restriction for each of these areas: (1) political 
feasibility, (2) agency administrative efficiency, and (3) project 
integrity.^ Assume that agency planners feel that they will receive a 
great deal of adverse publicity if too many acres of property rights are 
condemned. If they judge this to be at 30 percent of the project, or 
650 acres, let 650 acres then represent restriction Further assume 
that agency planners feel that too many acres of easement land would 
place an undue administrative burden on the agency. If they feel the 
maximum number of easement acres should be 1800 acres, let 1800 acres 
represent Finally, agency planners may feel that in order to have a 
truly viable land-use project, no less than 25 percent of the area must be 
owned in fee simple. Let R^^ equal 400 acres. 
Construction of the g, (b..X..) matrix follows. It is clear that 
k' 1] ij' 
each condemned easement acre will contribute one unit to the condemnation 
restriction R^^, so the (b^^) coefficient of 1.0 is appropriate. But the 
fee simple ownership control includes both purchased and condemned lands. 
If the agency's past experience indicates that about 30 percent of their 
fee lands were condemned, it seems reasonable to assume this same pattern 
A host of other restrictions exist limited largely by the planner's 
imagination and project considerations per se. Partial versus total 
ownership takings, geographical relationships between controls (e.g., 
blocking of fee ownership), and maintenance of the tax base are only a few. 
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will repeat itself in this project; thus, use a 0.3 (b^^) coefficient for 
fee simple ownership. The productivity matrix dealing with the 
easement restriction is easily determined. Every acre of easement 
land will contribute one unit toward fulfilling the restriction and all 
land-use controls dealing with easements should be assigned a (b.^) 
coefficient of (1,0).This same reasoning is applicable to the project 
integrity restriction. Fee ownership is given a coefficient of (1.0) and 
all other controls a zero coefficient. The result of these assumptions 
is shown in Table 41. When each coefficient is multiplied by the 
appropriate X.. term and summed over R-^, R.«, and R , the g, (b..X,.) 
ij ii iZ 1 j K ij IJ 
matrix is formed. 
Table 41 
Production Maximization II g, (b..X..) Productivity Coefficients 
K IJ IJ 
Restriction 
Land-Use Control 
Class Y, Y4 Y, Y, Y, Y^ Y, 
"11 
0.3 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
"12 
0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0 , 0  0 , 0  0 , 0  
13 
The problem can now be written in its linear and nonlinear forms: 
Maximize: 
P= l.OXjjt ... 
Subject to: 
1. OX ^ ' +1. OX^ ^^ 4-0+ * «+0 ^ 280 
0+ +0+1.0X„,+-.-+l,0X„,_+0+ +0 < 110 
: 21 210 - : 
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0+ 0X101+• .•+1,0X1010 1. 220 
0.3Xj^^+" •+0. 3^101+' •'+0.0X1010 < 650 (Rll) 
0.0X^^+'' •+1. 0^ 110+°+ "+1.0X1010 1800 (R12) 
l.OX +•• •+0. 0^ 110+°+ 0%101+' '"+0'0Xi010 
>_ 400 <Ri3) 
487.90%^^+ +649.40X^qjq < 250,000 
(linear) 
655.06X^^-6.09X^^^-6.09X^^X^2+ +649.40X^qjq < 250,000 
(nonlinear) 
Xjj >0 
Solutions may be calculated with linear and nonlinear programming methods. 
Conclusions 
This section has presented a method by which three types of outdoor 
recreation planning decision-making problems can be solved. Illustrative 
decision problems considered related to cost minimization and production 
maximization. Of the many analytical techniques available to aid 
decision-making, linear and nonlinear programming were discussed. Many 
decisions concerned with land-use control administration are similar to 
those discussed. However, other quite dissimilar decisions must be made. 
Efforts should be made to see if other analytical techniques would 
usefully aid decision-makers in these situations. 
Solution to decision-making examples relied on three basic types of 
information for solution: (1) knowledge of proposed project characteristics; 
(2) knowledge of land-use control costs; and (3) knowledge of land-use 
control productivity. Project and productivity information ought to be 
known to, or manufacturable by, agency planning personnel. Land-use 
control cost information is often not available. The examples shown 
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inidcate how an agency, in the absence of internal cost information, may 
use cost estimates developed earlier in this study. Where feasible, cost 
estimates specific to the administering agency are most desirable. 
Development of new cost estimates or utilization of the estimates presented 
here is most easily accomplished when costs are separated into land, 
acquisition, and subsequent administration costs. These distinctions are 
particularly useful when additional costs or heretofore unused land-use 
controls are contemplated. 
Use of linear or nonlinear programming as a decision aid is dictated 
by the type of problem being solved. Where the objective and/or restriction 
functions are not linear, the nonlinear method is appropriate. Cost 
functions and project size (applicability of cost estimates) determined 
the method used in these examples. The nonlinear model has the advantage 
that it can accept more mathematically complicated, and often more realistic, 
expressions of objectives and restrictions. The linear model has the 
distinct advantage in ease of solution computation. While techniques are 
available to solve linear programs at a desk, any fairly complicated 
nonlinear program requires an electronic computer for solution calculation. 
The opportunities for analytical decision-making have barely been 
touched upon in these examples. One might vary the level of project 
acceptability in the cost minimization problem. Various acceptability levels 
could be viewed as differing levels of benefits, each associated with a 
different cost, A benefit/cost analysis of a proposed land-use project 
could be conducted. Another use of analytical techniques is in the area of 
prospective land-use controls. A project could be analyzed both with and 
without the addition of a newly proposed land-use control. Resulting 
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measures of cost changes and organizational efficiency could well be used 
as evidence to support the agency position before a legislative body. 
Applicability of various techniques is limited largely by information 
availability and the imagination of decision-makers. Both should be 
most fully developed. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has been divided into three parts, each focused on one 
type of information needed by outdoor recreation decision-makers. The 
first dealt with the state of the art of land-use controls applicable to 
outdoor recreation purposes under each of four government powers. Police 
power controls may exert great pressures to force acceptable land-use at a 
relatively low cost. But these controls are typically unstable; in the 
final analysis, they are consensual — public or private pressures often 
result in changes which may be detrimental to open-space purposes. Various 
taxation oriented land-use controls have the distinct advantage of low 
cost; further, they attack the alledged basic problem of taxes forcing land 
into undesirable use. A case can, however, be made that land values, not 
land taxes, prompt use changes. Taxation may attack the wrong problem; 
it tends to act as a public subsidy, and still does not guarantee longevity 
of desired use. Spending and proprietory powers provide public agencies 
with great flexibility and permanency of desire. The full value of property 
rights acquired must be paid, which makes these the most expensive controls. 
Eminent domain provides a method by which the public can acquire private 
property rights against the wishes of the owner. Its availability seems of 
critical importance to accomplish any land-use control program. The full 
value of rights acquired must be paid, and there exists the ever present 
danger that this power %ill be exploited so that property rights are 
essentially confiscated. 
The literature of land-use controls amounts largely to a statement of 
the current situation. Almost totally absent is any sort of rigorous 
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consideration of why things are or what ought to be done. There seems to 
be ample room to determine ways of making police power and eminent domain 
procedures better protect and promote the public interest. Investigations 
should be undertaken to make land-use controls more consistent with basic 
economic criteria for efficiency of resource allocation. Expanding on 
this, research is needed on ways to eliminate the distinction between 
"economic" and "social" values which often lie at the heart of problem 
areas. Finally, efforts should be expanded in making the literature of 
land-use controls more readily available and palatable to control-using 
organizations. 
The second part of this paper was concerned with cost estimates for 
selected land-use controls. A clear problem area involved the lack of 
available information on agency costs. Cost estimates developed showed 
great cost variability was the rule. Variation may reflect inherent 
production variability, cost information availability, or variation due to 
organizational structures and method of operation. The lack of scale of 
operation efficiency was also apparent. Efforts should be made to determine 
root causes of the presence or absence of tuese cost efficiencies. 
Drawbacks in cost estimates presented relate largely to cost 
information availability, problems inherent in case studies, the acreage 
range for data applicability, and the effect of organizational characteristics 
on costs. All contribute to cost variation. Better structured and operated 
information gathering and retrieval systems together with research of a 
sufficiently large scope are needed. This research should explicitly 
account for organizational structures and procedures (a form of stratification) 
in an attempt to reduce cost estimate variation and better understand the 
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nature of land-use control costs; this, of course, assumes quality 
information systems. Additional efforts should also be expended by land 
controlling agencies themselves. Supplementing expanded research efforts, 
agencies ought to develop cost estimates specific to themselves; assuming 
quality planning, individual agencies are in the best position to obtain 
the necessary cost information. 
The final part of this paper dealt with land-use control decision­
making. The three illustrative examples shown concerned cost minimization 
and output maximization. These examples were couched in a decision-making 
framework applicable to the planning stage of an outdoor recreation 
project. A method was outlined by which physical project characteristics, 
experience with land-use controls, and land-use control costs could be 
integrated in a programming decision framework. Successful application 
eventually rests on agency expertise and quality cost information. The 
decision examples presented do not attempt to represent the wide range 
of problems to which programming might be applied. As agencies become more 
familiar with these concepts, the opportunities to expand the procedures 
and decision situations «ill become increasingly apparent, 
A major point was earlier made that no single land-use control is of 
much value when used in isolation; it was argued that combination or 
integration of land-use controls is essential to the decision-making 
process. Integration of various types of information in the decision­
making process itself is also important. Three types of information — 
state of the art, cost, and analytical technique -- have been presented in 
a way that suggested they all can be combined at one point in the 
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decision process to yield a solution. While this will be appropriate for 
a wide range of choice opportunities, many other situations exist where 
this simply cannot be done. 
Table 42 suggests that in general practice the use of nonanalytical 
Table 42 
Decision-Making Method, Level, and Criteria 
Decision-Making Decision-Making Level Decision 
Methods Lowest Medium Highest Criteria 
Totally Analytical v. Single Numerical Value 
Totally Nonanalytical ^ Multiple Non-numerical Values 
decision aids varies with the organizational level at which decisions are 
made. It should be pointed out that this relationship is not necessarily 
equivalent to increases in the degree of normative or subjective 
decision-making. Indeed, linear and nonlinear programming techniques are 
normative models. The important point is that while at lower levels of 
decision-making both normative and positive information may be utilized in 
an analytical decision model, this is not typically done at the higher 
levels. The result is that a clear decision choice is possible at lower 
decision levels because analysis results are expressed in comparable numerical 
values associated with each alternative; choice at the higher levels is 
more complex. Similarly, the degree of analyticity may vary and depend on 
the types of personnel talents available to the decision-makers. 
It should be fairly clear that the decision-making framework as 
presented earlier is largely applicable to lower level decisions. This 
need not be so. The information presented throughout this paper can be 
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utilized by decision-makers at various levels for a variety of reasons. 
For instance, cost estimates could be used by one agency to compare 
alternative ways of accomplishing a project at least cost (low level); 
another agency may use cost estimates as an input to an otherwise nonanalytical 
model primarily consisting of political and social value judgments (high 
level). 
The decision-maker ought to be aware of the inclusion of facts versus 
value judgments in the decision process. The presence of analytical 
decision models does not preclude value judgments. Davis and Bentley 
have suggested a method of "social accounting" by Wiich analysts present 
information to decision-makers in a readily analyzable form.^ All 
information presented in this paper can be utilized in this system for the 
range of low to high level decisions. Table 43 is an adaptation of Davis 
Table 43 
Social Accounting Presentation of Relevant Information 
Concerning Outdoor Recreation Project Alternatives 
Performance Criteria Project Alternatives 
Criteria Valuation No Project 50% Project Complete Project 
Benefits 
Economic 
Legal 
Political 
Social 
Costs 
Economic 
Legal 
Political 
Social 
Market 
Non-market 
Non-market 
Non-market 
Market 
Non-uiârkê u 
Non-market 
Non-market 
($), (#) 
(#), (><), (+, 0, -), (Words) 
(#), (><), (+, 0, -), (Words) 
(#), (><), (+, 0, -), (Words) 
C», (#) 
(#), (><), (+, 0, -), (words) 
(#), (><), (+, 0, -), (Words) 
(#), (><), (+, 0, -), (Words) 
Davis, L. S. and Bentley, W. R. The separation of facts and values. 
J. of Forestry 65:612-620. 1967. 
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and Bentley's social account to decision-making in an outdoor recreation 
project. It amounts to a formal way of viewing and presenting choice 
information to decision-makers. The three policy alternatives are 
explanatory only and relate to the type of decision made in the cost 
minimization problem earlier. The performance criteria correspond to the 
classes of information presented in the first part of this paper. The body 
of information displayed for decision-maker use ranges from dollar values 
and numbers to nonquantifiable descriptive phrases. The exact items 
included under each performance criteria is at the discretion of the 
analyst and dictated by the decision-making level and decision-maker's 
needs. For instance, political considerations relating to the maximum 
number of condemned acres might be subsumed as a constraint in a low 
level decision but be given explicit consideration at a higher level. 
The advantage of this method is that it forces planners and decision­
makers to overtly consider many important types of choice information. 
Whatever level outdoor recreation decision is being made, it is 
critically important to integrate all relevant information. Of equal 
importance is the integration of land-use controls into a coherent program 
of property rights acquisition. It is hoped that the information presented 
in this paper is a step in the right direction. 
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEI-IENTAL INFORMATION 
Zoning; Advantages 
(65, p. 5; 14, p. 5) 
1. A zoning ordinance can help to preserve and maintain things the 
community judges as good and desirable. For instance, it can make 
the community more attractive with adequate recreational areas by 
preserving open-space and natural terrain features. 
2. It can help safeguard and protect the community against undesirable 
conditions; it can increase safety on streets and provide for easy 
police and fire vehicle access to areas. 
3. It encourages the use of lands in accordance with their character and 
ability. It thereby assists community economic growth by helping to 
reserve adequate and desirable sites for various uses, 
4. It promotes orderly growth. It can help protect agricultural operations 
by controlling the leapfrog movement of residential subdivisions into 
farm areas. 
5. It makes possible a programming approach to the provision of various 
government sponsored systems. It can serve as a planning tool and help 
to keep the cost of public services down. 
6. It promotes compatability and harmony of use; for instance, it can 
discourage such practices as placing a truck terminal by a school. 
7. It provides stability and protects individual property owners from 
future harmful or undesirable uses of adjacent property. 
8. It provides a means to keep objectional property uses in their place. 
It can help keep farm conmunities from being the dumping grounds for 
activities trying to avoid municipal regulations. 
9. It helps keep down unnecessary taxes caused by undesirable development 
patterns and keeps the lid on farm property taxes forced upward by 
urban sprawl and rising public costs. 
10, II; helps to avert the limitations on normal farming operations which 
follow residential movement. 
11. It can help to prevent loss of property by reducing the damage from 
floods. 
1j3 
Zoning: Disadvantages 
1. Zoning is not retroactive (14). It cannot be used to remove 
objectionable buildings or stop objectionable uses of land that were 
established before the zoning ordinance. Ordinarily, the owner of 
nonconforming property may continue to use it as he has in the past, 
and anyone who buys it may carry on as before. 
2. Zoning is impermanent. It cannot assure that a community will 
perpetually retain the land uses as originally specified (14). 
Pressures can be put on the agency for change (75). The very techniques 
used for flexibility are also used for this purpose. This is called 
"erosion" of the zoning ordinance (39, p. 449). 
3. Many states pattern their enabling legislation after the model acts. 
These acts have safety valve clauses that have been exploited and the 
subsequent ordinance declared unreasonable (22, p. 393). 
4. A zoning ordinance cannot compel landowners to provide the public with 
a benefit (89). Also, it cannot abate a public nuisance of a business 
which is polluting or disturbing, or operating within a district 
zoned for that use (14, p. 6). 
5. Zoning does not conform to the notion of the right of an individual 
property owner to realize the benefits of his land (39, 14). One of 
the biggest obstacles to zoning is the idea that property ownership 
includes the God-given right to use the property in any manner (66, p. 83). 
6. "In the hands of undersized political units, zoning has been too 
often perverted from a device for rational land-use allocation to a 
play with an elaborate game of municipal 'oneupsmanship* " (33, p. 7). 
7. Zoning has been abused: (1) comprehensiveness and completeness of 
underlying information can create problems; (2) the unacceptable 
elimination of land-use alternatives can result in no reasonable 
economic return; (3) conditional use permits have been issued which 
were lacking performance standards for both the government and 
permittee; and (4) zoning has been used as a tactic to "stall" 
development (31, p. 18). 
8. Communities often wait too long (7, p. 506). The irony is that 
regulations are often thought unnecessary when there is little development 
and when thought necessary, it may be too late (18, p. 751). 
9. People oppose zoning because; (1) their self-interests are not involved; 
(2) their costs may be increased or income reduced; (3) they just 
reject authority; (4) they believe the less government, the better; and 
(5) they strongly believe in locally directed government and resent 
the professional role of planners and zoning administrators (14, p. 15). 
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10. Zoning ordinances may: (1) exclude non-nuisance uses; (2) create 
monopoly rights for a few property owners; (3) restrict land to poorly 
suited uses; (4) create islands of highly restricted property; 
(5) exclude uses that are incidental to permitted uses; (6) sometimes 
permit unfair or discriminatory uses; and (7) easily become out-of-
date (7, p. 505). 
11. Zoning agencies are consistently hampered by small budgets (67, p. 505). 
12. Zoning cannot maintain a productive agricultural area close to an 
aggressively expanding urban area. Similarly, it cannot succeed in a 
rapidly changing community without previous planning (14, p. 6). 
13. Zoning is difficult to apply to a large scale area such as a 
watershed (39, p. 449). 
14. Zoning has been ineffective in dealing with changing racial compositions. 
It has become one of the tools used to force what has been called the 
iron ring against Blacks in our suburbs (33, p. 8). 
15. Zoning violators often go unprosecuted(75, p. 7). All violations are 
subject to involved court cases, 
16. "Zoning is not a control at all, but a thermometer that measures the 
total amount of economic heat on a piece of property at a given 
moment" (33, p. 12). 
Preferential Taxation; Disadvantages 
(90, p. 6; 42, p. 5; 36, p. 587) 
1. Taxing based on highest and best use is argued as inequitable from 
the standpoint of the farmer's ability to pay from farm income a tax 
based on a different income producing ability. Yet, the farmer could 
sell to the new use and move. 
2. As the edge of development approaches his property, there is a great 
windfall gain to the farmer who receives tax preferences. 
3. The worst aspect is the effect of a decreased tax on land value. This 
decrease is capitalized into an increased land value to the present 
owner which must be paid by the next owner. 
4. Taxes on farm land have been kept down. It has long been standard 
practice tc assess farm land only on its farm value. 
5. Preferential tax assessment will probably conserve a considerable 
amount of open-space in the next few years, but its long run effect 
is dubious. 
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6. Preferential assessment may obscure for rural or farm groups the 
necessity of a more comprehensive approach to open land conservation. 
7. A reduction of the tax burden for some persons would increase the tax 
burden for others. Value judgments on income redistribution and 
distributive justice are being implicitly made. 
8. Preferences could actually encourage speculation. If some landowners 
did maintain open-space lands, the price of other open lands might 
skyrocket and speculation would be more acute. 
9. The scheme would complicate the administration of the real property 
tax system and erode the tax base; exemptions breed exemptions. 
10. It is difficult to determine if land is being held for legitimate 
farm (open-space) purposes or for speculation, 
11. If the government wants open-space lands, it has no assurance that 
preferential taxation will provide these lands; the option always 
remains with the landowner. 
12. The public would be unable to recoup the taxes conceded if the 
landowner would later sell. 
13. This method ignores the "fact" that it is high land prices, and not 
taxes, that induce land sales; thus open-space would not be safely 
preserved. 
Easements; Advantages 
(75, p. 8; 31, p. 14; 88, p. 6) 
1. Easements are a very efficient form of land-use control. Given that an 
agency is aware of its goals, it can obtain only those specific rights 
required for program completion. This allows a great deal of negotiation 
flexibility. 
2. The overall cost of land-use control is at the pure theoretical 
minimum. Only the rights needed are obtained. 
3. Long run agency land administration cost is lower than under other 
controls because ownership and administration remain a private function. 
4. The local government retains a source of property tax revenue, 
although at a reduced capacity, 
5. Easements can prevent an open-space area from being taxed at subdivision 
values, thereby reducing the probability that this would become the 
next use. 
1. 
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Easements; PisadvantaRes 
(92, p. 47; 90, p. 3; 6, p. 70; 39, p. 450, 
56, p. 358; 87, p. 63; 27, p. 79; 75, p. 9) 
General legislative statutes do not contain specific authorization for 
many agencies to use easements. 
It is very difficult to determine and enumerate, exactly, the nature of 
rights being acquired. 
It is very difficult to assess the value of land, for property tax 
purposes, on which an easement has been granted. 
Bureaucracies do not always use existing enabling legislation and 
dismiss easements as too expensive. Bureaucratic inertia may have 
to be overcome before easements will be used. 
Because the price of an easement is based on the loss of value, needed 
easements may cost too much in semi-developed areas. 
While an easement may be taken in perpetuity, experience has shown 
that they are not that long lived; yet, easements taken for less 
than perpetuity have renewal problems. 
Agency/landowner misunderstandings frequently occur and raise questions 
as to the validity of the easement; this may result when the agency 
attempts to keep its intentions secret. 
The most frequent error is a failure to distinguish between a scenic 
easement and an easement which grants public access. 
The risk always remains that if the public agency decides to give up its 
interest in a long-held asset, there is no way to recoup the public outlay. 
Easement acquisition funds may be tied to a source of revenue such as 
a tax on cigarette sales; if these sales drop, acquisition funds diminish. 
Landowners are uncertain about the effect of an easement on their income 
and/or property taxes. 
Agencies do not always make clear whether the sale is to be taxed 
as regular or capital gains income. 
The decrease in property value, after the easement grant, is not 
always matched by a property tax decrease. 
Costs of easement acquisition rise over time; scenic easements have 
been found to rise about 100 percent for the 1961-64 period over the 
1951-61 period. 
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15. The easement concept requires trained and experience acquisition personnel, 
16. Acquisition personnel have difficulty appraising land values which are 
taken only in part. 
17. Landowners must be educated as to the meaning and effect of a 
perpetual easement, 
18. Future tax policies are not typically established ex ante for 
easement lands. 
19. Easements are difficult to administer on lands which receive heavy 
public use. 
20. It is difficult to devise a uniform type of deed for an easement and 
not get bogged down in legal technicalities, 
21. Easements are not likely to permanently secure lands against development. 
22. Easements must be used extensively if one landowner is not to profit 
at the expense of another. 
23. The eventual validity of an easement is largely dependent on the ability 
of an agency to properly purchase it. 
24. Easement enforcement programs are often inadequate and it is difficult 
to obtain court injunctions against violators. 
Development Rights Easement; Disadvantages 
1. The biggest problem with the development rights easement is determining 
the value of lost rights (42, p. 9), 
2. This type of easement, when applied spatially over large areas, may 
almost totally prevent the development of the land (52, p, 24), 
3. Most of the land close to metropolitan areas has the potential for 
urban development; acquiring this land for full development rights 
would require a «urn approaching that of the fee (39, p. 450). 
4. There is a lack of flexibility; development rights do not possess a 
-î r» loT.t* i o /î-î -P-P-î r»ii 1 •{ ri /loPnnnno 
what is being taken; flexible definitions will not be enforced by 
the courts (47, p. 192). 
5. There are cost disadvantages; the community is required to pay at 
once for all development values which the owner himself is not now 
prepared to realize (47, p. 192). 
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6. There may be unfairness to the owner or the community -- if the land 
has no development value, the price should be $0 and is hence unfair 
to the owner; if one speculates on future value, it is unfair to the 
community (55, p. 192). 
Easements; Document Conclusions 
1. The most desirable form of easement contract is one that is both 
simple and straightforward (75, p. 11). 
2, Not all easements "run with the land," Easements in gross cannot 
generally be transferred unless the grant of easement expressly 
provides for transferability (9, p. 29). 
3. The easement contract must be carefully written. It must be explicit 
about the exact rights being granted. Open-ended clauses are not 
allowed (89, p. 69), They must contain a reverter clause (52, p. 4). 
Easements obtaining similar rights under similar conditions should be 
uniformly written (75, p. 11), "Novelty easements" have been stricken 
down as unfamiliar or indefinite when used as an attempt to keep the 
planning agency flexible (51, p. 53). 
4, When possible, an easement should be taken for perpetuity. Experience 
has shown that perpetual easements are as easy to obtain as are those 
for a lesser duration (45, p. 360), This avoids problems associated 
with renegotiation. 
Easements; Administration Conclusions 
1, Probably the most important ingredient in proper easement administration 
is personnel (4. p, 2), "Success to date is largely a result of 
individual initiative and imagination in analyzing the potential 
application of easements to conservation programs" (45, p, 359), 
The agency itself is important. The more "landowner oriented," the 
better (88, p, 6), 
2, The ability to use the power of eminent domain in an easement program 
is essential. Properly used, condemnation is an aid to successful 
negotiation (75, p, 11), Improperly used, it can replace 
negotiation (45, p. 360), 
3, The agency cost incurred in easement administration can be reduced in 
various ways. One example involves the use of a detailed versus 
nondetailed land survey (45, p, 361), 
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4. Easements, whenever possible, should be justified on the basis of 
present and not future values (88, p. 7), The following justifications 
have been suggested (91, p. 17): 
a. Water easements: watershed protection 
b. Agricultural land easements: check the decline of prime agricultural 
land supply 
c. Recreation easements: complement and protect park values 
d. Urban easements: channel metropolitan growth. 
Purchase Leaseback/Resale: Disadvantages 
(47, p. 197) 
1. There is strong popular reaction against the government or its agent 
going into the real estate business. 
2. At least initially these require large financial outlays. 
3, There are difficult "public purpose" constitutional problems. 
4, It is difficult to adequately frame deed restrictions. 
5. Condemnation with long-term leaseback might put many landowners in 
a tenural relationship with the government. 
6, While these techniques may be acceptable for limited purposes, they 
are not good for ambitious programs. 
Guaranteed Value: Disadvantages 
(52, p. 25; 36, p. 571) 
1. This system offers an inflexible choice between absolute regulation and 
absolute compensation. 
2. This method is complex and requires much administration. 
3. It is difficult to enforce the regulations. 
4. The eventual costs are difficult to predict. 
5. The method amounts to widespread public ownership of development rights. 
6. It denies to landowners the right to the speculative value of their property. 
7. This program is not adequate to meet the pressures needed for open-space. 
8. The regulations used in this method are subject to the same sort of 
erosion because of development pressures as is the zoning device. 
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Al'PHNDlX lî: COST FACTOR DEFINITIONS 
Iowa Highway Commission; Cost Factor Definitions 
Administration; Supervisor or other personnel whose time cannot be 
assigned to a specific project; a prorated cost. 
Appraisal; Determination of value of farm land and town lots with or 
without buildings (to determine the before and after value of taking); 
also, the value ot tenant's rights and land improvements (wells, 
farm ponds, fences, etc.). 
Certificates : Preparation of certificates for Federal Aid projects by 
listing all vouchers on the project, reviewing each project file, 
preparing a tabulation of all appraisals made, determining personnel 
costs, etc. 
Condemnation; Preparation of plats, descriptions, and legal papers for the 
work of condemning property and rights which cannot be obtained by 
negotiation. 
Condemnation award; Dollar settlement awarded to landowner for property 
rights acquired through involuntary condemnation. 
Condemnation survey; Surveying and staking property being condemned, and 
consultation with condemnation jury during condemnation proceedings. 
Document examination; Review of documents necessary to make payment for 
items contracted for right of way proper, tenant payments, title 
examinations, description checking, area determination, etc., and 
checking executed and recorded conveyances to see that all liens and 
objections have been properly handled. 
Estimating; Cost of estimating right of way needed for construction. 
Miscellaneous; Supervisor or other personnel whose time cannot be assigned 
to a specific activity within a project. 
Negotiation; Cost of preparing proposed right of way and tenant contracts, 
and obtaining signatures from applicable people. 
Old Condemnation; Same as "Condemnation" but incurred under an older cost 
accounting system. 
Property management; Tabulation of excess lands, buildings, etc., from 
right of way contracts and selling the same at auctions or "sealed bid 
sales." 
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Property plats; Preparation of pencil plats or ink plats. 
Purchase contract: Dollar value paid to landowner for property rights 
acquired through voluntary purchase. 
Relocation assistance; Development, review, and execution of plans for 
the orderly and timely relocation of persons affected by the 
highway project. 
ROW design; Development of plans and application of cross-sections for 
determining what right of way and borrow is needed for a specific 
project. 
Title search; Investigation done at county courthouse to determine owners 
of record. 
Utilities; Work applicable to railroads, gas, electric, telephone companies, 
etc., to arrange for moving, replacing, and adjusting their facilities 
as required in connection with highway projects. 
Iowa Conservation Commission; Cost Factor Definitions 
Administration; Administrative costs of miscellaneous activities such as 
preparation of project request forms or preliminary draftings of 
project plats. 
Appraisal; Determination of property value. 
Document examination; Review of option documents necessary for payment, 
checking executed and recorded conveyances to see that all liens and 
objections have been properly handled by staff and attorney general's 
office, and deed construction and devliery. 
NeKotiation: rtepariug proposed options, uegotiatiug options, presenting 
options to Commission, notifying owner of sale, acquiring and 
recording deed. 
Property plats; Drafting of pencil or ink plats of property. 
Purchase contract; Dollar value paid to landowner for property rights 
acquired through voluntary purchase. 
Survey: Field and other survey work related to determination of relevant 
boundary locations. 
Title search; Investigation to determine property owner of record, and 
preliminary ownership quality. 
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Wisconsin Department of Transportation; Cost Factor Definitions 
Administration; Land acquisition administrative supervisors for 
consultation, reviewal, approval, and other administrative aspects 
of acquisition projects. 
Appraisal; Development and processing of appraisal, including appraisal, 
appraisal review, determination of purchase and sales prices, etc. 
Condemnation award; Dollar settlement awarded to landowner for property 
rights acquired through involuntary condemnation. 
Contract; Dollar value paid to landowner for property rights acquired 
through voluntary purchase. 
Document recording; Recording and registering appropriate legal documents 
in county courthouses. 
Engineering I: Engineering activities, primarily survey and property 
plats, under an older cost accounting system. 
Engineering II: Engineering activities, primarily survey and property 
plats, under the current cost accounting system. 
Land acquisition-unclassified; Costs incurred in the performance of the 
land acquisition function not properly assignable to the specific 
subfunctions listed elsewhere. 
Land management; Costs incurred in the continuing activities of 
(1) maintenance of integrity of right of way, and (2) management and 
disposition of excess land and buildings remaining unsold at the time 
the acquisition projects were closed, including access control, 
issuance of permits and occupancy agreement, and review of 
subdivision plats. 
Litigation; Costs resulting from actual or threatened litigation 
including payments to or recoveries from condemnees resulting 
from court decisions. 
Public relations; Visits to persons from whom right of way is to be 
acquired, normally made prior to determination of offering price. 
Right of way operation; Costs incurred from the point of offer determination 
to the actual acquisition of title, including offering priées paid 
for property acquired, related costs charged to this function, and 
supplementary title search. 
ROW I; Right of way activities, such as appraisal and negotiation, under 
an older cost accounting system. 
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Site clearance; Clearance of right of way except where site clearance Is 
supervised by the Construction Section as part of a construction 
project, including razing contract costs (except as above) and the 
costs and proceeds from auctions and public sales of cleared property. 
Utility operations; Negotiations with public utilities for their lands 
and appurtenances, including the negotiation process through 
construction monitoring and costs of appraisal, sales prices, etc. 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources; Cost Factor Definitions 
Administration; Land acquisition administrative supervisors for consultation, 
reviewal, approval, and other administrative aspects of acquisition 
projects. 
Appraisal; Development and processing of appraisals to determine property 
value. 
Contracted abstracting: Costs associated with updating abstract of title 
where accomplished by outside organizations. 
Contracted document recording: Costs associated with recording and 
registering appropriate legal documents in county courthouses 
where accomplished by outside organizations. 
Contracted title search: Costs associated with determining owners of 
record and title quality where accomplished by outside organizations. 
Document recording; Recording and registering legal documents in county 
courthouses. 
Negotiation; Preparing proposed options, negotiating options, and notifying 
owaer of sale. 
Purchase contract; Dollar value paid to landowner for property rights 
acquired through voluntary purchase. 
Survey; Field and other survey work related to determination of relevant 
boundary locations including construction of property plats. 
Title search; Determining owners of record and title quality. 
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U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife; Cost Factor Definitions 
Contact fee owner: Explaining easement program and requesting permission 
to make value estimate from fee owner. 
Final package preparation; Reviewal of legal description, title, certificate 
of management indebtedness, subordination agreement, easement agreement, 
preparing drainage map, and approving invoice for payment. 
Initial courthouse review; Determining legal description and conducting 
a title review to determine owners of record and quality of title. 
Negotiation: Discussing contract offer with fee owner, obtaining agreement, 
typing agreement, notarizing and leaving option with fee owner, 
obtaining certificate of inspection and possession, tenant disclaimer, 
and other needed information. 
Purchase contract: Dollar value paid to landowner for property rights 
acquired through voluntary purchase. 
Regional office review; Designation of tract number, review of title 
memo. Wetland Coordination review, final acceptance, preparing 
acceptance letter, making final payment, etc. 
Select work area; Selecting desirable counties and townships for 
acquisition activities. 
Select specific ownership; Selecting desired ownership for acquisition 
within work areas. 
Supervisory appraiser review; Reviewal of all appraisal aspects by 
appropriate field supervisors. 
Supervisory transmittal: Includes all items necessary for field 
supervisors to transmit appropriate easement documents and materials 
to regional office. 
Value estimate; Estimating fee value of property considered for easement, 
using aerial photographs to make necessary computations, and computing 
easement payment. 
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APPENDIX C: FACTOR COSTS 
Table 44 
Iowa Highway Commission: Factor Costs 
Cost Factor 
Purchase Fee Simple Mixed Fee Simple 
Raw Data 5% Disc. 7^% Disc. 10% Disc. Raw Data 57, Disc. 75% Disc, 10% Disc 
Condemnation Award $550.14 $590.61 $569.04 $548.82 
Purchase Contract $1052.25 $1131.47 $1107,13 $1083.94 676.97 724.81 703.06 682.63 
Est. R.O.W. Const. 0,58 0.62 0,62 0.62 0.13 0.14 0,14 0.14 
Title Search 14.63 15.91 15.88 15.85 1.72 1.91 1,89 1.87 
R.O.W. Design 26.95 29.31 29.06 28.82 13.46 15.12 14,89 14.67 
Appraisal 56.54 60,67 59.90 59.16 28,42 31.24 30.53 29.87 
Negotiation 67.35 72.89 71.80 70.75 21,44 23.81 23.25 22,72 
Condemnation 10.73 11,14 10.82 10.53 12,35 13.02 12.43 11,88 
Certificates 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 
Utilities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.79 0.77 0.75 
Property Plats 2.46 2.62 2.55 2.48 0.26 0.29 0.28 0,28 
Property Management 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.64 0.88 0.92 0.86 0.81 
Document Exam 11.27 11.93 11.60 11.29 1.60 1.73 1.68 1.62 
Relocation Asst. 1.88 1.98 1.89 1.80 1.60 1.73 1.68 1.62 
Old Condemnation 23.42 25.00 24.28 23.61 20,57 22.88 22,30 21.76 
Condemnation Survey 3.93 4.14 3,95 3.77 7.11 7.81 7,57 7,34 
Administration 78.46 81.19 77.24 73.60 42.92 46.37 44.78 43,29 
Miscellaneous 128.94 137.50 134.25 131.22 37,14 40.56 39.42 38.34 
TOTAL $1480.13 $11587.09 $1551.68 $1518.14 $1416.01 $1522,21 $1473.09 $1426,96 
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Table 45 
Iowa Conservation Commission: Purchase Fee Simple Factor Costs 
Weighted Mean Cost Per Acre 
ist Factor 1 
Raw Data 5% Disc. 7^7» Disc. 10% Disc. 
Purchase Contract $191. 15 $203.21 $197. 65 $192. 37 
Survey 3. 87 4.22 4. 21 4. 21 
Appraisal 1. 04 1.15 1. 14 1. 13 
Title Search 0. 17 0.19 0. 19 0. 19 
Negotiation 0. 62 0.68 0. 67 0. 66 
Document Exam 0. 20 0.21 0. 20 0. 20 
Property Plats 0. 06 0.07 0. 07 0. 06 
Administration 1. 11 1.22 1. 20 1. 18 
TOTAL $198. 23 $210.94 $205, ,33 $200. 00 
Table 46 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation: Mixed Scenic Easement Factor Costs 
Weighted Mean Cost Per Acre 
Cost Factor 7 
Raw Data 5% Disc. 7,% Disc. 10% Disc. 
Condemnation Award $12, 48 $13. 23 $12. 99 $15.82 
Purchase Contract 59. 64 64. 75 64. 04 66,68 
Engineering I 10. 47 11. 65 11. 65 11.65 
Engineering II 2. 42 2. 56 2. 50 2.45 
ROW I 28. 04 30. 16 29. 77 29.39 
Appraisal 6. 18 6. 55 6. 42 6.30 
Public Relations 0. 00 0. 00 0, 00 0.00 
ROW Operations 5. 48 5. 84 5. 77 5.70 
Litigation 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0.00 
Site Clearance 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0.00 
Land Management 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0.00 
Utilities Operations 0. 00 0, 00 0. 00 0.00 
Unclassified 3. 11 3, ,30 3. 25 3.21 
Document Recording 0. 64 0. 68 0. 66 0.65 
Administration 6. 33 6, ,85 6, 80 6,75 
TOTAL $134. 78 $145. ,57 $143, 85 $142.21 
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Table 47 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation: 
Mixed Scenic Easement/Fee Simple Factor Costs 
Cost Factor 
Weighted Mean Cost Per Acre 
Raw Data 57o Disc. 7^% Disc. 10% Disc. 
Condemnation Award $37.88 $41.07 $40.83 $40.49 
Purchase Contract 69.28 73.92 73.75 73.59 
Engineering I 2.35 2.59 2.59 2.59 
Engineering II 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.35 
ROW I 6.72 7.48 7.48 7.48 
Appraisal 11.71 12.37 12.37 12.37 
Public Relations 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROW Operations 8.98 9.49 9.47 9.45 
Litigation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Site Clearance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Land Management 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Utilities Operations 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30 
Unclassified 2.36 2,50 2.49 2.49 
Document Recording 0.47 0.51 0.50 0.49 
Administration 4.46 4.80 4.77 4.73 
TOTAL $144.82 $155.38 $154.91 $154.46 
Table 48 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation: Mixed Fee Simple Factor Costs 
Weighted Mean Cost Per Acre 
Cost Factor 
Raw Data 5% Disc. 7g% Disc. 10% Disc. 
Condemnation Award $ 41.82 $ 44.36 $ 43.33 $ 42.34 
Purchase Contract 318.02 335.89 328.68 321.76 
Engineering I 24.43 26.23 25.78 25.34 
Engineering II 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 
ROW I 13.22 14.20 13.96 13.73 
Appraisal 22.33 23.63 23.44 23.25 
Public Relations 0.65 C.69 0.67 0.66 
ROW Operations 9.01 S.52 9.33 9.14 
Litigation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 
Site Clearance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Land Management 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Utilities Operations 0.00 0.00 0. GO 0.00 
Unclassified 3.94 4.12 4.06 4.00 
Document Recording 0.41 0.43 0.42 0,42 
Administration 4.88 5.27 5.24 5.20 
TOTAL $438.84 $464.49 $455.03 $445.95 
Table 49 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources: Fishery Easement Factor Costs 
(Weighted Mean Cost Per Acre) 
Gift Acquisition Purchase Acquisition 
Cost Factor T 7 " 
Raw Data .'5% Disc. 7g% Disc. 10% Disc. Raw Data 5% Disc, 7^% Disc. 10% Disc. 
Purchase Contract $ 0, .17 $ 0, ,20 $ 0. ,20 $ 0. ,20 $99. ,40 $116. ,90 $116. 28 $115, ,68 
Cont. Title Search 13, .01 15, ,35 15. ,11 14, ,89 17, .89 20. ,05 19. 75 19. ,45 
Cont. Title Abstract 1< ,96 2. ,24 2, ,18 2, ,13 4. ,60 5. ,07 4. 97 4, .88 
Cont. Doc. Recording 0, ,03 0, ,74 0. ,73 0. ,72 0. ,91 0. ,90 0. 88 0. ,85 
Admi nistration 33. ,96 32. ,35 31. ,00 30. ,89 46. ,71 44. ,15 42. 98 41. ,88 
Appraisal 5. ,29 6. ,22 6, ,15 6. ,08 9. ,68 10, 68 10. 59 10, ,51 
Title Search 1. ,59 1. ,91 1. ,88 1. ,86 0. ,92 1, 63 1. 11 1, ,11 
Document Recording 0. ,00 0, ,00 0. ,00 0, ,00 0. ,00 0. 00 0. 00 0, ,00 
Survey 5. ,01 6. 04 5, ,99 5, 94 3. ,97 4, 72 4. 72 4, 72 
Negotiation 6. 81 8. ,19 8. 12 8. 06 10. ,07 11. 74 11. 72 11, 70 
TOTAL $68, ,42 $73, 24 $71. 97 $70. 75 $194. 17 $215. 33 $213. 00 $210. 78 
149 
Table 50 
U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife: 
Purchase Waterfowl Easement Factor Costs 
Weighted Mean Cost Per Acre 
Cost Factor 
Raw Data 5% Disc. 7^% Disc. 10% Disc. 
Purchase Contract $16.38 $17.14 $16.73 $16.37 
Select Work Areas 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Select Specific Owner 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 
Courthouse Review 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 
Contact Fee Owner 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 
Value Estimate 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Negotiation 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 
Final Package Prep. 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Supervisor Review 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Supervisor Transfer 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Regional Office Review 0.63 0.67 0.65 0.64 
TOTAL $17.90 $18.74 $18.30 $17.90 
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APPENDIX D: EASEMENT EXHIBITS 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation 
The Specific rights and Interests hereby acquired are as follows; 
1. Ttie right for the State of Wisconsin, its agents and contractore, 
to enter upon the easement area; 
(a) To inspect for violations of the provisions of this easement 
and to remove or eliminate advertising displays, signs and 
billboards, stored or accumulated junked automobiles, farm 
Implements or parts thereof, and other salvage materials or 
debris, and to perform such scenic restoration as nay be 
deemed necessary or desirable. 
(b) To plant and/or selectively cut or prune trees and brush to 
Improve the scenic view and to implement disease prevention 
measures. 
(c) To plant and/or selectively cut or prune trses and brush to 
improve the scenic view and to implement disease prevention 
measures. The area excluded from this provision is described 
as follows: (Then describe excluded area much as residence, 
etc.) 
The owner's rights to engage in specified activities arc acquired as follows; 
1. The right to erect, display, place or maintain upon or within the 
scenic area any signs, billboards, outdoor advertising structures or adver­
tisement of any kind, except that one (1) on-premise sign of cot more than 
_______ square feet in size may be erected and malnttlaed to advertise the 
sale, hire or lease of the property, or the sale and/or manufacture of any 
goods, produces or aervlcc# upon the lôiiu. nûy «Xistiug slgas, Cthsr thss 
the one on-premise sign, and/or advertisements as described above shall be 
terminated and removed on or before , 
2i The right to dump or maintain a dump ef ashes, trash- rubbish, saw­
dust, garbage, offal, storage of vehicle bodies or parts, storage of farm 
implements or parts, and any other unsightly or offensive material. 
3. The right to cut or remove any trees or . 
4. The right to cut or remove any trees, except marketable timber and 
then only In compliance with local forest cropping practices, however, at 
no time will the scenic area be denuded of trees. 
5. The right to park trailer houses, mobile homes, or any portable 
living quarters. 
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6* Th« right to qumrry, or remov#, or ttort aay surfaca or aubaurfaca 
mineral# or matarlala. 
7* All rights except ganarsl crop and/or llveatock faming (agri­
cultural) within the first faat of tha scenic area aa measured 
normal to the (canterllna) (reference Llaa) (naareat adg« of pavement) 
(right of way line) of tha highway. 
8, All rights cxcept general crop and/or livestock farming 
(agricultural). 
9* Tho right to develop the easement area except for limited 
residential development consistent with applicable state and local 
regulations* Such limited rights retained by the owner are as followsi 
(a) Each single family residential lot fronting on and 
abutting (Identify Highway) shall be limited to 
a minimum width of . feet as measured 
parallel to tha hlRhway; 
(b) A total of _________ single family residential lots le 
the maximum number authorized for the easement area, 
10* The right to change tha use of the easement area from residential 
I to any other use. 
11# The right to change the use of the easement area from commercial 
to any other use* 
I 
ltt«vl«id April 1870) 
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
U. S. FISH AND V/iLDLIFE SERVICE 
BUREAU OF SPORT FlSi cRIES AND WILDLIFE 
CONVEYANCE OF EASEMENT FOR WATERFOWL j/VlANAGEMENT RIGHTS 
THIS INDENTURE, by and between 
parties of the first part, and the UiVITliD STATES OF AMKJiICA, acting by ond through the Secretary of the Interior 
or his authorized representative, party of the second part. 
WITNESS iOTH: 
WHEREAS, section 4 of tlio Migratory Hird Huntinf. Stamp Act of March 16, 1934, as amended by section 3 
of the Act of August 1, 1008 (72 Stat. 480, 16 U.S.C., see. 71) 'l (c)), «uthorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire 
small wetland or pothole areas suitable for use as waterfowl production areas: 
WHEREAS, the lands described below contain or include small wetland or pothole areas suitable for use as 
waterfowl production areas: 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the aum of ($ ) 
Dollars, the parties of the 
first part do hereby convey to the United States, commencing with the acceptance of this indenture by the Secretary 
of the Interior or his authorized representative which acceptance must be made within months of the execution 
of this indenture by the parties of tho first part, or any subsequent date as may be mutually agreed upon during the 
term of this option, a permanent easement (in perpetuity) or right of use for the maintenance of the land described 
below as a waterfowl production area, including the right of access thereto by authorized representative: of the United 
States: 
Subject, however, to all existing rights-of-way for highways, roads, railroads, pipelines, canals, laterals, elec­
trical transmission lines, telegraph and telephone lines, cabin lines, and all outstanding mineral rights. 
The parties of the first part, for themselves and for their heirs, successors and assigns, covenant and agree 
that they will cooperate in the maintenance of the aforesaid lands as a waterfowl production area by not draining or 
permitting the draining, through the transfer of appurtenant water rights or otherwise, of any surface water including 
lakes, ponds, marshes, sloughs, swales, swamps, or potholes, now existing or recurring due to natural causes on the 
above-described tract, by ditching or any other means; by not filling in with earth or any other material or leveling, 
liny part or portion of the above-described tract on which surface water or marsh vegetation is now existing or here­
after recurs due to natural causes; and by not burning any areas covered with marsh vegetation. It is understood and 
agreed that this indenture imposes no other obligations or restrictions upon the parties of the first part and that 
neither they nor their successors, assigns, lessees, or any other person or party claiming under them shall in any 
way be restricted from carrying on farming practices such as grazing at any time, hay cutting, plowing, working and 
cropping wetlands when the same are dry of natural causes, and that they may utilize all of the subject lands in the 
customary manner except for the draining, filling, leveling, and burning provisions msationed above. 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS 
1. This indenture shall not be binding upon the UNITED STATES OP AMERICA until accepted on behalf of 
the United States by the Secretary of the Interior or his authorized representative, although this indenture is acknow­
ledged by the parties of the first part to be presently binding upon the parties of the first part and to remain so until 
the expiration of said period for acceptance, as hereinabove described, by virtue of the payment to parties of the first 
part, by tho UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, of the aum of One Dollar, the receipt of which is hereby expressly 
acknowledged by parties of the first part. 
2. Notice of acceptance of this agreement shall be given the parties of the first part by certified mail address­
ed to 
at , 
and such notice shall be binding upon all the parties of the first part without sending a separate notice to each. 
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3. It is further mutually agreed that no Member of or 1'"'legate to Congress, or Resident Commissioner, shall 
be admitted to any share or part of this contract, or to any benefit to arise thereupon. Nothing, however, herein con­
tained shall be construed to extend to any incorporated company, where such contract is made for the general benefit 
of such incorporation or company. 
4. Payment of the consideration will be made by a United States Treasury check «ifter acceptance of this in­
denture by the Secretary of the Interior or his authorized representative and after the Attorney General, or in appro­
priate cases, the Field Solicitor of Department of the Interior shall have approved the easement interest thus vested ' * 
in the United States. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties of the first part have hereunto set their hands and seals this 
d a y  o f  , 1 9  
-{L.S.) .(L.S.) 
.(L.S.) .(L.S.) 
.(L.S.) .(L.S.) 
.(L.S.) 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
STATF 
COUNTY OP. 
On this day of , in the year, , before me personally appeared-
, his wife, known to me to 
bo the persons described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to mo that they (he) executed 
the same as their (his) free act and deed. 
(SEAL) (Official Title) 
My commission expires 
ACCEPTANCE 
The Secretary of the Interior, acting by and through his authorized representative, has executed this agreement 
on behalf of the United States this day of 19 
THE UNITED STATES OP AMERICA 
By 
(Title) 
Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife 
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APPENDIX E: MISCELLANEOUS TABLES 
Table 51 
"Land-Use Control Cost Category Approximate Input Cost Rate Ranges, 1970 
Cost 
Category 
Cost 
Rate 
Unit Fee 
Purchase 
•^2 
Fee 
Mixed 
Fee 
Purchase 
T4 
Scenic 
Easement 
Mixed 
T5 
Scenic 
Easement 
Fee Mixed 
^6 
Fee 
Mixed 
T7 
Fishery 
Easement 
Gift 
Tg 
Fishery 
Easement 
Purchase 
T9 
Waterfowl 
Easement 
Furcha se 
Land Costs $/a 1049-7047741-4119 75-9164 13-482 14-390 35-882 .5-1.5 42-175 5-43 
Plats & Survey $/hr WA® NA 4-6 NA NA NA 4-6 4-6 3-7 
Document $/hr NA NA 5-6 NA NA NA 4-6 4-6 3-7 
Appraisal $/hr NA NA 4-15 NA NA NA 4-6 4-6 3-7 
Negotiation $/hr NA NA 4-5 NA NA NA 4-6 4-6 3-7 
Condemnation $/hr 9-22 9-22 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Administration $/hr NA 1)JA 4-6 6-7 6-7 6-7 NA NA 3-9 
Miscellaneous $/hr NA NA 4-15 4-15 4-15 NA NA NA NA 
®Not available. 
Table 52 
Accepted Acquisition Costs Per Acre 
Land-Use Control Constant 
Dollars 
5% 
Discount 
i\L 
Discount 
10% 
Discount 
^1 
Purchase Fee Simple 
Linear 
Nonlinear 
$476.69 
476.69 
$452.28 
452.28 
$441.32 
441.32 
$431.08 
431.08 
^2 Mixed Fee Simple Linear 
Nonlinear 
193.28 
193.28 
181.87 
181.87 
176.73 
176.73 
171.88 
171.88 
^3 
Purchase Fee Simple 
Linear 
Nonlinear 
7.84 
7.84 
7.73 
7.73 
7.69 
7.69 
7.63 
7.63 
"4 
Mixed Scenic Easement 
Linear 
Nonlinear 
69.24 
69.24 
67.59 
67.59 
66.82 
66.82 
66.09 
66.09 
^5 Scenic Easement & Mixed Fee Linear 
Nonlinear 
Simple 
40.53 
40.53 
40.39 
40.39 
40.34 
40.34 
40,27 
40.27 
^6 Mixed Fee Simple 
Linear 
Nonlinear 
86.78 
296.35-6.94(a) 
84.24 
252.05-6.11(a) 250 
83.02 
.18-6.09(a) 
81.85 
248.39-6.07(a) 
^7 
Gift Fiîîhery Easement 
Linear 
Nonlinear 
75.78 
75.78 
73.04 
73.04 
71.77 
71.77 
70.55 
70.55 
Tg Purchase Fishery Easement 
Linear 
Nonlinear 
112.18 
235.70-25.40(a) 
98.43 
222.89-23.73(a) 217 
96.72 
.08-22.95(a) 
95.10 
211.61-22.22(a) 
Tg Purchase Waterfowl Easement 
Linear 
Nonlinear 
1.67 
4.25-.03(a) 
1.61 
4.08-.03(a) 4 
1.57 
.02-.03(a) 
1.53 
3.95-.03(a) 
